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INTRODUCTION

1477

The rise in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of a professional
class of writers stimulated authors' demands for better remuneration from
their writings.2 The increase in authors who sought to live from their work,
2. The emergence of a profession of authors in the eighteenth century was recognized
See, e.g., 5 JAMES BOSWELL, BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON, TOGETHER
contemporaries.
by
WITH BOSWELL's JOURNAL OF A TOUR OF THE HEBRIDES AND JOHNSON's DIARY OF A
JOURNEY INTO NORTH WALES 59 (G.B. Hill ed., 1934); Oliver Goldsmith, 'LetterLXXXIII

from Lien ChiAltangi, to Fum Hoam, first President of the CeremonialAcademy at Pekin, in China," in
OLIVER GOLDSMITH, 2 LETTER FROM A CITIZEN OF THE WORLD TO HIS FRIENDS IN THE
EAST 127, 130 (J. & R. Childs pub., Bungay 1820) (1762) ("At present, the few poets of
England no longer depend on the great for subsistence; they have now no other patrons but
;
the public, and the public, collectively considered, is a good and generous master .....
Q.R.S., On the Expedieng of Instituting a Literay Sodety on a Prudential and Permanent Plan,
WESTMINSTER MAG., 1773, at 368, 370 ("literary patronage among the Great has
ceased . . . literary property has risen upon its ruins . . ."); Letter from Philistor John
Pinkerton to the People of Great Britain, in 58 The GENTLEMAN'S MAGAZINE: AND
HISTORICAL CHRONICLE 125, 126 (London, John Nichols 1788) (describing booksellers as
"the sole patrons of literature in this country," and suggesting that some level of patronage
by "the Great" might be desirable in order to allow publication of works of high importance
even though they would not meet with "public taste"); On the HistoU ofAuthors by Profession,
BEE, LITERARY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCER, May 11, 1791, reprinted in 3 THE BEE, OR
LITERARY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCER, CONSISTING OF ORIGINAL PIECES, AND SELECTIONS
FROM PERFORMANCES OF MERIT, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC 13 (James Anderson ed.,

Edinburgh, Mundell and Son) (recognizing shift, but arguing, however, that authors were
"subjected to a new dependence," that is, upon publishers); A VINDICATION OF THE
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF AUTHORS TO THEIR OWN WORKS: A SUBJECT Now UNDER
CONSIDERATION BEFORE THE TWELVE JUDGES OF ENGLAND 38-40 (London 1762)
[hereinafter VINDICATION], in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (L. Bently &

M. Kretchmer eds., 2008) [hereinafter PSoq, http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgibin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/%22uk_1762b%22.
Historians of literature have confirmed the claim, though with different emphases
on the timing and extent of the shift. See, e.g., VICTOR BONHAM-CARTER, AUTHORS BY
PROFESSION (1978); RICHARD B. SHER, THE ENLIGHTENMENT & THE BOOK: SCOTrISH
AUTHORS & THEIR PUBLISHERS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN, IRELAND, & AMERICA

ch. 3 (2006) (acknowledging that "the professionalization of authorship ... increased
dramatically during the eighteenth century" but highlighting that the changes did not
represent a simple shift from "aristocratic patronage" to patronage by booksellers or the
public); John Feather, John Nourse and HisAuthors, 34 STUD. BIBLIOGRAPHY 205 (1981) ("[fIt
was in the eighteenth century that authorship, for the first time, became a viable profession
for a substantial number of practitioners."); Dustin Griffin, The Rise of the ProfessionalAuthor?,
in 5 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE BOOK: 1695-1830, at 132 (Michael F. Suarez & Michael
L. Turner eds., 2009); see also JAMES

G.

HEPBURN, THE AUTHOR'S EMPTY PURSE AND THE

RISE OF THE LITERARY AGENT (1968) (noting that Alexander Pope "was possibly the first
eminent writer earning his living by his pen who was freely able to do so"); Peter
Lindenbaum, Author and Publishers in the Late Seventeenth Centu, II: Brabazon Aylmer and the
Mysteries of the Trade, 3 LIBR. 32 (2002) [hereinafter Lindenbaum, Brabazon Aylmerj; Peter
Lindenbaum, John Milton andthe Republican Mode ofLiteraU Production, 21 Y.B. ENG. STUD. 121

1478

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:1475

rather than from patronage or personal fortune, likely provided at least one
impulse for the author-protective provisions of the 1710 Statute of Anne.
Under the regime of printing privileges that preceded the Statute of Anne,
authors generally received from publisher-booksellers a one-time payment,3
made when the authors surrendered their manuscripts for publication.4
Authors whose works enjoyed particularly high demand might negotiate
additional payments for new editions or for new printings of a work that had
done well, 5 or they might extract a higher price per sheet for their next work,6
but neither law nor custom generally assured authors remuneration reflective
of their works' sales. As a result, few authors participated in the continued
success of their works.

(1991) (arguing that Milton began writing within a system of aristocratic patronage, but
broke free of it).
3. In discussing the period prior to 1800, we use the terms "bookseller" and
"publisher" interchangeably. See, e.g., Terry Belanger, From Bookseller to Publisher:Changes in the
London Book Trade, 1750-1850, in BOOK SELLING AND BOOK BUYING: ASPECTS OF
NINETEENTH CENTURY BRITISH AND NORTH AMERICAN BOOK TRADE 7 (Richard
Langdon ed., 1978); John Feather, The Commerce of Letters: The Study of the Eighteenth-Centugy
Book Trade, 17 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUDS. 409 n.18 (1984). William Strahan, printerturned-bookseller, who himself operated no retail outlets, explained to his American
correspondent that "[w]hat constitutes a Bookseller is having Property in Copies." R.D.
Harlen, William Strahan: Eighteenth-Century London Printer and Publisher 236 n.58 (1960)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan).
4. The Upcott manuscripts contain at least three relevant documents from before
1710. Additional Manuscripts in the British Library, BL Add. Mss. 38727-38730 [hereinafter
BL Add. Mss.], 1 THE UPCOTT COLLECTION, ORIGINAL ASSIGNMENTS OF MANUSCRIPTS
BETWEEN AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS, 1705-1810 (DRAMATIC AUTHORS), BL Add. Mss.
38727, at [204], [120] [hereinafter 1 UPCOTT]; 2 THE UPCOTT COLLECTION, ORIGINAL
ASSIGNMENTS OF MANUSCRIPTS BETWEEN AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS, 1707-1810
(MATHEMATICAL & ELEMENTARY WORKS), BL Add. Mss. 38729, at [110] (Assignment of
March 20, 1706/7) [hereinafter 2 UPCOTr]; see also Letter from Tonson to Pope (Apr. 20,
1706), BL Add. Mss. 4807, fol. 172v.
5. Milton received additional payments for subsequent editions of ParadiseLost. Juan
Christian Pellicer, Harleian Geogic from Tonson's Press: The Publication ofJohn Phik's Cyder, 29
June 1708, 7 LIBR. 185, 187 (2006) (noting a 1707 contract between publisher Jacob Tonson
and John Philips's for the latter's poem Cyder also providing for the possibility of an eventual
second edition, which would have brought him another k1 0).
6. See, e.g., Peter Lindenbaum, Authors and Publishersin the Late Seventeenth Centuy: New
Evidence of Their Relations, 17 LIBR. 250, 262 (1995) (explaining that a bookseller agreed in
1689 to pay John Locke 10s for each sheet of text of his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding and in subsequent agreements in 1693/94 and 1699, the booksellers agreed to
pay Locke 1Os per sheet for any additionalmaterial he wished to provide for subsequent
editions).
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While many debate the extent to which the Statute of Anne in fact
departed from the prior regime of printing monopolies,7 one feature of the
Act that distinguished it from prior regulatory practices was the vesting of
exclusive rights in authors, rather than in publishers.8 Moreover, the last
clause of the Statute, granting authors a contingent reversionary right, was
both unprecedented and, as enacted, manifestly a measure favoring authors.
Section 11 stated:
Provided always, [t]hat after the expiration of the said term of
fourteen years, the sole right of printing or disposing of copies shall
return to the Authors thereof, if they are then living, for another
[T]erm of fourteen years.9
The Statute of Anne thus conditioned the duration of exclusive rights on
the author's survival. More importantly, the Statute designated the author as
the beneficiary of the additional term of years. In theory, the second fourteen
years should have enabled the author to grant rights anew from a stronger
bargaining position should her work have earned a substantial audience. By
focusing on the "encouragement of learned men to . . . write useful books" 0
and vesting the "copies" in them, the Statute of Anne shifted the law's
emphasis toward authorship, but in this the law did not entirely innovate:
even under the prior regime authors occasionally obtained privileges (which
they subsequently transferred to booksellers)." By contrast, the Statute broke
7. Compare HARRY H. RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE: AN ESSAY ON AN
ACT FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF LEARNING, 1710 (1956), and RONAN DEAZLEY,
Commentary on the Statute of Anne 1710 (2008), available at PSOC, supra note 2,
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabeCom// 22uk
1710%22 (emphasizing author-oriented aspects of statute), with JOHN FEATHER,
PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICS: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF COPYRIGHT IN BRITAIN

(1994) (emphasizing continuity between the Statute of Anne and the prior regime), and
LYMAN R. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968) (viewing Statute of

Anne as a trade regulation device designed to restore order to the book trade).
8. See, e.g., Laura Moscati, Lo Statuto di Anna e le origini del copyright, in FIDES
HUMANITAS LUS. STUDI IN ONORE DI LUIGI LABRUNA, VI, at 3671-88 (2007) (tracing

history of author-orientation of Statute of Anne but also emphasizing the Statute's aim to
restrain the power of the Stationers' company); cf BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE
MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760-

1911, at ch. 10 (1999) (criticizing the tendency to attribute the origin of modern copyright to
the Statute of Anne, and preferring to identify the emergence of copyright as part of modern
intellectual property law in the mid-nineteenth century).
9. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (1710) (Gr. Brit.).
10. Id.
11.

See, e.g., SAMUEL DANIEL, THE COLLECTION OF THE HISTORIE OF ENGLAND

available at PSOC, supra note 2, http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi(1618),
bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/%22uk_1618%22; MARJORIE PLANT, THE ENGLISH BOOK
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new ground when it not only gave the author the rights at the outset, but also
(providing she survived) "return[ed]" them to her for a second time.
This study of author's reversion rights begins with the Statute of Anne
and the debates that led up to the adoption of section 11. It then will address
the impact of the author's reversion right on publishing practice and authors'
welfare in the United Kingdom through the eighteenth century to the demise
of the reversion right in 1814.12 We will suggest that the apparent lack of use
of the reversion right by authors in the eighteenth century was a result of a
host of factors, including but not limited to the common (but by no means
universal) contractual practice which purported to confer on a publisher the
entirety of an author's rights. In addition, we call attention to the multiple
and shifting interpretations of what was required by section 11, as well as the
social and economic limitations on an author's capacity to take advantage of
the reversion. The second half of this study turns to the law and publishing
practices in the United States, where reversion rights have proved more
enduring if not always more beneficial to authors.
II.

THE REVERSION RIGHT IN BRITAIN FROM 1710 TO
1814

A.

STATUTE OF ANNE: ORIGINS OF SECTION 11

As is clear now from the many treatments of the subject, relatively little
specific detail is known about the passage of the Statute of Anne itself,13 let
alone the circumstances in which section 11 was enacted.14 In part, this is
because the matter of the regulation of the book trade was not considered
one of great public interest. It is also because parliamentary debates were not
reported systematically until late in the eighteenth century-indeed reporting

BOOKS 109 (1939) (giving
examples of a 1589 patent to Dr. Bright for works in shorthand and such other works as he
might compile, and a 1592 grant to John Norden for Speculum Britanniae).
12. Parliament reinstituted a reversion right in the 1911 Imperial Copyright Act, but
the history of that reversion and its adoption in the countries of the British Empire is
beyond the scope of this study.
13. RANSOM, supra note 7, at ch. 7; MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE
INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 42-48 (1993); John Feather, The Book Trade in Politics. The
Making ofthe CopynightAct of 1710, in PUBLISHING HISTORY 8, 19-44 (1980).
14. Patterson, for example, merely cites section 11 and then proceeds to argue that the
Statute was a "trade regulation statute." PATTERSON, supra note 7, at 146. John Feather takes
this argument further asserting that the Act "says nothing and implies little about the rights
of authors," characterizing section 11 merely as providing for an extension of term on reregistration. FEATHER, supra note 7, at 5, 62, 70. In fact, there is nothing in the section about
re-registration.
TRADE: AN EcONOMIC HISTORY OF THE MAKING AND SALE OF
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was a matter of "parliamentary privilege" and therefore required prior
authorization. 15 Thus we are left to work from the skeletal offerings of the
7
Journalsof the Lords and Commons,16 as well as some surviving bills, tracts,' and
commentaries, 8 particularly those of the writer and keen supporter of the
Bill, Daniel Defoe.' 9
The introduction of the 1710 Bill followed a petition to the House of
Commons in December 1709 by a group of booksellers, headed by Henry
Mortlock, and the case was backed up with a further petition to Parliament
the following February from printers and bookbinders.20 The Bill, the
preparation of which was entrusted to Edward Wortley, Samuel Compton
and Craven P(e)yton, was introduced into the Commons in January
1709/10.21 At this stage, the Bill did not contain any clause similar in nature
to section 11-in fact, it contained no clause at all relating to term. 22
15. For an overview, see Jason Peacey, The Print Culture of Parliament, 1600-1800, 26
PARLIAMENTARY HIST. 1, 1-16 (2007). For an example of publication authorized by

Parliament, see H. Tomis G6mez-Arostegui, The Untold Stog of the First Copyrnght Suit Under
the Statute ofAnne in 1710, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247 (2010) (discussing Tonson v. Baker).
16. 16 H.C. JOUR. (Jan. 11, 1709/10) 260 (First Reading), (Feb. 9, 1709/10) 300
(Second Reading), (Feb. 21, 1709/10) 332 (Committee); 19 H.L. JOUR. (Mar. 16, 1709/10)
109, (Mar. 24, 1709/10) 123, (Mar. 30, 1710) 134, (Apr. 3, 1710) 138-39, (Apr. 4, 1710) 14041. Prior to the 1752, the calendar year formally began on Lady Day, March 25. See 24 Geo.
3, c. 23. So, formally, December 1709 was followed by January, February and March 1709,
and April 1710. However, it was also common to refer to the first three months of the year
by a joint reference, and it is that convention that we follow here.
17. See, e.g., JOHN How, SOME THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF PRINTING AND
BOOKSELLING (London 1709) (proposing protection of booksellers based on registration,
though he also proposed protection for prints, maps, charts, pictures, and sculptures).
18. 2 LUCUBRATIONS OF ISAAC BICKERSTAFF, Nov 29, 1709, at 264 (complaining
about "pirates" and the affect on authors' remuneration, noting that he himself could obtain
more from "palmistry and astrology" than from writing); TATLER, Dec 1709. The passage of
the Act is reported in the London GaZette on April 4, 1710 and an abridged version was
included in the issue for May 2, 1710.
19. See generally Review of the State of the British Nation, Dec. 6, 1709, Feb. 2, 1709/10
(praising the proposed law to prevent "barbarity and piracy" and famously describing the
book as "the author's property, 'tis the child of his inventions, the brat of his brain"), Feb.
11, 1709/10 (reviewing criticisms of the bill that it would raise the price of books), and Feb.
18, 1709/10. On Defoe, see MAXIMILLIAN E. NOVAK, DANIEL DEFOE: MASTER OF
FICTIONS 278 (2001) ("one of the Act's most enthusiastic supporters"). Seegenerally RONAN
DEAzLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE MOVEMENT OF
COPYRIGHT LAW IN EiGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1695-1775), at ch. 2 (2004)

(discussing Defoe's writings on literary piracy).
20. FEATHER, supra note 7, at 60.
21. A copy of the Bill is held at Lincoln's Inn Library. See Bodleian Library Manuscript,
Bodleian MS Rawl D.922. fols. 380-86.
22. A Bill for the Encouragement of Learning, and for the Securing the Property of
Copies of Books to the Rightful Owners Thereof, available at PSOC, supra note 2,
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Prepared with the interests of the major booksellers in mind, the Bill offered
perpetual protection. But this was not acceptable to either of the Houses of
Parliament. 3 Consequently, during passage through the Commons-probably
at the Committee stage, which Compton chaired-the broad assertion of a
perpetual property was replaced with a fixed term: in the case of extant
works of twenty-one years, and for those created after the Act would come
into force a period of only fourteen years. 24 When the Bill went to the Lords,
a second term of fourteen years was added,25 in what the literary historian
Harry Ransom referred to as "perhaps the most significant amendment.'2 6
Who proposed the amendment is unknown27 In the manuscript version of
the Act, section 11 is physically "tacked on" to the Bill.28
1. The Purpose of the ContingentReversion
What was the purpose of the clause? Why have two terms of fourteen
years rather than a single term of twenty-eight years (as would be adopted,
fifty-seven years later, for engravings)? Various possible explanations have
been suggested by modern commentators. 29 Frank Curtis speculates that the
term "return" was intended to mean "recur" and that "the failure to mention
assigns in the second-term proviso was an inadvertent lapse by the Lords in
amending the basic legislation drafted by the Commons."30 For Curtis, the
clause was not meant to protect the author from his assignee, but merely to
confer a second term, should he be living, at the end of the first term. 3' But
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe//22uk_1710a%22.
In December 1709, Daniel Defoe had proposed an Act with only two clauses, the effect of
which would also have been to create a perpetual right. See DEAZLEY, supra note 19, at 3536.
23. 16 H.C.JOUR. (1709/10) 260 (First Reading).
24. 16 H.C. JOUR. (1709/10) 332 (Committee).
25. 19 H.L.JOUR. (1710) 140-41.
26. RANSOM, supra note 7, at 96; ROSE, supra note 13, at 46-47.
27. W. Cornish, The Statute of Anne 1709-10: Its Historical Setting, in GLOBAL
COPYRIGHT: THREE HUNDRED YEARS SINCE THE STATUTE OF ANNE, FROM 1709 TO
CYBERSPACE 23 (L. Bently, U. Suthersanen & P. Torremans eds., forthcoming 2010) ("How
exactly this provision found its way into the Act is far from clear. . .
28. PSOC, supra note 2.
29. Frank R. Curtis, Protecting Authors in Copyright Transfers: Revision Bill f 203 and the
Alternatives, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 802 (1972) ("The meagre legislative history of the
Statute does not reveal why the Lords added a separate second term instead of simply
lengthening the original term.").
30. Id. at 803. Some support for this interpretation can be found in the decision of
Yates, J., in Millarv. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (using the term "recur" to describe the
effect of the section).
31. See also FEATHER, supra note 7, at 5, 62, 70; John Draper, Queen Anne's Act: A Note
on English Copyrnght, 36 MODERN LANGUAGE NOTES 146, 147 (1921) ("The copyright was
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why, then, have two periods? Curtis sees this as a reflection of a desire to
ground the right in the act of composing the work: the term was only to be
extended "if the source of such rights and the primary beneficiary of
Parliament's largesse" was still alive. 32 While Curtis may be right to see the
framing of the clause as consistent with the framework that Parliament had
adopted, it would have been equally consistent to simply extend the term
from fourteen to twenty-eight years, the author being the source of those
rights.
Mark Rose has argued that the bifurcated term reflected the perceived
need to align the term of protection with that in the Statute of Monopolies,
which was the source of the fourteen-year limit in the first place. This 1624
law limited the powers of the Crown to grant monopolies, but created an
exception relating to any "manner of new manufacture" as long as the
monopoly did not exceed a specified limited term: twenty-one years for
extant grants; fourteen years for future grants. 33 When the Commons looked
for a suitable period to which to limit the rights of authors, the Statute of
Monopolies was an obvious model to which to turn.34 When the Lords
wanted to lengthen the term, Rose argues "they were reluctant in the light of
the Jacobean Statute of Monopolies' provision against any monopoly terms
longer than fourteen years simply to declare a longer term." 35
Although there is a startling parallel between the terms in the Statute of
Monopolies and those of the Statute of Anne, what is less clear is what we
can infer from this about the Lords' extension. Were the two terms of
fourteen years chosen to pay lip-service to the established model, or chosen
because it was believed to be problematic to confer a longer term? There
seems to be a number of problems with Rose's analysis. First, the regulation
of the book trade, even via printing patents, had been exempted from the
Statute of Monopolies. 36 Even had the legislators conceived of the Statute of
vested in the author or his assigns for fourteen years with the right of extension to twenty
eight.').
32. Curtis, supra note 29, at 802 ("In weighing the need for protection against the costs
of the copyright monopoly, the Lords evidently concluded that a further period of
protection was needed, but only if the source of such rights and the primary beneficiary of
Parliamcntary largesse-the author himself-were still alive.").
33. Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac., c. 3 (Eng.); see, e.g., CHRISTINE MAcLEOD,
INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660-1800, at
15 (1988) (discussing Statute of Monopolies).
34. ROSE, supra note 13, at 45.
35. Id. at 47; see also DAVID FoxoN, POPE AND THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
BOOK TRADE 238 (1991) ("the [Statute of Monopolies] must have provided the framework
of regulation underlying the 1709/10 Act").
36. Statute of Monopolies, 1624,21 Jac., c. 3, § 10 (Eng.).
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Anne as conferring a "standing patent for authors," as Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke would later put it,37 this was a "standing patent" over printing and
reprinting particular books and technically would have fallen outside the
Statute of Monopolies. Second, the Statute of Monopolies was just that-a
statute-and could have been repealed, implicitly or explicitly, by a later
statute, such as the Statute of Anne, with respect to its application to
monopolies over particular books. The 1624 Act did not create some sort of
constitutional norm. Almost two hundred years later, in 1814,38 when the
statutory term of copyright was extended to twenty-eight years, or, if the
author survived, for his or her life, not a single person raised the question of
compatibility with the 1624 statute.39 Third, the legislature clearly regarded it
as open to grant longer terms, as it did on a number of occasions in relation
to mechanical inventions.40 The Statute of Monopolies may have been a
precedent from which the Commons were working in 1710, but it was
certainly not a straitjacket.
Rose also acknowledges that the Lords' amendment might have been
influenced by the philosopher John Locke's "suggestion that, after first
publication, the right to reprint should revert to the author."41 Rose here
relies on Raymond Astbury,42 who claims that Locke suggested during a
discussion in 1695 of the proposed legislation that would replace the
Licensing Act in 1695, that authors should have the sole right to reprint a
work "for a certain number of years after the publication of the first edition."
Astbury argues that this idea "anticipated the terms" of the Statute of Anne.

37. See Millar

v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. at 211 (reporting Lord Hardwicke's

characterization); see also DANIEL DEFOE, AN ESSAY ON THE REGULATION OF THE PRESS 21

(London 1704) ("The Clause in the Law is a Patent to the Author. . . .").
38. 54 Geo. 3, c. 156, § 4 (Gr. Brit.); see also INFORMATION FOR ALEXANDER
DONALDSON AND JOHN WOOD 58 (1773), available at PSOC, supra note 2,
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/001 0/exec/ausgabe/%22uk_1 773b%22

(mentioning "a standing universal patent").
39. Nor indeed did anyone raise this issue in 1767 when the term of copyright for
engravers was made twenty-eight years. See 7 Geo. 3, c. 38 (Gr. Brit.).
40. Eg., Act for the Incouragement of a New Invention by Thomas Savery for Raising
Water and Occasioning Motion to All Sortes of Mill Worke by the Impellant Force of Fire,
1699, 10 Will. 31. (Eng.) (extending standard fourteen year patent, No. 356 of July 5, 1698,
by a further twenty-one years); see also James Watt's Fire Engines Patent Act, 1775, 15 Geo.
3, c. 61 (Eng.), the lobbying for which is carefully analyzed in Eric Robinson, Matthew Boulton
and the Art of ParliamentaryLoblying, 7 HIST. J. 209 (1964).
41. ROSE, s-pra note 13, at 45-46.
42. Raymond Astbury, The Renewal of the Licensing Act in 1693 and Its Lapse in 1695, 33
LIBR. 296, 313 (1978) (citing a letter from Locke to Freke dated Mar. 18 1695). The letter is
available at Bodleian MS Locke b. 4, fol. 78.

2010]

ANGLO-AMERICAN AUTHORS' REVERSION RIGHTS

1485

However, a closer look at Locke's text suggests that Astbury, and, in turn,
Rose may be making too much of this. Locke wrote:
And be it farther enacted that noe book[s] pamphlet[s] pourtraiture
or paper printed with the name of the Author or publisher upon it
shall within

_

years after its first edition be reprinted with or

without the name of the Author to it without Authority given in
writeing by the Author or Somebody intituled by him, for soe
doeing under the penalty of the forfeiture of all that shall be soe
reprinted to the Author his Executors Administrators or
Assignes. 43
Even if we assume that Locke's manuscript comments circulated widely
enough to have influenced the formulation of the Statute of Anne,44 it is by
no means obvious that Locke was proposing a reversion to the author here.
The proposal envisages consent to reprinting being given not only by the
author but by "somebody intituled," and the benefit of the remedy is
conferred not just on the author but also his or her "Assignes." Moreover
the consent is only required if the proposal is to reprint the work within a
period of time. Even if understood as empowering the author, the author is
given that power only for a limited number of years, rather than, as with the
reversion, after a given number of years.
Whatever the source of the author-centric orientation of section 11, the
text of the Statute supports the inference that the purpose of the additional
contingent term was to assist authors. Were the objective otherwise, for
example to prolong the printer's monopoly, there would be no point dividing
the "sole right" into two periods, nor tying the second to the author's
survival, much less designating the author as the person to whom the
exclusive right shall "return." Both Harry Ransom and the copyright
historian Ronan Deazley agree that the provision was, in fact, designed to
benefit the author.45 Harry Ransom, writing in 1957, referred to section 11 as
43. 5 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE 795 (Esmond Samuel de Beer ed.,
1976-1989) [hereinafter CORRESPONDENCE OF LOCKE] (transcribing John Locke, Printing
94/5: Amendments to the Draft Bill (Mar. 18, 1695)) (unpublished manuscript) (the original
of which is held at the Bodleian Library in Oxford, Boldeian MS Locke b. 4, fol. 78).
44. Clearly, Locke's now famous proposal on term ("for those who purchase copies
from the Author that now live and write it may be reasonable to limit their property to a
certain number of years after the death of the Author or the first printing of the book as
suppose 50 or 70 years") was not so influential. See John Locke, Printing 94: Criticisms of
the Licensing Act of 1662 (Dec. 1694) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Bodleian
Library, Oxford, MS Locke b. 4, fol. 75-76, transcribedin 5 CORRESPONDENCE OF LOCKE,
supranote 43, at 785-91).
45. DEAZLEY, supra note 19, at 43; DEAZLEY, supra note 7; cf Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Reflections on Copynight Law II, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 719, 722 (1945) ("It could not have been
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part of a systematic attempt in Parliament to further the interest of
the writer as distinguished from that of the bookseller ....
Fourteen years would demonstrate the value of a book. If it failed,
the author could either improve its usefulness by revision or quietly
forget it. If its value had grown meanwhile, the author could sell
the copyright a second time. 46
Deazley is in accord:
Had [the Lords] simply chosen to introduce a longer term, this
would, in practice, have meant control of the work remaining with
the [owner of the book, who would more than likely be a
bookseller]. Rather, the use of the divided term, albeit reminiscent
of the earlier statute, was designed to ensure that the control of the
work would in fact return to the author if still alive. Given that this
was the only section within the final Act to make reference solely
to the author, it seems likely that the [Lords fully] intended to
benefit the author and only the author.47
This understanding that section 11 was intended to protect writers is also
consistent with what we know about the extra-parliamentary attitudes and
behaviour of some of those involved in the Lords' amendments. For
example, the President of the Council, Baron John Somers, who was also in
the Lords Committee charged with the Bill, 48 was described by writer
Jonathan Swift as "a great Patron of Learning."4 9 Indeed, many writers during
this period dedicated their works to him, including Swift himself. The
dedication in Swift's Tale ofa Tub, for example, was that he would not "desire
any other Help, to grow an Alderman, than a Patent for the sole Privilege of
dedicating to your Lordship."50 It seems plausible, then, that Somers might
well have been involved in the addition of section 11 to the Bill.
One contemporary account, at least, supports the Deazley-Ransom
interpretation.51 In the issue dated February 11, 1709/10,52 the journal The
the object of the Statute of Anne, because the renewal privilege there belongs to the owner of
the copyright who was almost always a bookseller.").
46. RANSOM, supra note 7, at 97, 104.
47. DEAZLEY, supra note 19, at 43.
48. 19 H.L. JOUR. (1710) 138.
49. WILLIAM L. SACHSE, LORD SOMERS: A POLITICAL PORTRAIT 198 (1975).
50. For a discussion of Somers literary connections, see id. at ch. 10.
51. Although Deazley does not refer to these, it was he who first drew our attention to
them. See Ronan Deazley, What's New About the Statute ofAnne? Or Six Observations in Search of
an Act, in GLOBAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 27, at 46-47.
52. OBSERVATOR (LONDON), Feb. 11, 1709/10 (accessible electronically via 17TH AND
18TH CENTURY BURNEY COLLECTION NEWSPAPERS). In an earlier issue, The Observator
indicated its support for statutory protection of books. Id. On Wednesday, February 1,
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Observator discussed a proposal to protect authors through the journalistic
device of a dialogue between the "Observator" and his "Countryman,"
Roger. The Countryman referred to a suggested amendment of the Bill (then
in the Commons), "which is design'd as a Kindness to us Authors," namely
[tihat the Bookseller shall have a Property in the Copy only for a
limited Time, after which it shall revert to the Author or his
Assignees. This they say will be an Encouragement to Learning,
and a Security to Authors against being ill treated or impos'd upon
by Booksellers, who run away with the Profits of their
Labours ... ; so that Authors not being able to foresee this,
because Copies are like Ships put to Sea, whose prosperous or
unfortunate Voyage is not to be foreseen, they have nothing more
than their first Copy-Money, let the Book sell ever so well.53
The "Observator" responded by criticizing this well-meaning proposal,
predicting that it would in fact be "detrimental to [authors]." 54 It argued that
the bookseller, given such a limited right, would offer less to authors, and, if
the book proved successful, the bookseller would "print so many before his
Time expire, as will make the [r]eversion of little or any Profit to the Author
or his Assignees."55 In any case, the Observator argued that it was open to
authors who wished to achieve the same effect, to restrict the sale of the
copyright or "agreeing for so much for every future impression."5 6
These discussions preceded, and clearly foreshadowed, the Lords'
amendment, effected in early April 1710, that became section 11. The
significance of the comments in The Observator lies in the fact that they
indicate that the idea of a provision protecting authors was already in
circulation, and that providing for "reversion" was one way of achieving this
end.
2.

Why a Reversion PaghtRather Than Regulation of Author-Publisher
Contracts?

An alternative strategy which the Lords could have taken would have
been to amend the Bill to extend the copyright term to twenty-eight years,
while protecting the author by providing that no assignment that purported
1709/10 the it approved the Bill and described piracy as "as unjust robbing on the Highway, or breaking up our Houses, and carrying off our Goods and Provisions, that should
accommodate and maintain us and our Families." OBSERVATOR (LONDON), Feb. 1,
1709/10.
53. OBSERVATOR (LONDON), Feb. 11, 1709/10.
54. Id
55. Id.

56. Id.
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to transfer such a right would be effective in so far as the term of the
contract exceeded fourteen years. Contractual limitations were known in
English law, both at common law and under statute. The formalities for
entering certain contracts, for example those relating to the sale of land, were
regulated by the Statute of Frauds, and a contract that failed to comply with
the standards it set were treated as void or unenforceable.5 8 Similarly, the
terms of certain contracts were controlled by laws setting prices of bread,59
wages, 60 and limits on interest. 61 Moreover, courts of equity would intervene
to protect borrowers from onerous terms in mortgages, 62 while courts of law
held void and unenforceable agreements in restraint of trade.63 Indeed the
57. An Act for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (Eng.).
Rather like the Statute of Anne, there has been much debate over the proper dating of the
Statute of Frauds. See G.P. Costigan, The Date andAuthorshp of the Statute ofFrauds, 26 HARV.
L. REV. 329 (1913).
58. The original purpose of the statute was to provide evidence of contracts and to
reduce the temptations of perjury. See, e.g., G.H.L. Fridman, The Necessity for Writing in
Contracts Within the Statute of Frauds, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 43 (1985); Lionel Summers, The
Doctrine of Equitable EstoppelAppled to the Statute of Frauds,79 U. PA. L. REV. 440 (1931).
59. An Act to Regulate the Price and Assize of Bread, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 18 (Gr. Brit.)
(constituting the Act directly preceding the Statute of Anne in the statute book); 1714, 1
Geo., c. 26 (Gr. Brit.) (continuing and modifying the rules on the pricing of bread). The
assize of bread was abolished in London in 1815, and nationwide in 1836. For background
and commentary, see Sidney Webb & Beatrice Webb, The Assige of Bread, 14 ECON. J. 196
(1904).
60. Statute of Artificers, 1563, 5 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.); Act for Regulating Journeymen
Tailors, 1720, 7 Geo., c. 13 (Eng.) (setting hours or work and wages of tailors); see also R.
KEITH KELSALL, WAGE REGULATION UNDER THE STATUTE OF ARTIFICERS (1938)
(describing wage regulation primarily through setting maximum wage); R. Keith Kelsall, A
Centuy of Wage-Assessment in Herefordshire, 57 ENG. HIST. REV. 115 (1942); MASTERS,
SERVANTS AND MAGISTRATES IN BRITAIN AND THE EMPIRE, 1562-1955, at 81 (Douglas
Hay & Paul Craven eds., 2004) (wage regulation continued in many parts of the country until
the middle decades of the eighteenth century).
61. An Act to Reduce the Rate of Interest Without Any Prejudice to Parliamentary
Securities, 1713, 13 Ann., c. 15 (Gr. Brit.) (setting the permitted interest rate at 5%. Any
claim above this rendered the contract void and would have rendered the lender vulnerable
to a penalty of three times the value of the loan). The usury laws were not repealed until
1854, (1854) 17 & 18 Vic. c. 90 (Gr. Brit.), though various legal devices had long been
deployed to avoid their impact. Coincidentally, the 1713 Act was sometimes referred to as
"the Statute of Anne." See, e.g., M.M. Long, Trends in Usury Legislation-CurrentInterest Overdue,
34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 325, 326-27 (1980).
62. Bruce Wyman, The Clog on the Equity of Redemption, 21 HARV. L. REV. 459 (1908)
(describing Equity's recognition of a right to redeem a mortgage as having emerged in the
seventeenth century and calling it a "violent . . . interference with the rights of parties to a
mortgage to agree as they please"). For a recent assessment of English law, see M.P.
Thompson, Do We Really Need Clogs?, 65 CONVEYANCER 502 (2001).
63. A key development in the doctrine of restraint of trade occurred only a year after
the enactment of the Statute of Anne. In Mitchel v. Reynolds, Lord Macclesfield introduced the

2010]

ANGLO-AMERICAN AUTHORS' REVERSION RIGHTS

1489

Statute of Anne itself limited the ability of the author or proprietor to grant
licences to reprint the book by requiring the author or proprietor's consent in
writing signed by two witnesses, and by containing "price control"
provisions.64 In short, as of 1710, there was no ideological reason preventing
Parliament, had it desired to do so, from protecting writers by interfering
with their contracts with publishers. In fact, twenty-seven years later, a Bill
was circulated which proposed that no assignment of copyright should be
valid in so far as it purported to last for more than ten years. 65 Although the
Bill was not passed, its circulation indicates that regulation of contractual
terms was considered a plausible legislative response to the informational
asymmetries and differences in bargaining power that informed author-

distinction between general restraints and partial (or geographically restricted) restraints, the
former being automatically void, whereas the latter were valid if reasonable. Mitchel v.
Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347; see, e.g., JOHN DYSON HEYDON, THE RESTRAINT OF
TRADE DOCTRINE 1-36 (1971); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF
RESTRAINT OF TRADE 9-16 (1986); Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73
HARV. L. REv. 625, 629-46 (1960).
64. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (1710) (Gr. Brit.) (stating that "without the
consent of the proprietor or proprietors thereof first had and obtained in writing signed in
the presence of two or more credible witnesses").
65. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning (Draft) 9 (1737), available at PSOC,
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/
2,
supra note
%22uk_1737b%22. The draft states:
And forasmuch as the true Worth of Books and Writings is, in many
Cases, not found out [until] a considerable Time after the Publication
thereof, and Authors, who are in Necessity, may often be tempted
absolutely to sell and alienate the Right, which they will hereby have to the
original Copies of the Books which they have composed, before the Value
thereof is known, and may there[fore] put it out of their Power to alter
and correct their Compositions, upon maturer Judgment and Reflection;
Therefore, be it enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That from and after
the said Twenty fourth Day of Junne, One thousand, seven hundred and
thirty seven, no author shall have power to sell, alienate, assign, or
transfer, except by his last Will and Testament, the Right hereby vested in
him to the original Copy of any Book, Pamphlet, or Writing, to any
Person or Persons whatsoever, for any longer Time than Ten Years, to
commence from the Date of such Sale, Alienation, Assignment, or
Transfer; and all Sales, Alienations, Transfers, Assignments, and all
Covenants for any Sale, Alienation, Assignment or Transfer, for any
longer Time, or to commence from any future Date, and all Bargains and
Covenants for Renewal of the same, before the first Term is expired, shall
be utterly void and of none effect.
Id. The Bill is discussed by Ronan Deazley, Commentag on the Booksellers' Bill (1737), available at
PSOC, supra note 2, at n.59 (speculating about the possibility that the revolutionary ten year
term was Swift's suggestion); see also James McLaverty, Pope and Copyrnght, in FOXON, supra
note 35, at 245.
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publisher relations. And, if regulation of contracting was a plausible strategy,
why did the House of Lords choose not to limit the term of the contract to
protect the author rather than creating a second reversionary term? Why did
they choose a "proprietary" technique rather than a "contractual" one?
One explanation might be that at the time the Act was being passed the
potential object of regulation, that is, "publishing agreements" between
authors and publishers, was not a sufficiently stable category of business
relations to make such regulation readily conceivable. Although we know that
authors did enter into arrangements with publishers transferring "copies"
before 1710,66 the exact legal basis for such contracts was unclear. Indeed,
the Stationers' supposed "rights" in copies were in large part founded on
entry in the Stationers' Company's register, rather than on consensual
derivation of the copy from the author. 67 It was only as a consequence of the
Statute of Anne that the foundation of the publishers' properties was
clarified, for future works, as authorship (i.e., composition of the text, rather
than mere possession of the manuscript). 68 Consequently, the idea of
regulating contracts between authors and publishers would not have
suggested itself to the legislature in 1710 before the Statute of Anne because
it was only as a consequence of the Statute that publishing contracts became
legally necessary. Indeed, it is interesting to observe that the Statute contained
a provision regulating the granting of consent to print and publish a work,
but made no specific provision for transfer or assignment of the statutory
right itself. In short, the Statute of Anne was primarily concerned with
establishing and securing a "property," and thus was a logical precursor to
"contract." Author-protective sentiments thus found expression more easily
through the grant of additional, contingent, proprietary rights, rather than
through controlling contract terms.
Two more mundane (but perhaps more persuasive) explanations can be
suggested for the preference of a reversionary term over the regulation of
contracts. First, the idea of a reversionary term was already circulating and
thus readily available to legislature seeking to offer additional protection to
writers. Certainly, the limited evidence that survives does not suggest that the
66. See supra notes 5-7.

67. MARJORIE PLANT, THE ENGLISH BOOK TRADE: AN ECONoMic HISTORY OF THE
MAKING AND SALE OF BOOKS 117 (2d ed. 1965); Astbury, supra note 42, at 297. But see
Lindenbaum, Braba.ZonAylmer, supra note 2, at 255-56 (deducing, from a surviving document
under which the publisher Joseph Watts paid John Milton's widow, Elizabeth, for
permission to republish Milton's works, that mere entry in the register book could not have
been regarded as sufficiently to secure the rights in a work).
68. Cf PATTERSON, supra note 7, at 69-70 (claiming that stationers recognized the
rights of authors in manuscripts).
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idea of contractual limitations had been raised, whereas the idea of the
second reversionary term was had been discussed publicly in The Observator
while the Bill was moving through the Commons.69 Secondly, a reversionary
term could be easily incorporated within the structure of the Bill that had
passed through the Commons; modifying the Bill by adding a contingent
reversion was in fact achieved, as we have seen, by way of a simple proviso.
In contrast, adding provisions regulating contractual assignments would likely
have required considerable restructuring; after all, the Bill did not even
address the question of formalities necessary to transfer copies. The property
approach, then, interfered less with the Bill that had been passed through the
Commons than a contractual one would have. In light of the fact that the
consideration of the Bill in the Lords came very close to the end of the
session, 70 the ready availability and ease of incorporation of such a provision
may have taken on particular importance.
B.

IMPACT OF SECTION 11 ON AUTHORS AND BOOKSELLERS

If the 1710 Act was, as the evidence suggests, intended as an author
protective measure, what was its impact? Did publishers, as The Observator
predicted, merely attempt to get around the restriction? Were assignments
couched to assign the second term? Were they effective in achieving that
result? If not, were writers able to take advantage of the additional bargaining
power offered by the reversion? Were authors able to negotiate improved
deals with their existing publisher or offer their works to other publishers on
more favourable terms?

69. Of course, this begs the question why contemporaries had only developed
"proprietary" rather than "contractual" solutions to the problem of providing authorial
protection. It may be that the emphasis on the effects of piracy on the welfare of authors
and their families, evident in the petitions that preceded the legislation, made various devices
for protecting landed families from creditors more obvious models than the laws that
regulated the prices of bread, wages or interest rates. For discussion of such familyprotecting rules, see Claire Priest, Creatingan American PropertyLaw.-Alienability andIts Limits in
American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385 (2006).
70. The Parliamentary session ended on April 5, 1710. The Bill was brought up from
the Commons and given its first reading in the Lords on March 16, 1709/10, receiving its
second reading on March 24. The Report from the Committee, proposing amendments,
took place on April 4, 1710, the day before the session came to an end. On the final day of
the session, the House of Commons had to decide whether to accept the Lords'
amendments. It did so with one exception: the Lords had proposed to remove the provision
regulating book prices, and the Commons regarded this as important. In order to reach an
agreement a committee was formed to draw up an explanation for the disagreement, and this
was conveyed to the House of Lords. In turn, it was reported that "[t]he Lords do not insist
upon their Amendment." See 19 H.L.JOUR. (Mar. 16, 1709/10) 109, (Mar. 24, 1709/10) 123,
(Apr. 4, 1710) 140, 16 H.C.JOUR. (Apr. 5, 1710) 394-96.
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The conventional wisdom is that the reversion right was ineffective to
secure additional rewards to writers (and composers) because the dominant
practice was the ritual assignment to publishers of copyright in perpetuity
and for a single lump sum. Book historian Harry Ransom, for example, wrote
that "[t]he true intention of this proviso was ignored from the start: authors
continued to sell their books outright."7I Additionally, music historian Nancy
Mace argues that the booksellers (and music-sellers, with whom she is
primarily concerned) invariably took assignments and assumed these applied
to both the initial term and the reversionary period.72 Legal historians Bill
Cornish and Ronan Deazley also reiterate this orthodox view that writers
assigned the reversionary term when they agreed to publish, and thus lost any
power to renegotiate in the event of a work selling well and received no
additional remuneration beyond the lump sum paid by the bookseller for the
right to publish the work.73
While the conventional wisdom that writers and composers did not
benefit substantially from the introduction of the reversion right is probably
correct, the mechanisms by which the intent of the reversionary term was
nullified are much more complex than the conventional account supposes. In
the first place, one may doubt the claim that all writers ritually assigned
copyright in perpetuity. The historical archive, which comprises a substantial
body of post-1710 author-publisher documents, reveals a much more diverse
set of practices. 74 Secondly, even if such assignments were commonplace, the
effect of such assignments on the reversionary term depended on how the
legal operation of that reversion was understood. More specifically, the effect
of such assignments depended on whether the law regarded the reversionary
term to be assignable, and, if so, by what mechanisms. Prior to the decision
in Millar & Dodsley v. Taylor in 1765, and even perhaps right through to the

71. RANSOM, supra note 7, at 104; see also Griffin, supra note 2, at 134 (noting "as any
careful historian of copyright observes, eighteenth-century authors almost always
immediately sold their owner's right to a bookseller").
72. Nancy Mace, Charles Rennett and the London Music Sellers in the 1780s: Testing the
Ownershp of Reversionag Copyght, 129 J. ROYAL MUSICAL Ass'N 1, 2 (2004).
73. Cornish, supra note 27, at 23 (noting that "initial contracts between author and
entrepreneur tended expressly to include a grant of rights for both periods"); Deazley, supra
note 51, at 48 ("For the most part, however, booksellers would simply purchase an author's
copyright outright, including the author's reversionary interest set out within s.11 of the
Statute of Anne.").
74. See infra Section II.B.1; JAMES RAVEN, THE BUSINESS OF BOOKS: BOOKSELLERS
AND THE ENGLISH BOOK TRADE 242, 316-17 (2007) (pointing out that there were many
cases of author-publication, profit-sharing, and single-edition contracts).
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1780s, this was a matter of legal speculation.7 After 1785, and the decisions
in Rennett v. Thomson, Rennett v. Longman, and Carnan v. Bowles,76 it seems, the
better view was that the reversionary term could be assigned by express
terms only.77 In light of this, we can safely say that only some-certainly not
all-of the surviving author-publisher documents would have been effective
in transferring the reversion.78
The conclusion that not all documents would have been regarded as
effective to transfer copyright, however, leads us to the third component of
this complex reality: whether writers were conscious of their legal rights, and,
if they were, their practical capacity to take advantage of the reversion. The
evidence here suggests that, whatever their legal rights may have been, few
writers in fact took advantage of their reversionary rights.79 In part, this can
be explained by reference to the fact that few works would have had a
substantial market fourteen years after first publication, and, in a good
number of those that did attract continued demand, the author may well not
have survived the first fourteen year term.80 But, in the few cases in which
the reversion right related to works for which there remained continuing
demand, the right would only have had value if a writer were conscious of his
or her legal rights and able to interest other publishers in such rights. With
regard to consciousness, it seems likely that many writers would have looked
to the literal terms of their contracts with publishers for guidance, rather than
to the 1710 Act. Consequently, they likely would not have appreciated their
legal rights under section 11. Moreover, some writers may have shared the
view, widely advocated by publishers after the 1740s, that copyright was
really a matter of common law and that it existed in perpetuity, therefore
their rights had been assigned effectively in perpetuity as well (whatever the
Statute may or may not have said).81 Furthermore, particularly after 1774
(when it came to be understood that rights in published works were
determined wholly according to the terms of the 1710 Act),82 one may doubt
75. See infra Section II.B.2.b (discussing perceptions prior to the unreported case of
Millar & Dodsley v. Taylor in 1765 and the uncertain status of that decision).
76. See infra Section II.B.2.e.
77. See infra Section II.B.2.e (discussing Carnanv. Bowes, (1785) 29 Eng. Rep. 45 (Ch.)).
78. See infra Section II.B.1.
79. See infra Section II.B.2.
80. Some famous examples serve to illustrate the point: James Thomson, author of the
poem Libery, published by Andrew Millar in 1735, died in 1748; Henry Fielding, author of
Joseph Andrews (published in 1742), and TomJones (published in 1748-49) died in 1754; Oliver
Goldsmith, author of The Vicar of Wakefield, which was published in 1766, died in 1774;
Samuel Johnson, author of Lives of the Poets, published between 1779 and 1781, died in 1784.
81. See infra Section II.B.2.
82. See infra Section II.B.2.d.
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how much scope there might have been for using the reversionary term to
negotiate better terms, either with the existing publisher or a new publisher.
Some writers would likely have been bound to their publisher through more
than a single deal, and the ability to utilize the reversion to negotiate with
other booksellers would have been circumscribed by the realities of a
continuing, and frequently positive, relationship.8 3 Even where this was not
the case, there is considerable evidence that the book market remained
relatively uncompetitive even after the House of Lords decision in 1774 in
Donaldson v. Beckett 8 4 (rejecting the booksellers' claim to a perpetual right at
common law) and possibly well into the nineteenth century. 5 It is unclear
what, if any, scope authors would have had in practice to switch publishers,
and thus to renegotiate the terms of the original publishing agreement.
1. ContractualPracticeAfter 1710
The main assumption that underpins Ransom's claim as to the
irrelevance of the reversionary right is that, even after the passage of the
Statute of Anne, writers continued to assign all rights in full, and that this
practice effectively assigned the reversion.86 In this section, we suggest that
the evidence indicates that while outright assignments were common, they
were by no means the universal practice. Moreover, as it is unclear that such
purported assignments would have been regarded as effective to assign the
reversion, a closer analysis of contractual practice is warranted.
In order to make any assessment of contractual practice, it is first
necessary to say something about the evidence available from which we can
work. There is a surprising amount of surviving documentation relating to
83. Richard Sher gives many examples of authors who had continuing relationships
with specific publishers, and circumstances where publishers would "compensate" authors
for bad bargains with additional gratuitous payments or increased payments on later works.
SHER, supra note 2, at 244-45.
84. Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 257; 17 COBBErr's PARLIAMENTARY
DEBATES 998,passim (1774) (House of Lords).
85. RAVEN, supra note 74, at 232 (stating that "changes before the 1774
pronouncement and continuities after it suggest less a 'watershed' than a point in a much
longer and more complex course of development ... [C]heap reprinting had flourished for
several decades ... and leading booksellers' de facto extended copyright continued as
securely as ever . .. "); Michael Suarez, To What Degree Did the Statute ofAnne (8 Anne, c. 19,
[1709]) Affect CommercialPracticesof the Book Trade in Eighteenth CentuU England?Some Provisional
Answers About Copyright, Chiefy from Bibliography and Book History, in GLOBAL COPYRIGHT,
supra note 27, at 61 (noting that "[e]ven after Donaldson v. Becket, the established London
trade continued to conduct its business in many of the same ways it had in the 1680s,
behaving in 1800 largely as if copyright was perpetual").
86. The limited surviving evidence of contractual practice before 1710 reveals a similar
trend.
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author-publisher relationships in the eighteenth century. For this study, we
have analysed over three hundred British author-publisher documents. The
most substantial collection of such documents is The Upcott Collection,
compiled by William Upcott (1779-1845), an antiquary and autograph
collector, and currently held at the British Library. In addition, there are also
some collections of documents relating to individual publishers, including
eleven contracts with bookseller Robert Dodsley, from 1743 to 1753,87 as
well as archives, collections of correspondence, and biographical accounts of
individual authors.88
Three caveats are worth noting about the usefulness of these sources.
First, they tend to relate primarily to the authors who were regarded
retrospectively as successful. Secondly, the surviving contracts represent only
a limited number of publishers (and the bulk of them come from before
87. These are contained in the Egerton Manuscripts at the British Library, BL Eg. Mss.
738. See also THE PUBLISHING FAMILY OF RIVINGTON 60-61, 57, passim (Septimus Rivington
ed., London, Rivington, Percival & Co. 1894); CHARLES WELSH, A BOOKSELLER OF THE
LAST CENTURY: BEING SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE OF JOHN NEWBERY, AND OF THE
BOOKS HE PUBLISHED, WITH A NOTICE OF THE LATER NEWBERYS 52-53 (Cambridge Univ.

Press 2010) (1885).
Other collections, which we have not consulted, or have not consulted
systematically for the purposes of this paper, are (i) the Longman archive, University of
Reading, which contains at least two contracts (assignment of copyright by Sir James Steuart
to Andrew Millar for Inquit into Prinmicles ofPolitical Oeconomy, June 15, 1767, MS 1393/26/2
(d), University of Reading Library; contract between Alexander Adam and Strahan, Cadell,
and Creech, June 30, 1794, Ms 1393, 26/8); (ii) the Strahan Archive in the British Library
(which contains a contract between Blair and the three publishers Creech, Strahan & Cadell,
1780, in Strahan Archive, BL Add. Mss. 48901, fol. 20); (iii) the archives of George
Robinson, publisher, held at Manchester Public Library (on which, see G.E. Bentley, Jr.,
Copyright Documents in the George Robinson Archive: William Godwin and Others 1713-1820, 35
STUD. 67, 67-110 (1982)); (iv) the collection of music contracts of the firm in BL Add MS
63814; (v) the Murray Archive in the National Library of Scotland; (vi) the Houghton
Library collection at Harvard University; and (vii) the examples in the Osborne manuscripts
in the Beinecke Library at Yale. Another source that we have not utilized systematically is
surviving court records.
88. Often the archives or originals are in private hands, but printed transcriptions are
available. See, e.g., JEAN MARTEILHE, THE MEMOIRS OF A PROTESTANT CONDEMNED TO
THE GALLEYS OF FRANCE FOR HIS RELIGION, at xv (Oliver Goldsmith trans., 1895)

(representing a receipt for sale from Goldsmith to Edward Dilly, January 11, 1758, relating
to translation of the work); JAMES PRIOR, THE LIFE OF OLIVER GOLDSMITH, M.B. FROM A
VARIETY OF ORIGINAL SOURCES (London, 1837); TOBIAS G. SMOLLETr, LETTERS OF

TOBIAS SMOLLEfr 26, 64-66 (Edward S. Noyes ed., 1926); Receipt for sale of rights from
Adam Ferguson to Cadell for Ferguson's Essay on the HistoU of Civil Society (Apr. 10, 1767),
(on file with Beinecke Library, Yale), reprinted in 1 ADAM FERGUSON, THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF ADAM FERGUSON 71-72 (Vincent Merolle ed., 1995); Memorandum

from Adam Ferguson to Strahan, Cadell & Creech (Feb. 28, 1782) (on file with CE French
Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society), reprinted in 2 FERGUSON, supra, at 576.
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1770). This presents problems particularly in relation to tracking the
evolution of contractual practice, because the main sources for particular
periods are frequently just one or two publishers. Thirdly, the archives
contain a range of author-publisher documents. About two thirds of the
surviving documents take the form of receipts, that is, acknowledgments of
money received from a publisher. About one quarter of the documents are
more formal, purporting to assign copyright from authors, or, in the case of
married women, their spouses,89 or occasionally descendants,90 to publishers;
while one in twelve documents is an agreement to write, compile or translate
a work. The variety of documents makes generalization hazardous. One
particular difficulty in having so many receipts is inferring whether there
would have been a lengthier, more formal contract accompanying such a
receipt, or whether these rudimentary written documents operated in lieu of
such formal documents. We know that there are cases where both receipts
and more formal documentation exist in relation to the same transaction,9 1
but there are good reasons to believe that in many cases (particularly relating
to transactions of lower value), the surviving receipts were the only
documents. Indeed, some of such receipts specifically provide that further
documents will be entered if necessary--implying that the receipt was the
only document?2 Moreover, in some of the litigation in the 1780s, music
publishers seemed to admit that they relied on such receipts to transfer all
rights (including the reversionary interest)-importantly, for our purposes,
indicating that there frequently would be no other documents evidencing the
terms of a transaction.93
89. E.g., 2 Upcorr, supra note 4, at [31], [35].
90. E.g., RIVINGTON, supra note 87, at 60-61; 1 UPcoTr, supra note 4, at [37], [119].
91. Note, for example, the range of documents that survive in relation to Milton's
works. For the post 1710 period, see, e.g., the various documents relating to Goldsmith's
NaturalHistog,including the agreement to write the work, receipts for payments on delivery
of various volumes, and an assignment of the copyright, in 2 PRIOR, supra note 88, at 200-01
(referring to an agreement dated February 29, 1769 with William Griffin that Goldsmith
would write eight volume Natural History), 218 (receipt), 340 (referring to assignment as in
same terms as contract).
92. 1 UPcoTT, supra note 4, at [32], [110] (stating "I promise to assign the above
mentioned copy over to John Watts on Demand," March 3, 1732, between John Watts and
Wm Havard); 2 UPcorr, supra note 4, at [172] (explaining how on June 12, 1723, Thomas
Marshall gave receipt to Hook and promised "to sign a Bill of Sale for the same upon
demand'.
93. See Answer of Samuel Thompson, Ann Thompson and Peter Thompson,
E112/1705/3808 (1785) (which can be found at the National Archive, Kew) (stating "it has
always been the usage and custom in the purchase of such kind of Musical Compositions to
take a Receipt from the Author or Composer thereof which was meant or expressed to be in
full for the purchase of all the Right Interest and Property whatsoever of such Author or
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There are a host of documents that appear to say nothing about
copyright at all. 9 4 Of the 130 or so documents in volume 1 of The Upcott
Collection, for example, eighty take the form of receipts. Of these, about fifty
specify they are for the "copyright" or "copy" or "property," but around
thirty do not specify that the consideration was paid for the property, as
opposed to permission to publish or services provided. Many of the
surviving receipts for transactions involving publisher Edmund Cur1l, for
example, say nothing about the "copy." One signed by Thomas Foxton,
dated January 1, 1725, mentions payment "being in full for translating Laus
Ululae or the Praise of Owls," 95 while another, three months later, signed by
Thomas Cooke, is expressed to be "in full for writing Mr Marvells Lfe,
procuring some of his letters & publishing his works." 96 The same is true for
a host of the receipts that Oliver Goldsmith signed for his publishers in the
1760s. 97 Moreover, a number of the contracts in the small collection relating
to the bookseller Robert Dodsley also say nothing about rights.98 An example
is the agreement dated October 15, 1748 with historian John Campbell
(1708-1775). Campbell agreed to write a book The Geography, NaturalHistoU
and Antiquities of England & Wales between sixty and eighty sheets in length
within a period of ten months, and for Dodsley to pay him two guineas per
sheet and to print the work. No reference was made in the agreement at all
Composer in or to such Work or Composition"). In Millar v. Taylor, C33/426, fol. 60r- (Ch.
1765) (also at the National Archive), the co-plaintiff, James Dodsley, relied on receipts
signed by Edward Young to Robert Dodsley from 1743 and 1744 in order to substantiate his
claim, perhaps suggesting that no other documents existed. There is no suggestion in the
summary of the court that a separate assignment had occurred but that the document had
not survived.
94. OLIVER GOLDSMITH, THE COLLECTED LETTERS OF OLIVER GOLDSMITH 73, n.3
(Katherine C. Balderston ed., 1928) (referencing a receipt from Goldsmith relating to
payment by James Dodsley "for writing and compiling" his Histog of England, August 8,
1764); 1 UPCOTT supra note 4, at [52], [56], [102], [103], [1211, [196].
95. 1 Upcorr, supra note 4, at [102].
96. 2 UpCoTr, supra note 4, at [52]. According to the English Short Title Catalogue,
Laus Ululae was written by Conradus Goddeus, and the translation by Foxton appeared in
volume 2 of Curll's Miscellanea in 1725. ENGLISH SHORT TITLE CATALOGUE [hereinafter
ESTC], available at http://estc.bl.uk/. The Catalogue also includes a 1726 edition of The
Works ofAndrew Marvell,published by Curl and edited by Thomas Cooke.
97. Compare 1 PRIOR, supra note 88, at 388, 392, 397, 407, 473, 490, 2 PRIOR, supra note
88, at 130 (receipts for money received from John Newbery), and 1 PRIOR, supra note 88, at
465 (contract between Goldsmith and James Dodsley for the lives ofEminent Persons), with 1
PRIOR, supra note 88, at 397 (receipt from Goldsmith for payment by John Newbery for "the
copy" of The ChineseLetters), and 2 PRIOR, supra note 88, at 131 (receipt for payment for "the
copy"), 218 (receipt for payment by William Griffing coupled with promise to assign
copyright).
98. BL Eg. Mss. 738, supra note 87.
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about the transfer of the "copy" (i.e., copyright). The same is true of an
agreement Dodsley entered into on August 22, 1749 with Thomas Salmon
(1679-1767) to write The Tradesman's DirectoU,99 and with Joseph Wharton, on
March 7, 1749/50, to translate Virgil's Georgicks. 1oo Yet other Dodsley
contracts, with Henry Baker, Fellow of the Royal Society, (1698-1774) and
William Duncan, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen
(1717-1760), are quite specific on the matter of copyright. 0 Looked at in the
round, these documents suggest that the assumption that after 1710 copy
was universally assigned from authors to publishers in full upon the initial
sale of the manuscript is something of an exaggeration.
Moreover, individual biographical studies record that authors sometimes
retained copyright in their works. 102 Some authors published their own
works, with booksellers being offered a commission on sale, while other
authors granted publishers limited licenses to print only the first edition. The
scientist James Ferguson (1710-1776) adopted the former strategy,
publishing his Astronomy Explained in 1756 before assigning copyright to
Andrew Millar in 1758, 103 while Oliver Goldsmith published his own
translation of Memoirs of a Protestant.104The philosopher David Hume (17111776) retained copyright in his Histoy of England, initially permitting
Midwinter to publish only a single edition, before he later chose to sell the
copyright to publisher Thomas Cadell and printer-publisher William
Strahan.105 There is some suggestion that the London publishers particularly
resented authorial self-publication. For example, Tobias Smollett (17211771) "incurred the hostility of several important publishers by retaining the

99. BL Eg. Mss. 738, supra note 87, fol. 8 (describing the payment as "copy money").
The ESTC, supra note 96, contains no such book of that tide either being published by
Dodsley or written by Salmon.
100. The ESTC, supra note 96, contains no record of this.
101. See infra note 160. Many of these arrangements where there is no reference to
copyright relate to translations, and one possibility is that it might have been assumed that
no copyright subsisted. Having said this, Lintot's famous contract with Alexander Pope
related to Pope's translation of Homer. On the latter, see infra note 117.
102. RAVEN, supra note 74, at 242, 316-17; SHER, supra note 2, at Ch. 3 (both pointing
out that there were many cases of author-publication, profit-sharing, and single-edition
contracts).
103. JOHN R. MILLBURN, WHEELWRIGHT OF THE HEAVENS: THE LIFE AND WORK OF
JAMES FERGUSON, FRS 90 (1988); SHER, supra note 2, at 217.
104. Henry Dobson, Introduction, in MARTEILHE, supra note 88, at xiv (Goldsmith
published himself).
105. SHER, supra note 2, at 240-41; see also 2 UPcoTT, supra note 4, at [144] (where
author had published work himself and sold copies and "right of re-printing" to bookseller).
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whole of the copyright to PeregrinePickle" in 1751.106 However, many of the
London publishers in fact facilitated such activities, for example by printing
and selling the works. In any case, such hostility did not prevent authors
from continuing to self-publish, often with success. In the 1760s, Vinerian
Professor of Civil Law, William Blackstone (1723-1780), arranged for
Oxford University Press to print his Commentaries, only selling the copyright
to William Strahan, the bookseller, after the book had been in print for eight
years. Then in the 1790s James Boswell (1740-1795) famously retained
copyright in his Life ofJohnson.107

Even so, Ransom is correct that, in the majority of cases, a publisher
would purport to take an assignment of the rights in the "copy." However, as
we will see, the details of these documents vary rather dramatically. This
variety may well have had much greater significance than Ransom
recognized. This is because considerable uncertainty surrounded the question
of whether the reversionary right was capable of assignment at all, and, if so,
by what means. The former question would be resolved in 1765 and again in
the 1780s by a series of cases (the most famous of which is Carnan v.
Bowles108) which held that the reversionary term could be assigned by a
transaction effected during the initial term. 109 But those cases did not resolve,
at least with any clarity, the question of precisely what was required to assign the
reversion. Here, at least two matters deserve careful attention. First, what was
the required form of the document: was a deed required, or at least writing
attested to by two credible witnesses, or would any writing do? Second,
precisely what form of expression would be effective to indicate an agreement
to transfer the reversion: would a mere transfer of the "copy" or "copyright"
be sufficient, or would that be regarded as effective only to assign the first
term? Would the reversionary term be transferred by assignment forever, or
was it necessary to refer, explicitly, to the reversion? Was it necessary to
express an intention to override the protective aims of the statute, or would
some indication that the author was to retain no claim or interest be

106. Harlen, supra note 3, at 67; LEWIS M. KNAPP, TOBIAS SMOLLETr: DOCTOR OF MEN
AND MANNERS 118-19 (1949) (stating that the advertisement for the 1758 edition explained
that certain booksellers had tried to stifle the novel at birth, and speculating that this was
because "they disapproved of Smollett's independent reservation of the whole copyright");
SHER, supra note 2, at 218-19 & n.53.
107. Boswell made k1555 profit on the first edition. THE CORRESPONDENCE OFJAMES
BOSWELL WITH DAvID GARRICK, EDMUND BURKE AND EDMOND MALONE 410 (George

M. Kahrl ed., 1986); SHER, supra note 2, at 220-24.
108. Carnan v. Bowles, (1785) 29 Eng. Rep. 45 (Ch.); see case discussion, infra Section
II.B.2.e.
109. See case discussion, infra Section II.B.2.e.
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effective?"IO While many of these matters remained undecided right until the
repeal of the reversion right in 1814, the precise form and content of the
contract was clearly all-important-a matter which Ransom and others have
frequently failed to recognize.
a) Formalities
The Statute of Anne said nothing about transferring the first term of
copyright, let alone the reversionary term. The Act did, however, indicate
formalities which any licensee would have to satisfy to escape an accusation
of infringement by the author or proprietor: the licensee would need to
demonstrate his or her consent in writing, signed, and witnessed by two
credible witnesses.' Presumably, given that the legal effect of an assignment
is more serious than the grant of a licence, an effective transfer of the first
term required compliance with at least the same formalities. Moreover, given
its author-protective intent, this must have been all the more the case with
the reversionary term. Certainly, some thought a deed was necessary. 112
Of the surviving cache of documents, only a small proportion is under
seal,113 while most are merely written and signed by the author alone. There
are seventeen contracts under seal, signed by two witnesses, in volume 1 of
The Upcott Collection, and ten in the second volume. Of these, most (thirteen)
related to transactions with printer-turned-publisher John Watts.114 Two
sealed transactions have only one witness.115 Most of the remaining
documents are merely signed, but not witnessed: only seven are also
witnessed (one by two witnesses).116 It is perhaps of significance that of the
deeds, the majority were created in the 1720s and 1730s, and only five derive
from after 1750, suggesting, possibly, that the perceived need to comply with
statutory formalities faded as belief in common law copyright became more
widespread.117 However, assignments by deed also survive in the Strahan
110. These questions also came to be posed in the U.S. caselaw. See infra text
accompanying notes 378, 417-20.
111. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, 5 1 (1710) (Gr. Brit.).
112. See infra Section II.B.2.a (describing the view of Alexander Pope).
113. For example, those between Pope and Lintot. See discussion, infra Section II.B.1.e.
114. 1 UPCoTr, supra note 4, at [431, [451, [142], [146], [1481, [150], [1521, [1551, [1691,
[1611, [200], [206], [210] (dating from between 1727 and 1744).
115. 1 UPCOTr, supra note 4, at [29] (dating from 1731); 2 Upcoir, supra note 4, at [28]
(dating from 1742).
116. 2 UPcorr, supra note 4, at [40], [56], [152], [208].
117. In addition, three surviving Pope contracts, all with Bernard Lintot, were made
under seal. Egerton Charters, BL Eg. Ch. 128 (over translation of The Iliaa), Ch. 129 (relating
to a collection of Pope's Works, this contract from 1717 was witnessed by Henry Lintot and
William Fortescue and bears the signature of Lintot, but not that of Pope), BL Eg. Ch. 130

2010]

ANGLO-AMERICAN AUTHORS' REVERSION RIGHTS

1501

Archive, relating, inter alia, to Hugh Blair's Sermons (dated December 21,
1780) and William Buchan's Preventive Medicine (dated March 5, 1781)."1
One response to the uncertainty over formalities was to include within
the contract an agreement to do anything necessary at any stage to perfect
the title of the transferee. A good example is provided by an agreement,
dated March 15, 1734, between actress and writer, Eliza Haywood (16931756), and two publishers, Francis Cogan and John Nourse, relating to
Haywood's The Histoy ofBritish Theatre.119 The agreement recites that in return

for C1 6 and four shillings, Haywood acknowledged that she had
sold unto the said Francis Cogan & John Nourse, the Copy Right
... & at the request of the said Francis Cogan & J Nourse the said

Eliza Haywood shall immediately assign over to them all her the
said Eliza Haywood's Right Title Interest Claim Demand or
preference whatsoever to the Copy and Copy Right of the said
Book for ever by such instrument as they shall be adised is proper &
sufficientfor the purpose.120

A measure of this sort would, on its face, have enabled the purchaser to
call for the perfection of an assignment (including an assignment of the
reversionary interest), should that have proved necessary. 121 Less elaborate
clauses, requiring the author to "execute an assignment of the ... copy on
demand," can be found in quite a number of documents, including some that
are agreements to write works, and some that acknowledge receipt of

(relating to a proposed translation of Homer's The Odyssey, dated February 18, 1723). The
Dodsley dealings also include some in the form of deeds. E.g., BL Eg. Mss. 738, supra note
87, fol. 2, (addressing an agreement under seal dated June 3, 1744 between Henry Baker and
Robert Dodsley, relating to publication of A Treatise on Microscopes).
118. Strahan Archive, BL Add. Mss. 48901, supra note 87, at fol. 20 (Blair), fol. 22
(Buchan).
119. 1 Upcorr, supra note 4, at [112]; 2 UPCorr, supra note 4, at [20] (containing a
contract, dated January 4, 1733, in similar terms with Theodore Barlow for the publication of
a legal treatise on the Duty and Office of a Justice of Peace); see also 1 Upcorr, supra note 4,
at [192] (noting a contract between John Shebbeare and John Nourse, dated January 22,
1754, where Shebbeare undertook "to secure to [Nourse] said Property against all persons
who may have pretensions" to it); 2 UPcoTr, supra note 4, at [28] (indicating a contract
between Nourse and Barlow, dated August 8, 1744). Poet James Thomson's agreement with
Andrew Millar for the poem Liberty, dated December 16, 1734, contains an undertaking to
do "all and every such further and other lawfull and reasonable act and acts thing and things
assignments and assurance whatsoever." JAMES THOMSON: LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS 89
(A. McKillop ed., 1958).
120. 1 UPcorr,supra note 4, at [112] (emphasis added).
121. See infra Section III.E.2.c.
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payment.122 A further strategy was to require the author to refrain from doing
anything that would undermine the effect of the agreement.123 This, it was
hoped, would have prevented an author from taking advantage of any flaws
in the title conferred on the publisher, for example by assigning the rights to
a third party publisher or even giving another publisher consent to republish
the work. In so far as such devices were attempts to undercut the statutory
policy underpinning both the requirement of formalities, and section 11, it
must have been unclear whether the courts would have enforced them.
b) Interest Transferred
The precise language used to indicate what, if anything, was transferred
from author to bookseller varied significantly. Over the century under
review, a range of terms are used: "right," "title," "property," "interest,"
"copy," and "copy right," either alone or in combination (as, for example,
"whole and sole right and property").124 During the thirty years following the
Statute of Anne, the language of "sole right and title to the copy" appears in
over one quarter of the documents 25 In the following thirty years, from 1740
to 1770, the term "copy right" is used to identify the subject of the transfer
in over one third of the documents we have examined.126 More elaborate

122. 1 Upcorr, supra note 4, at [32], [110] (stating "I promise to assi[g]n the above
mentioned copy over to John Watts on Demand," contract between John Watts and Wm
Havard, dated March 3, 1732); 2 UPCorr, supra note 4, at [200-01] (referring to an
agreement dated February 29, 1769 with William Griffin that Goldsmith would write eight
volume Natural Histog), [2181 (receipt of £500 for five volumes of Natural History with
promise to assign), [432] (receipt for C250 in relation to History of Greece coupled with
promise to assign).
123. E.g., 2 UpcoTr, supra note 4, at [140] (featuring a contract between John Hill and
Thomas Osborne, dated Dec 21, 1752, in which Hill undertook not to do anything
"whereby it may in any way [bje a [p]rejudice to this [u]ndertaking").
124. For examples of "the copy," see 1 Upcorr, supra note 4, at [157] (between Curll
and Charles Molloy (d. 1767), dated April 23, 1718, for the play The Coquel); see also id. at [37],
[102], [49], [163], [38]. For "right and property," see, for example., id. at [189 (a contract
between John Watts and George Sewell, dated January 9, 1718, for a Tragedy entitled Sir
Walter Raleigh).
125. E.g., 1 UPCOTr, supra note 4, at [120] (relating to a play entitled The Tragedy of King
Hent the Fourth of France, and a translation of Rapin's Xtn, a contract between Curl1 and
Charles Beckingham, dated Nov. 13, 1710); see also id. at [185], [34], [41], [187], [127], [188],
[197]; Agreement Between Jacob Tonson and Matthew Prior (1718), in RIVINGTON, supra
note 87, at 58-59.
126. The publishing contracts entered by John Nourse and Thomas Lowndes frequently
merely indicate the transfer of the "copy" or "copyright." 2 UPcorr, supra note 4, at [791
(featuring a contract dated March 21, 1746 between John Nourse and James Dodson for
"the whole and entire Copy & all his Right and Title of the first Volume of a Work called
and entitled The MathematicalReposito!)"); see also 1 UPCOTr, supra note 4, at [113], [192]; 2
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variations on the language of "right and title," such as "whole right, tide and
property" or "right, tide and claim" also become more prevalent. Henry
Fielding's agreement with Andrew Millar for JosephAndrews,127 dated April 13,
1742, transferred "all his Title Right and property" for f199 6s, and his
agreement for Tom Jones, dated June 11, 1748 for C600 was in similar terms
(though it did indicate the transfer was "for ever").1 28 In two agreements in
1743 and 1744 with bookseller Robert Dodsley,129 Henry Baker purported to:
[S]ell transfer and assign to the said Robert Dodsley the said Book
Copy or Treatise .. . together with all the nght property Benefit and

Interest of the said Henry Baker of and in and to the same To Hold
the same to the said Robert Dodsley his Executors Administrators
and Assigns as his and their own proper Goods and Chattles [sic]
30
for ever more.1

Others were more extensive still, such as that dated December 21, 1752,
according to which John Hill, in return for C472,
Granted, Bargained, Sold, Assigned, Transferred and set over

...

unto ... Thomas Osborne his Executors Administrators & Assigns
all that the Copy Right or Priviledge of Printing reprinting Publishing
Vending & Selling in any Volumes and under any Title whatsoever

of all those Books compiled or written by the said Dr John Hill
Entitled A GeneralNaturalHistory ... and all Benefit Profit Gain and
advantage of the said Several Books and Every of them or to be had
or made by them & Every of them and also the Estate Right Title

Interest Property Claim & Demand whatsoever both at Law and in Equity or
othenvise howsoever of him the saidJohn Hill of in and to the said Copy Right
UPcorr,supra note 4, at [80], [158], [172] (featuring a contract dated June 12,1723 between
Hook and Thomas Marshall "for the Copy right ofJuvenal & Persius with notes by me").
127. The contract is contained in the Forster Collection at the Victoria & Albert
Museum in London. See Austin Dobson, Fielding andAndrew Millar,7 LIBR. 177 (1916).
128. G.M. GODDEN, HENRY FIELDING: A MEMOIR 183, 304-05 (1910); Dobson, supra
note 127, at 184 (citing a letter from Horace Walpole to George Montagu (May 18, 1749), in
2 HORACE WALPOLE, THE LETTERS OF HORACE WALPOLE, FOURTH EARL OF ORFORD 160
(London, Richard Bently & Son pub., 1891)). The Appendix to Dobson's article contains a
transcription of the formal contract, dated 25 March 1749, which is in the JP Morgan Library
in New York.
129. BL Eg. Mss. 738, supra note 87, fol. 2 (june 3, 1744, A Treatiseon Microscopes), fol. 3
(August 22, 1743, An Attempt TowardsA NaturalHistoy of the Polype). According to the ESTC,
supra note 96, Dodsley published three works on microscopes by Baker: MicroscopeMade Easy
(1742, 1743, 1744, 1754, 1769), Etployment For the Microscope (1735, 1753, 1764) and Of
Microscopes (1760, 1785), as well as The Polype. In a further agreement, Will Duncan agreed to
translate Caesar's Commentaries, "the Property of the said Book shall be vested in the said
Robert Dodsley and his Heirs for ever." BL Eg. Mss. 738, supra note 87, fol. 6. The ESTC,
supra note 96, lists this as published by DodsleyJ & R and Tonson and S. Draper in 1753.
130. BL Eg. Mss. 738, supra note 87, fol. 2 (emphasis added).
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of the said Books and Every of Them. To have & to hold the said

Copy Right or Priviledge of Printing Vending or Selling the said
Books and Every of Them and all benefit or advantage to be had
or made thereby unto the said Thomas Osborne his Executors
Administrators and Assigns to & for his and their own proper use
and Benefits and as his and their own Proper Goods & Chattels
from henceforth for ever.131
However, while some documents use every conceivable term to describe
the interest being transferred, many-indeed most-are more rudimentary.
These various formulae may, in law, have had more significance than
contemporaries appreciated. Were a court to demand evidence of a "specific
intent" to convey the reversionary interest, as opposed to "general words,"132
there would have been significant doubt over whether and, if so, which, of
these less elaborate verbal formulae sufficed. As we will see, one possibility
was that the term "interest" indicated an intent to convey the expectancy as
opposed to the vested right (which would have been included in the term
"right" or "property"). But only about one in ten documents used that term
to describe the subject of the transfer.
c) Duration of Transfer
Most surviving documents that refer to the transfer of the "copy"
purport to transfer rights "for ever." For example, the deeds between
Bernard Lintot and Alexander Pope (to which we will return), as well as
between publisher Jacob Tonson and the poet Matthew Prior (1664-1721),
indicate that they had intended to transfer rights "for ever." 33 Contracts
purporting to convey rights "for ever" continued to be common throughout
the century.134 Some documents seem to confer the same open-ended power
131. 2 Upcorr, supra note 4, at [140] (emphasis added). The ESTC, supra note 96,
indicates that the book was published by Thomas Osborne in parts between 1748 and 1752.
Hill had issued a proposal for a subscription in 1746, a copy of which remains in the
Wellcome Institute.
132. See discussion of the interpretation of Carnan v. Bowles (1785), infra Section II.B.2.e.
133. RIVINGTON, supra note 87, at 57-59, sets out the agreement between Jacob Tonson
and Matther Prior, 1718 (contracting "to have and to hold all the said Copy of the said
Poems ... unto the said Jacob Tonson his heirs and assigns for ever') and between John
Gay and Bernard Lintot and Jacob Tonson, Jan 28, 1719 ("He the said John Gay doth
hereby promise and agree to assign unto the said Bernard Lintot and Jacob Tonson the copy
of all and singular the several new pieces which shall be printed in this edition to go equally
share and share and alike unto the said Bernard Lintot and Jacob Tonson their heirs and
assigns for ever.").
134. 2 UPCOTT, supra note 4, at [135]. See also, for example, the arrangement between
the writer Thomas Stackhouse (d. 1750) and the bookseller Stephen Austein, relating to
Stackhouse's commentaries on the Bible, dated 1740, set out in Informationfor Messrs John
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in a different way, that is, by conferring on the grantee the right to reprint the
work as many times as he (it usually was a man) "thinks fit."13s
Nevertheless, a significant number of documents say nothing about the
term of any transfer, typically referring merely to the transfer of the
"copy," 36 or the "copy right."137 It could not have been completely clear that
such transfers indicated an intent to transfer both terms of protection, and it
was certainly not obvious that the courts would interpret them in such a way.
d) Exclusion of Statute
Some contracts explicitly sought to negate the reversionary effect of the
second term by providing for the transfer of all interests, notwithstanding the
existence of "any statutory provision to the contrary." For example, the
printer-turned-bookseller John Watts frequently stipulated that his authors
give over full and sole rights to their work "for ever, any Law or Statute to
the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding."138 The first of these is a
contract dated February 5, 1727, over poet and playwright John Gay's (16851732) comic ballad opera, The Beggar's Opera. Here, Watts combined with
Jacob Tonson to purchase the rights, with John Gay giving them:
all the sole Right & Title of in and to the Copys & Copy Right of
Two books [Fifty Fables and The Beggars Opera], with Copys & Copy

Right of the said two Books .. . equally share & share alike & to

Hinton et al 2-3 (1773), available at PSOC, supra note 2, http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgibin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/"uk 1773a". One peculiar agreement attempted to transfer
the rights for "the life" of the author, the idea presumably being to give the benefit of the
remainder to the author's family. 1 UpcoTr, supra note 4, at [37], (Feb. 17, 1718-19)
(conveying to "Mr. Curll Full Satisfaction for a Copy of a Novel called The GermanAtlantis,
or Hanover Talesfor the life of the Author. Robert Busby").
135. As was the case with James Thomson's contract with Andrew Millar for "Spring"
signed on Jan 16, 1729/30. Houghton Library, Harvard, reproduced in JAMES THOMSON, supra
note 119, at 69.
136. E.g., 1 UPCOTr, supra note 4, at [157] (between Currl and Charles Molloy, dated
April 23 1718, for the play The Coque); see also id at [37], [38], [49], [102], [163].
137. E.g., 2 Upcorr, supra note 4, at [172] (documenting the June 12, 1723 contract
between Hook and Thomas Marshall "for the Copy right of Juvenal & Persius with notes by
me"). In 1724, Edmund Curll contracted with Ann Browne for her husband's translation of
a French story entitled, The German Apothecay. The contract conveyed "all my own right,
Property and Interest to and in the following Copies" which "shall for the future be invested
in the said Mr Edm: Curll, and his Assigns." 1 Upcorr, supra note 4, at [37] (dated Mar. 3,
1724/5).
138. 1 Upcor, supra note 4, at [43] (citing a contract between Watts and Colley Cibber,
on September 14, 1727, for The Provok'd Husband, or, A Journey to London by Sir John
Vanbrugh and Colley Cibber); see also id. at [29], [45], [142], [146], [148], [150], [152], [155],

[159], [161], [200], [206].
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their heirs and assigns equally share & share alike for ever any Law in
39

being now to the Contrary notwithstanding.1

The only law that might have been conceived as "to the Contrary" was
section 11 of the Statute of Anne. Such contracts, then, without explicitly
referring to any reversionary right, appear to have recognized such right, or
"expectancy," and attempted to exclude its operation. Interestingly, perhaps,
this language does not appear in all the surviving documents that involve
Watts in this period: some just refer to the "whole and sole right in the
copy."14 0 This perhaps suggests a targeted use of the clause. It is also worth
observing that while Watts was the first to use this device, a few other
publishers used similar clauses, though they are rare after the middle of the
century.141 Whether a court would regard such a clause as effective to nullify
the author-protective effect of section 11 of the Statute must have been
anything but clear.
e) Explicit Reference to the Reversionary Term
Only three surviving author-publisher documents from the first three
quarters of the eighteenth century make explicit reference to the reversionary
term, in each case seeking then to override its operation. All three contracts
involved the poet Alexander Pope and the publisher Bernard Lintot: the first
related to Pope's agreement to translate Homer's Iliad in 1713/14;142 the
second, dated December 28, 1717, underpinned publication of a collection of
Pope's works that had previously been individually published by Jacob
139. Id. at [107] (emphasis added).
140. Id. at [110] (with William Havard, March 3 1732 for the "whole & sole right of the
copy of a Tragedy call'd Scanderberg"); see also id. at [32], [41], [52], [104], [121], [126], [181],
[199].
141. Id. at [129] (a contract dated November 25, 1735, the bookseller John Gray
purchased the copyright in a play, The London Merchant, or the History of GeoTe Barnwell, by
George Lillo (1693-1739) for £105).
142. Egerton Charters, supra note 117, Ch. 1288. The contract has been transcribed by
James McLaverty, The Contract for Pope's Translaion of Homer's Iliad: An Introducton and
Transcnpfion, 15 LIBR. 206 (1993). This one is less explicit in its reference to the Statute than
the next two. Pope grants "the sole and absolute property" to Lintot
for and dureing all such time terme and termes of yeares and in as large
ample and beneficiall manner to all intents and purposes as he the said
Alexander Pope his Executors or Administrators or any or either of them
may can might or could have use or enjoy the Same ....
Id.
Although there is no reference to the reversionary term as such, the document is alluding to
the Statute of Anne in its reference to "such time term and termes ofyears." Id. The contract
purports to assign all Pope's rights, present or future (through the language "may can might
or could have"). Id.; see also FoxoN, supra note 35, at ch. 2.
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Tonson and Lintot;143 and the third, dated February 18, 1723, related to a
proposed translation of Homer's The Odyssey.144
The second contract is the most explicit in its reference to the reversion
of term in the Statute of Anne.14 5 The document recites:
Whereas by an Act of Parliament made in the Eighth year of the
reign of Her Majesty Queen Anne It is enacted that the Author of
any Book or Books his Assignee or Assigns shall have the sole
Liberty of Printing and Reprinting such Book or Books for the
Term of fourteen years to commence from the first Day of
publishing the same And that after the Expiration of the said Term
of fourteen years the sole Right of printing and disposing of Copys
shall return to the Authors thereof if they are then living for
another Term of fourteen . . . .146
The deed purports so far as is permissible to convey both statutory
terms. The rights are assigned:
for and during the Terme of fourteen years next ensueing the
publication of the said book for all and every other term or terms
as far as the said Alexander Pope now hath or hereafter may have
any Right Power and Authority by the said Act of Parliament or
otherwise to grant and sell the same.147
Moreover Pope undertook, for himself, his heirs, executors and assigns, both
not to sell the rights to anyone else,148 and more positively, should he be alive
at the end of fourteen years, to transfer the reversionary right to Lintot. 149

143. Egerton Charters, supra note 117, Ch. 129. The document is sealed, witnessed by
Henry Lintot and William Fortescue and bears the signature of Lintot, but not that of Pope.
144. Id. Ch. 130. The contract is reproduced in GEORGE SHERBURN, THE EARLY
CAREER OF ALEXANDER POPE 313-16 (1934). McLaverty observes that it shows "specific
awareness of the Queen Anne Act." FoxoN, supra note 35, at 241.
145. McLaverty refers to it as "the strangest" of Pope's agreements. FoxoN, supra note
35, at 240.
146. Egerton Charters, supra note 117, Ch. 129.
147. Id.

148. Pope undertook that he would
not at the end of the fourteenth year next after the publishing of the said
book nor at any time or times whatsoever here after grant or sell the
Liberty or Privilidge of printing reprinting or selling the said book or any
of the poems or works therein contained (except as before excepted) to
any person or persons whatsoever other than to him the said Bernard
Lintott."

Id.
149. Id.
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These three contracts, then-uniquely amongst all those seen from
before 1774-referenced the fact that the statutory assignable term was, on
its face, only fourteen years. The contracts attempted to ensure that any
subsequent term, statutory or otherwise, was also conveyed. At the same time
they recognized that there were doubts over an author's ability to convey the
reversionary term and included language that attempted nevertheless to
secure such assignment.
Much later in the century, contracts referring to the fourteen-year term
make a revival. The Strahan archive contains a number of deeds, dating at
least from 1780, in which the author undertakes that were they to be living at
the end of fourteen years from publication, they will "assign and set over
such further rights and property in and to the said work as by any Law
Custom or Use the said [author] shall be entitled to do."15o
f) Other Aspects of Contracts
The majority of surviving documents involved a flat fee,1st though the
payments varied enormously in size. 152 In the early decades, at least from the
evidence in The Upcott Collection, few payments are above double figures. The
first such payment was in 1727, from John Watt to Colley Cibber (16711757) for The Provok'dHusband. After the middle of the century, payments (at
least at the upper end) increased significantly. David Hume received L1200
from Gavin Hamilton and John Balfour for agreeing to the publication of a
single edition of his HistoU of Great Britain.153 For some time, this was
regarded as the high-water mark of payment. 154 However, in the late 1760s,
the publisher William Strahan started paying even larger sums for historical
works. 5 5 In 1768, the Scottish historian William Robertson (1721-1793)
150. BL Add. Mss. 48901, supra note 87, fol. 20 (addressing the contract dated 1780
between Blair and Creech, Strahan & Cadell).
151. See ROBERT DODSLEY, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ROBERT DODSLEY 1733-1764,
at 30-34 (ames Tierney ed., 1988).
152. Letter from David Garrick to Jean Baptiste Antoine Suard (Mar. 7, 1776), in David
Garrick, THE LETTERS OF DAVID GARRICK 989 (David M. Little & George M. Kahrl eds.,
1963) (a dramatists "profits, with his copy-moey, have sometimes risen to 8 or 9 hundred,
and sometimes a thousand pounds").
153. DAVID HUME, LETTERS OF DAVID HUME TO WILLIAM STRAHAN 15, 33 (G.B. Hill
ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1888); 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, JOHNSONIAN MISCELLANIES 349
n.7 (G.B. Hill ed., 1897) (receiving £1940 for the first two volumes of the History ofEnglana).
154. It should be contrasted with the 60 guinea fee that John Newbery paid Oliver
Goldsmith for The Vicar of Wakefield See ELIZABETH E. KENT, GOLDSMITH AND His
BOOKSELLERS 68 (1933); WELSH, supra note 87, at 58.
155. Letter from James Beattie to Sylvester Douglas (Aug. 14, 1775), in 2 THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES BEATTIE 308-09 (Roger Robinson ed., 2004) (recognizing
Strahan's generosity).
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received C3400 for his History of Charles V16 in 1772, William Blackstone was
paid £2000 for copyright in the Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland (which had
been first published in 1765);157 while in 1773, journalist and essayist John
Hawkesworth (1720-1773) received £6000 for the Voyages of Captain Cook.'5
156. JAMES A. COCHRANE, DR JOHNSON'S PRINTER: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM STRAHAN
40 (1964); HUME, supra note 153, at 15 (Hill's analysis); Stewart J. Brown, William Robertson
(1721-1793) and the Scottish Enlghtenment, in WILLIAM ROBERTSON AND THE EXPANSION OF
EMPIRE 7, 28 (Stewart J. Brown ed., 1997) [hereinafter ROBERTSON] (putting figure at £3500
plus another £500 if the book went into a second edition); Harlen, supra note 3, at 102
(putting price at £4000); Richard B. Sher, Charles V and the Book Trade: An Episode in
Enlightenment Print Culture, in ROBERTSON, supra, at 164-65 (stating that "the eighteenth
century equivalent of a six-figure deal, worth at least £200,000 or $300,0000 in late twentieth
century British and American currencies"). For the view that Robertson was unusually
successful, see Letter from Hume to Morellet (July 10, 1769), in 2 THE LETIERS OF DAVID
HUME 203 (J.Y.T. Greig ed., 1934) ("the greatest price that was ever known to be given for
any book"); Letter from John Douglas to Alexander Carlyle (Apr. 6, 1771) (on file with
Edinburgh University Library, Dc 441 no 19), cited in Sher, supra, at 166. Sher tells us that
Strahan shared the copyright with Cadell and John Balfour, and that the publishers earned
something like £15,000 from the sale of five editions. Id. at 178. Henry Brougham had put
the figure at £50,000. 1 HENRY BROUGHAM, LIVES OF MEN OF LETTERS AND SCIENCE
WHO FLOURISHED IN THE TIME OF GEORGE III 210 (Kessinger Publishing 2006) (1846).
In 1759, Robertson had received £600 from Andrew Millar and Thomas Cadell for
his debut book, History of Scotland During the Reigns of Queen May and King James 1/I till His
Access to the Crown ofEngland. Letter from Robertson to John Jardine (Apr. 20, 1759), rprinted
in 1 BROUGHAM, supra, at 278-79 ("more than was ever given for any book except David
Hume's"); Letter from W. Robertson to Andrew Fletcher and Lord Milton (Apr. 10 1758)
(on file with Saltoun Papers, MS 16707, fol. 98-99, NLS), cited in Stewart J. Brown, William
Robertson (1721-1793) and the Scottish En/ghtenment, in ROBERTSON, supra, at 7, 19; Jeffrey
Smitten, Robertson's Letters and the Life of Writing, in ROBERTSON, supra, at 36, 41; BL Add.
Mss. 48800, supra note 87, at 107, cited in Harlen, supra note 3, at 101. According to
Robertson, Strahan and Cadell made £6000 from it, though Sher indicates that Millar and
Cadell made these profits, whilst Strahan benefited from the printing work. 3 BOSWELL,
supra note 2, at 334.
In 1777, Strahan, Cadell and Boswell contracted with Robertson for rights in his
History ofAmerica, on the same terms as Charles . Harlen, supra note 3, at 207. Overall,
Richard Sher claims Roberston's publishing income was "more than C700,000 or well over
$1 million in early twenty-first century money." SHER, supra note 2, at 214.
157. Strahan nevertheless made profits from the work to the tune of £1768. BL Add.
Mss. 48800, supra note 87, at B, and BL Add. Mss. 48889, id., cited in Harlen, supra note 3, at
189.
158. JOHN HAWKESWORTH, AN ACCOUNT OF THE VOYAGES UNDERTAKEN BY THE
ORDER OF HIs PRESENT MAJESTY FOR MAKING DISCOVERIES IN THE SOUTHERN

HEMISPHERE (1773). Hawkesworth was appointed by the Government to write the account
in 1771 and supplied with the journals of the relevant ships, but was permitted to retain "the
property of the work." Id. He sold this to Strahan and Cadell (in preference to Thomas
Becket, seemingly at the cost of Hawkesworth's friendship with David Garrick). 2 BOSWELL,
supra note 2, at 247 n.5; JOHNSON, supra note 153, at 349; JOHN LAWRENCE ABBOTT, JOHN
HAWKESWORTH: EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY MAN OF LETTERS 147 (1982) (stating that this
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The historian Edward Gibbon was paid (726 by William Strahan and
Thomas Cadell for the right to publish the first edition of his Decline and Fall
of the Roman Empire in 1776, the publishers only finally securing the copyright
in the first three volumes, for C4000, in 1780; and, the final three volumes, in
1787, for the same sum. 15 9 These payments were, of course, for tried-andtested authors. Many contracts offered the writer a fee based on the number
of sheets in the published volume.160 The rates varied, but the eventual
income was not always insignificant: Tobias Smollett, for example, who was
paid by publisher James Rivington at a rate of three guineas per sheet, may
have received over £1000 for his four-volume A Complete History ofEngland.161
Many contracts included an entitlement to copies of the printed book,162
and in some cases these could be quite valuable. The agreement between the
poet Alexander Pope and his publisher Bernard Lintot on March 23,
1713(/14), whereby Pope undertook to translate Homer's The Iliad into
was "the largest payment of its kind during the whole of the century"). According to Abbott,
Strahan complained to Hume that he had overpaid. Letter from Strahan to Hume (Apr. 9,
1774), in HUME, supra note 153, at 283-84 (noting that "the event of which purchase, if it
does not cure Authors of their delirium, I am sure will have the proper effect upon
booksellers"); see Letter from Hawkesworth to Garrick (May 6, 1773), BL Add Ms 28, 104
fol. 45-46, reprinted in DAVID GARRICK, THE PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID
GARRICK WITH THE MOST CELEBRATED PERSONS OF HIS TIME 535 Games Boaden ed.,
London, Colburn & Bentley 1831).
159. EDWARD GIBBON, THE MEMOIRS AND LIFE OF EDWARD GIBBON 194-95; SHER,
supra note 2, at 259 n.161 (Gibbon received over £9000 for The Decline and Fal); BL Add.
Mss. 44805 "G" and BL Add. Mss. 48809, at 49, cited in Harlen, supra note 3, at 203-04;
Letter from E. Gibbon to T. Cadell (Dec. 16, 1786 & Feb. 24, 1787), in EDWARD GIBBON, 3
THE LETTERS OF EDWARD GIBBON G.E. Norton ed., 1956) [hereinafter GIBBON LETTERS]
(commenting on the fact "that so important a transaction will have been concluded in the
first instance by three minutes of conversation, and in the second by three lines of a letter, a
memorable example in the annals of authors and booksellers"); BL Add. Mss. 34887, at 5,
10.
160. See, e.g., the following contracts entered by bookseller Robert Dodsley: BL Eg. Mss.
738, supra note 87, fol. 2 June 3, 1744 with Henry Baker for A Treaise on Microscopes, 1 guinea
per sheet), fol. 4 (August 22, 1743 with Henry Baker for An Attempt Towards A Natural
Histoy of the Poype at 2 guineas a sheet), fol. 4 (October 15, 1748 with John Campbell for The
Geography, NaturalHistory andAniquities of England & Wales at 2 guineas a sheet); fol. 6 (with
Will Duncan for translation of Caesar's Commentaries at llls and 6d per printed sheet),
fol. 8 (August 22, 1749 with Thomas Salmon of Temple for The Tradesman'sDictionary at 1.5
guineas/sheet); SHER, supra note 2, at 215 (speculating that Duncan must have realized
several hundred pounds from his dealing with Dodsley).
161. SHER, supra note 2, at 215.
162. E.g., 1 UPCorr, supra note 4, at [188) (between Curll and Robert Samber, dated
February 20, 1723 whereby Samber received 4 Guineas and 12 copies); see also SHER, supra
note 2, at 220 (describing William Buchan's arrangement with publishers Cadell, Strahan,
Creech and Balfour, under which Buchan was to receive C50 or 100 copies of any new
edition of Domestic Medicine).
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English (to be published in six volumes), gave Pope a fee of C1290 (200
guineas per volume), as well as 750 copies of each volume which Pope
intended to sell by subscription.163 Lintot was to allow Pope one month in
which he could dispose of the copies free of any competition, whereafter
Lintot could print and sell the work. Pope made a fortune from the deal.164
Another example is the contract between the publishers Thomas Longman,
John Nourse and Dr. William Lewis (1708-1781), dated January 16, 1746.
Lewis would prepare a book A New English Dispensatory in which the
booksellers would gain copyright, in return for which Lewis would receive
65
L105 and one hundred copies.1 Four years later, Nourse entered an
agreement to publish a work by James Dodson (d. 1757) entitled The
Accountant Method ofBookkeeping, paying f 12 and 12 shilling and "fifty printed
copies" for the copyright.166 William Robertson, the historian, said he chose
to publish his history of Charles V with Strahan rather than Becket, who had
been recommended by Garrick, in part because Strahan included in the
arrangement twenty-five copies, worth L75.167 Similarly, the 1774 contract
between Captain Phipps and bookseller John Nourse relating to Phipps'
voyages involved a payment of C200 and "as many copies for [sic] in sheets
68
as he shall want not exceeding eighty."

163. COCHRANE, supra note 156, at 39; MAYNARD MACK, ALEXANDER POPE: A LIFE
267, passim (1985). The agreement was varied by the parties by a deed dated February 10,
1715, in relation to the second edition: Lintot was entitled to the subscription money on the
750 copies, in return for giving Pope a lump sum of L200 (over and above the contractual
200 guineas for the second volume). See BL Eg. Mss. 1951, fol. 3 (witnessed by William
Waters and John Dighton).
164. According to Peter Quennell the contract "laid the foundations of a modest
personal fortune" for Pope. PETER QUENNELL, ALEXANDER POPE: THE EDUCATION OF
GENIUS 1688-1728, at 99 (1968). The contract turned out to be an unfortunate one for
Lintot, and he even considered a legal action with a view to extricating himself from it.
REGINALD H. GRIFFITH, ALEXANDER POPE: A BIBLIOGRAPHY 41-42, 121-22 (1922);
WILLIAM WARBURTON & JOHN KNAPTON, POPE's LITERARY LEGACY: THE BOOK-TRADE
CORRESPONDENCE OF WILLIAM WARBURTON AND KNAPTON WITH OTHER LETIERS AND
DOCUMENTS, 1744-1780, at Iv (Donald W. Nichol ed., 1992).
165. 2 UPCOTT, supra note 4, at [152]. The work went into numerous editions, with
Nourse reprinting the 1753 work in 1765 ("second edition with large additions"), 1770, 1781,
1785 (a fifth edition carefully revised and improved after the authors death), and Nourse's
successor adding a further edition in 1799. Id.
166. 2 UPcorr, supra note 4, at [80]. The ESTC, supra note 96, contains only one edition
published by Nourse in 1750 under the title The Accountant. See 2 UPcorr, supra note 4, at
[53], [81], [82].
167. GARRICK, supra note 158, at 535.
168. 1 UPcOrr,supra note 4, at [177].
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Sometimes, an additional fee was paid to the author on the sale of a
specified number of copies,169 or on a reprinting.170 In one agreement, dated
May 1, 1752, between the bookseller Joseph Pole, and the surgeon George
Aylett, relating to The Gentleman's Farrieyor Treatise on the Diseases of Horses, the
latter assigned copyright for 10, with a further sum of L10 payable once 750
copies were sold, with a further proviso that:

[I]f the said Book come to a second or third Impression Seven
hundred & Fifty copies & no more to be printed of the first &
second edition of the said book, the said Geo Aylett is to receive
the like sum of Ten pounds in books in manner as above
mentioned for his Receiving & Allowing each of the said second
and third edition the Copy right of the said Book on the [] of
these Conditions being and recognising at all times the sole Right

and Property of the said Jos Pole his Executors etc.'1'
Frequently, provision for further payment was conditional upon the
author updating the work for issuance as a second edition. An example is an
agreement dated July 23, 1753 between William Lewis and publisher John
Nourse relating to Lewis's two volume treatise, New Practiceof Pysick. Lewis
agreed to "assign over the Copy right of the said Work" to Nourse for L157,
with Nourse agreeing "to pay to W. Lewis thirty one pound ten shillings, in
case he shall print a second edition of the above mentioned work, twenty one
pound upon a third seventy one pound upon a fourth edition. Each edition
to consist of one thousand copies."1 72
In some circumstances, an early form of the "out of print" clause appears
with the author purporting to retain rights to reprint the work should the
bookseller choose not to issue a second edition. For example, on June 3,

169. See, e.g., 1 UPCoTT,

supra note 4, at [157], [198]; 2 UPcoTr, supranote 4, at [12].

170. See, e.g, 1 UPCOT, supra note 4, at [38], [1251, [147], [183]; 2 UPCo r, supra note 4,
at [54], [55], [132], [161], [164], [197], [206], [208], [231]; BL Eg. Mss. 738, supra note 87, fol.
2 (June 3, 1744 between Henry Baker and Robert Dodsley, A Treatise on Microscopes, whereby
Baker was to receive 1 guinea/sheet on a first edition of 1000 copies, and half a guinea/sheet
on each subsequent edition of 1000), fol. 3 (August 22, 1743 between Henry Baker and
Robert Dodsley relating to An Attempt TowardsA NaturalHistory of the Polpe,whereby Baker
was to receive 5 guineas for each new impression), fol. 6 (between Dodsley and Will Duncan
for his translation of Caesar's Commentaries according to which Duncan was to receive 10
shillings & 6d per sheet for a second edition). Where such arrangements did not specify the
size of an edition, publishers may have been tempted to print greater umbers than normal.
See SHER, supra note 2, at 220 (describing very large editions of William Buchan's Domestic
Medicine).
171. 2 UPcoT, supra note 4, at [12]; see also id. at [54], [164].
172. Id. at [161]; see also id. at [26] (relating to a June 15, 1734 payment from Francis

Cogan and John Nourse to Theodore Barlow for revising Parish-Law).
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1744, the publisher Robert Dodsley agreed to publish Henry Baker's A
Treatise on Microscopes.73 Their contract purported to transfer the copyright
"for ever more," with Baker to receive a payment on any new edition.174 The
contract went on to provide that:
[fjn case the said Robert Dodsley shall not reprint the same within
two years next after the Sale of the books of the first impression
Then the Sole Property of the said Copy or Treatise shall at the
Expiration of such Two years revert to and be reinvested in the
said Henry Baker his Executors Administrators or Assigns and
upon being paid by him or them one half of the charge that he the
said Robert Dodsley shall have been at for the said Copper plates
and engraving thereof reassign the said Book and Plates to him or
them and all the property and Interest of the said Robert Dodsley
in and to the same.175
Thirty years later, in 1774, Captain Constantine John Phipps (later Lord
Mulgrave) (1744-1792) agreed that John Nourse should publish the Voyage
towards the North Pole, allowing Nourse "to make an impression of 1500 copies
at his own risque & charges upon such paper & type as shall be approved of"
and giving him a right of printing a second Edition "in all respects equal to
the first edition."17 6 Phipps also specified that "[i]f upon the first Impression
being out of print or rising in price & J. Nourse declines to publish a second
Edition Captain Phipps reserves to himself a power of giving to any other
person such 2nd Edition." 77
Occasionally, a contract provided for profit-sharing between author and
publisher,178 or involved assignment of only a portion of the copyright' 9 A

173. BL Eg. Mss. 738, supra note 87, fol. 2.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 1 UPCOTT, supra note 4, at [177]. According to the ESTC, supra note 96, a 1774
edition was issued not by Nourse but by F. Newbery. See also Memorandum between Adam
Ferguson and Strahan, Cadell & Creech, (Feb. 28, 1782) (on file with CE French Papers,
Massachusetts Historical Society), reprinted in 2 FERGUSON, supra note 88, at 576 (according
to which Ferguson was obliged to purchase copies that were unsold after eighteen months
and, on so doing, the publishers would "reassign the Copy Right").

177. Id.
178. 2 UPCOTT, supra note 4, at [23], [120], [150]; see also SHER, supra note 2, at 236; R.B.
Sher, New Light on the Publication and Reception ofThe Wealth of Nations, 1 ADAM SMITH REV.
3, 3-29 (2004); Letter from SHER, supra note 2, at 236; Adam Smith to William Strahan
(Nov. 13, 1776), in ADAM SMITH, CORRESPONDENCE OF ADAM SMITH 221 (1776) (Letter
No. 179); Letter from William Strahan to Adam Smith (Nov. 26, 1776), in SMITH, supra, at
222 (Letter No. 180).
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good example is the agreement made on September 18, 1747 between
Abraham Le Moine (d. 1757), writer of A Treatise on Miracles, and John
Nourse. The agreement recounted that Nourse had printed 750 copies at his
own expense, and undertook that once those expenses had been paid "the
Profits arising from the sale of the remaining Copies are to be equally divided
between the two said Parties." 80 Another, dated October 30, 1800, between
Rev. John Farrer (1735-1808) and J. and G. Rivington, relating to a volume
of Sermons on the Parablesgave the Rivingtons "one half of the copy right" and
required them to print 750 copies and pay Farrer half the profits on the sale
of those copies (and any subsequent impressions). 81
2. How Was the Reversion Understood?
Given the wide variation in contractual provisions that we have
identified, a key question arises as to how these clauses would have been
understood as affecting the reversion right. Was the reversionary term seen
as overriding contractual attempts to assign the copyright or not? Or was the
second term assignable? If so, in what circumstances? It is only with an
understanding both of contractual practice and law (or perception of law)
that we can assess whether section 11 secured any benefits for authors during
the eighteenth century. However, prior to the decision of the Court of
Chancery in Millar & Dodsley v. Taylor in 1765 there are no clear answers to
these questions. Even after that date, and after further court decisions in the
1780s confirming the assignability of the reversion, the legal requirements
that needed to be satisfied remained largely a matter of conjecture.
Throughout the eighteenth century, there was little discussion of the question
of the assignability of the reversion in the few textbooks and commentaries.
Our sources comprise a few brief letters, notes, and the contracts themselves.
Moreover, even though the Statute of Anne was applicable throughout
Britain, for much of the eighteenth century different answers were given to
these questions in Scotland as opposed to England.182

179. 2 Upcorr, supra note 4, at [31] (discussing a sale by Alexander Blackwell to John
Nourse, dated September 28, 1737, of one third share in a book created by his wife,
Elizabeth); see also id. at [35], [38].
180. Id. at [150]. The ESTC, supra note 96, refers to one edition published by Nourse in
1747.
181. 2 UPCO'rT, supra note 4, at [120].
182. See DEAZLEY, supra note 19, at 182 (discussing the Act of Union 1707, and the
question of common law rights), 189 ("The legal plurality of a politically united British state
allowed for legitimisation of two fundamentally opposed concepts of copyright, one in the
north and one in the south.").
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1710-1765: A Plurality of Interpretations

In the period before 1765, there were at least three interpretations of the
law: first, that the reversion was personal and non-assignable; second, that it
was assignable, but this required some indication of an explicit intention to
do so and, possibly, the use of a deed; third, that the reversion was subsumed
within, and assignable along with, the perpetual common law right.
The view that the reversion was not assignable at all seems to have widest
recognition in Scotland.183 A letter from Ronald Crawford to George Ross,
dated November 28, 1754, discussing whether Robert Foulis, a Scottish
publisher, had infringed rights in Pope's works, argued that in relation to
work in which a second term of fourteen years had begun to run before
Pope's death, no action could be brought.184 Crawford explained that "yet I
have a doubt If on his Death, such Privilege is assignable for what part of the
2d term may be then to run. It seems to be only personal, to the Author
himself, but not to his Executors or Assigns."185 Crawford's legal opinion
thus suggests that the second term itself was personal and not assignable.
The basis for such a claim was the close, textual reading of the Statute of
Anne. The section granting the initial term described the right that was
conferred on authors or their assignees as "the sole liberty of printing and
reprinting such book,"186 whereas the clause granting the reversionary term to
authors related to "the sole right of printing or disposing of copies."' 87
Crawford, it seems, was arguing that the different descriptions of the
beneficiaries ("authors or their assignees" v. "authors") and objects ("books"
and "copies") implied different interests, in particular, that the reversion gave
only a personal right, not a proprietary one. Therefore, it appeared, on a
technical reading of the statute, that the right was non-assignable even after the
right fell into possession. This view certainly had some circulation in

183. A similar doubt appears to have existed in the mind of the author of Pope's
contracts with Lintot. This transferred rights for "as long as the said Alexander Pope hath
any right power and authority by the said Act of Parliament or otherwise to grant or sell the
same" and added a promise, were the immediate transfer not effective, on Lintot's request,
to "without further Consideration or Reward whatsoever. . . make any new or further grant
of the said Book and the Poems and ... for and during another Term of fourteen years and
for and during all and every other Term or Terms asfar as the said Alexander Pope hath any
Right powerand authoriy by the saidAct of Pariamentor other wise to grant or sell the same." (emphasis
added). See sources cited supra note 117.
184. Letter from Ronald Crawford to George Ross (Nov. 28, 1754), BL Eg. Mss. 1959,
fols. 23-24, reproduced in WARBURTON & KNAPTON, supra note 164, at 102.
185. Id
186. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (1710) (Gr. Brit.) (emphasis added).
187. Id § 11 (emphasis added).
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Scotland, but ultimately fell to be rejected by the Court of Session in Cadellv.
Anderson (1787).
A second view was that the reversionary term was assignable, but only by
way of express terms in a deed (that is, a promise under seal). This seems to
have been the view of Alexander Pope, decipherable from a note scribbled
on the back of a letter:
I never alienated, intentionally, any Copy for ever, without
expressly giving a Deed in forms, to witness & that the Copy right
was to subsist after the Expiration of the 14 years in Queen Ann's
Act, which then was understood generally to be the [c]ase, unless
covenanted to the Contrary.'88
Although somewhat ambiguous, Pope seems to imply that it was
generally understood that a "deed" or "covenant" was required to establish
that the purported transferee was vested with the whole copyright, the
contingent interest otherwise reverting to the author. While the Statute of
Anne said nothing about a deed, Pope's views might have reflected
provisions in some royal privileges requiring that consent be by deed, or the
fact that famous contracts from before the Statute, most notably that
between Milton and Simmons, were by deed. Whatever the reason, Pope was
of the view that a number of his works that had been printed by Jacob
Tonson Junior, and had been published in 1712 and 1714, had reverted to
him in 1726 and 1728: "the property is therfore reverted to Me from that
time, unless I covenanted to the contrary; which will appear by the writing I
gave. & by which I am ready to be determined." 189 Although he
acknowledged that he could not recollect the details of the transactions, Pope
was convinced that he had not alienated the reversion to Tonson, "because
the Mony I receivd was a very trifling Sum, no way proportioned to a
Perpetuity." 9 0
If Pope's understanding of the interaction of section 11 of the Statute of
Anne and contractual practice was widely held, then Ransom's claim that the
188. BL Eg. Mss. 1951, supra note 163, fols. 17, 18, 19; ALEXANDER POPE, THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF ALEXANDER POPE 222-24 (George Sherburn ed., 1956). McLaverty
says the note reveals "a fiercely protective attitude to literary property and a close knowledge
of the legislation." FOXON, supra note 35, at 238.
189. POPE, supra note 188, at 223.
190. Id. at 224. Given what went before (in particular, Pope's observation that books

published prior to 1710 were now "no man's property but common" suggesting that Pope
thought that the statutory terms governed), this reference to "perpetuity" was probably not
an indication that he believed (as some booksellers did) that there was a "perpetual"
common law right, but rather, merely, that he could, and had in some circumstances,
transferred the potentially twenty-eight year term in full.
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reversionary right was useless because of the continued practice of
assignment in perpetuity looks particularly dubious. If a deed were really
required to assign the reversionary term, very few of the surviving
documents-maybe one in ten-would have actually been effective to do so.
However, Pope's view may have been idiosyncratic or unusually wellinformed. Or, his view may have prevailed in the period from 1710 to 1740,
only to be replaced by a more flexible view. The contractual practice revealed
by The Upcott Collection can be interpreted as reflecting such a change in
understanding after 1740.
The third view was that the reversion was assignable. This was held by
Pope's literary executor, William Warburton. Warburton was one of the first
to resuscitate the claim to perpetual copyright (which some of the
booksellers had themselves claimed before 1710).191 As is well known, 192
Warburton published in 1747 A Letterfrom an Author to a Member of Parliament
Concerning Literay Propery, developing from first principles an argument in
support of "the rnght of property in AUTHORS to their works."193 The same
argument was simultaneously being made (albeit inconclusively) in an action
in Scotland against some Scottish reprinters, 194 and was echoed fifteen years
later by the author of A Vindication of the Rights ofAuthors (1762) in parallel
with another inconclusive action in England.195 In practice Warburton acted
as many booksellers did, as if the statutory terms meant nothing. Not
insignificantly, this practice extended to acts that were not self-serving. For
example, Warburton gave shares in the 1751 edition of Pope's works to
Tonson and Lintot, even though the statutory twenty-eight-year terms in
works in which they had any interest (all published before 1723) would have
lapsed. In a letter to Mercy Dodderidge, in 1759, he explained, "If the work

191. Jacob Tonson the Elder, the leading publisher in the reign of Queen Anne, held
such views before the enactment of the statute, but may well have concluded that the Statute
replaced the common law. See G6mez-Arostegui, supra note 15.
192. Warburton's authorship has sometimes been questioned. See, e.g., INFORMATION
FOR ALEXANDER DONALDSON, supra note 38, at 66. But, it is clear from his letter to
Knapton, on August 26, 1747, BL Eg. Mss. 1954, supra note 87, fol. 1, in WARBURTON &
KNAPTON, supra note 164, at 13.
193. WILLIAM WARBURTON, A LET'ER FROM AN AUTHOR TO A MEMBER OF
PARLIAMENT, CONCERNING LITERARY PROPERTY (1747).

194. Midwinter v. Hamilton (1743-48) and Millar v. Kincaid (1749-51) BL 18th century
reel, 4065/03, 04. The litigation is explained in DEAZLEY, supra note 19, at ch. 5(1).
195. VINDICATION, supra note 2. The parallel litigation was Tonson v. Collins, which is
described in DEAZLEY, supra note 19, at ch. 5(2).

1518

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:1475

was written within fourteen years, the property is secured by Act of
Parliament; when that time elapsed, it is then claimed by common law."196
The reversionary term seems to have made no impression on
Warburton's consciousness. For those educated to believe in common law
copyright, the terms of the contract, rather than section 11 of the Statute,
may have been believed to govern the mutual rights of authors and
publishers. According to Boswell, writing in 1763, "it has always been
understood by the trade, that he who buys the copy-right of a book from
another, obtains a perpetual property; and upon that belief, numberless
bargains are made to transfer that property after the expiration of the
statutory term."197

b) Millar &Dodsley v. Taylor (1765): The First Ruling on Assignability
The first legal ruling on the reversion right issued from the Court of
Chancery in the mid-1760s in the suit Millar & Dodsley v. Taylor.198 The case
involved Edward Young's poem The Complaintor Night-Thoughts on life, Death
and Immortality. A work of nine parts, The Complaint had been published in
stages during the 1740s, and two publishers Andrew Millar and James
Dodsley sought in 1763 first to prevent Alexander Donaldson, the
Edinburgh and London publisher, from reprinting, and Robert Taylor, who
operated in the south west of England,199 from selling the book.200 Although
196. Letter from Warburton to Mercy Dodderidge (Mar. 8, 1759) (on file with Historical
Society of Pennsylvania, Dreer Collection); Letter from Robert Foulis to William Murray
(Dec. 20, 1754), BL Eg. Mss. 1959, supra note 184, fol. 20, in WARBURTON & KNAPTON,
supra note 164, at 105.
197. 1 BOSWELL, supra note 2, at 437 (entry for July 20, 1763). According to Boswell,
Johnson stated that "the term of fourteen years is too short; it should be sixty years." Id.
198. Millar & Dodsley v. Taylor, C33/426 (Ch. 1765). The case was never reported, and
the following account is based on the original court documents held at the National Archive
at Kew.
199. C111/166 (May 5, 1766) (explaining he sold copies in Bristol, Exeter, Taunton,
Salisbury and Bridgewater).
200. The Bill of complaint by Millar against Donaldson, dated May 2, 1763, is
C12/515/13. We are grateful to Tomis G6mez-Arostegui for supplying us with a copy of
this. Affidavits were lodged in relation to the action against Donaldson by Millar, Dodsley &
William Nicoll, the latter of St. Pauls Churchyard, and dated May 2, 1763. Nicoll attested to
having purchased a copy of The Complaint, printed by Donaldson & Reid in Edinburgh in
1761, from Donaldson for two shillings and six pence. See C31/148, 270. An interim
injunction was awarded on May 3, 1763. C33/420 at 244. The Answer, dated May 9, 1763, is
located at C12/405/18. Significantly, perhaps, Donaldson's demurrer was argued
successfully, and the injunction was dissolved by a provisional order on March 18, 1766,
made absolute on April 24, 1766. C33/426 at 158, 245. An order was made permitting
amendment of the plaintiff's complaint on June 7, 1766, but it is not clear that the matter
was pursued any further. C33/426 at 383.

2010]

ANGLO-AMERICAN AUTHORS' REVERSION RIGHTS

1519

Donaldson entered a general demurrer, Taylor did not deny selling the work,
150 copies of which he had acquired from Donaldson. Instead, Taylor
explained that Donaldson had "informed ... [him] ... that the said doctor
Young had never sold or assigned the copy right of the said Poems but was
pleased with every person who published the same for the public and general
benefit of mankind. . . ."201 In addition to asserting his ignorance as to Millar
and Dodsley's title, Taylor asserted that neither Dodsley nor Millar had any
subsisting interest in the poem, the first fourteen years having lapsed. In
essence, Taylor did not deny the illegitimacy of his acts, but rather the right
of the claimants to object: if anyone was to bring such an action, Taylor
argued, it was Edward Young himself. The defendant:
humbly insists and is advised that the Authors of Books of genius
and Compositions of the Brain or the assignees have not vested in
them by law a perpetual indefinite right or property to the Copies
of such Books but that the sole liberty given to Authors or their
Assigns of Printing or reprinting such Books is limited are
restrained to the Term of ffourteen Years with this exception that
in case the Author of such Book be living after the Expiration of
such Term of ffourteen years the sole Right of printing and
disposing of Copies of such Books reverts and returns to them for
another Term of ffourteen years and this Defendant humbly insists
with great submission to the Judgment of honourable Court that
the Sale and Assignment of the Books set forth in the Bill (if any
such there was) was not good and valid in law for any greater or
longer term than ffourteen Years And also humbly insists that the
Term of ffourteen years which commenced from the first
publication of the said Books being some time since expired and
the said Doctor Young being the Author thereof being still alive (as
this Defendant believes) the sole property of printing and disposing
of the Copies did return to and is now vested in the said Dr
Edward Young and him only clean and discharged from the
The Bill against Robert Taylor, dated May 31, 1763 is C 12/517/43 m.l. Affidavits
were supplied by Millar, dated May 25, 1763, and James Easton, dated May 26, 1763. Millar
attested to his and Dodsley's joint tide, while Easton, of Salisbury in Wiltshere, gave
evidence that he had purchased a copy of The Complaint, printed by Donaldson & Reid in
Edinburgh in 1761, from Taylor for two shillings and seven pence on May 20, 1763. See
C31/148 at 254, 275. After an ex parte hearing at which the plaintiff was represented by the

Attorney General, an inteim injuction was awarded on June 3, 1763. C33/420 at 307.
Taylor's answer was much slower in coming, dated February 1, 1764. C12/517/43 m.2. The
Answer was taken by Jacob Kirbey and John Lean on February 1, 1764, at the Fountain
Tavern in Bristol. Further orders, for Taylor to produce witnesses or show cause to why
publication should not pass, were made on May 11, 1765 and June 7, 1765. C33/424 at 226,

299.
For the best published account, see
201. C12/517/43 m.2.

DEAZLEY, supra note 19, at 172-73.
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original Sale and unaffected by any mesne assigment of the right of
printing such Books.... And this Defedant humbly insists upon
and hopes he shall have the benefit of the Act of the Eighth of
Queen Anne ch. 8 .. . in like manner as if he had pleaded the same
to the Complainant's Bill of Complaint ... .202
The Master of the Rolls, Thomas Sewell, reviewed the evidence and granted
an injunction. Examining the contracts, the Court found that the first five
parts had been published in 1743 by Robert Dodsley, who had purchased for
1168 "the sole right to him and his heirs forever of the Copy." 203 Dodsley
had also purchased "the sole right of Printing" the sixth part in January 1744,
Young giving a written receipt for C52.204 The rights in the remaining three
parts were purchased in 1749 by Andrew Millar, for C63, in a deed which
conveyed "all that the said Edward Young's sole right and property in and
to" the second volume of the work "forever."205 When Robert Dodsley gave
up business as a publisher in 1759, rights in Young's work had been
transferred to James Dodsley, and thus he and Millar controlled the rights to
the work jointly. Following "debate of the matter," the Master of the Rolls
affirmed the grant of an injunction:
to stay the defendant from printing, publishing and vending the
Books in question .. . for the remainder of the two terms of
fourteen years and fourteen years during which the said Doctor
Young as Author of the said Work and the Plaintiffs as standing in
his place had a right to the sole printing publishing and vending of
the said Books. 206

Moreover, the Master of the Rolls referred the calculation of an account of
profits to the Master. 207
The decision thus indicates that the Court regarded the reversionary term
as transferrable, and, indeed, that an agreement to transfer the reversionary

202. Id.

203. C33/426.
204. The receipt is contained in the Houghton Library, Harvard University, and is
reproduced in EDWARD YOUNG, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF EDWARD YOUNG 597 (Henry
Pettit ed., 1971).
205. Id. at 598.
206. C33/426.
207. In his response to interrogatories, Taylor persisted in his claim that he had only

sold 150 copies, and that he had gained these in exchange for certain other books (Milton's
Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained, Bunyan's Pilgrims Progress) which he gave Donaldson.
Taylor argued that he made, at most six pence on each sale, so that the profits for which he
should account were a measly k315 shillings. C111/166 (May 5, 1766).
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term could be entered into prior to the vesting of that term. 20 8 Thus Ronan
Crawford's view, that the reversion created a purely personal right, was
rejected. Although the reasoning remains unknown, the holding highlights
the limitations of the statutory approach. By conceptualizing the authorprotective measure in proprietary terms, in 1710 Parliament placed the right
within the more general logic of property. One aspect of that logic was, and
remains, that property rights are typically assignable.
Moreover, it is an irresistible conclusion from the facts of the case that
the Court considered that it was unnecessary to refer explicitly to the
reversionary interest or to attempt to override the effect of section 11
through some sort of exclusion clause (such as that pioneered by John
Watts). Beyond that, however, it is difficult to draw any precise conclusions
as to what the court regarded as necessary to assign the reversionary term.
Although Dodsley was relying on rather rudimentary documentation, the
holding does not imply that this was, of itself, sufficient to transfer the
reversionary term. This is because the Court would have been able to base its
conclusion that an injunction should be granted on the rights in the final
three parts of The Complaint,which Millar had secured by way of a deed. All
we can be certain of is that a deed in that form was sufficient to transfer the
reversion, at least where the dispute was between the alleged transferee and a
third party (rather than between the alleged transferee and the intended
beneficiary of the statutory reversion, the author).
c) 1765-1774: Common Law Copyright and the Redundancy of the
Reversion Right
The 1765 Millar e'r Dodsley v. Taylor decision, significant as it looks in
retrospect, seems to have attracted little attention at the time, for booksellers
and authors were consumed by a much more significant question: that of
common law copyright. Following the 1762 action in Tonson v. Collins, which
had been dismissed on the basis that the defendant's fees were in fact being
paid by the claimant, the issue of an author's rights at common law had been
fully argued but lay tantalisingly unresolved.209 The eyes of the booksellers

208. One question mark must have hung over the decision: how could Taylor, the seller,
be liable if Donaldson, the publisher, was not? See supra note 200.
209. Tonson v. Collins, (1762) 96 Eng. Rep. 108. Perhaps the arguments in Tonson also
informed Millar and Dodsley's decision to pursue Taylor and Donaldson over Young's
work. Joseph Yates, counsel for Collins, had argued that there could be no perpetual right in
the author on the basis that it was inconsistent with section 11: "The Limitation of Time is
still farther proof of the same: It commences at a future day; It endures for fourteen years; if
the author be living, the right returns to him for fourteen years more. Why only fourteen?
Why not to his Representatives, as well as himself?" Id.
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and authors were thus, from 1763, firmly fixed on the other Millar v. Taylor,
the case involving James Thomson's The Seasons. When the Court of King's
Bench held in 1769 that an author, and his assigns, had a perpetual copyright
at common law, the limitations that Parliament had imposed on copyright
through the Statute of Anne, including the reversionary right, were implicitly
redundant.210 A common law right existed that, like any other, was assignable
in full. Indeed, the common law right in that case may have arisen in
Thomson's The Seasons as a result of his original efforts, but the action was
brought by Andrew Millar, who had himself acquired the rights in three of
the four poems from Thomson's original publisher, John Millan. The original
agreement between Thomson and Millan was embodied in a written receipt,
dated July 18, 1728, purporting to confer on Millan "the intire Right and
Property ... for ever."211 The recognition of the common law right, then, not
only undermined the "reversion," 212 but may have also resolved the
uncertainty that clearly existed over the precise form and content of an
assignment. Absent special regulation, common law property in "copies" was
assignable like any other property. 213
d) 1774-1785: Attention Returns to the Statute of Anne
Common law copyright, however, did not survive for long. On February
22, 1774, in the great case of Donaldson v. Beckett,214 the House of Lords held
that once a work was published, the existence of copyright depended solely
on the terms of the Statute of Anne. The decision thus clarified the existence
of a legal public domain of books in which copyright had lapsed and in

210. Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201.
211. The original receipt is in the Houghton Library, Harvard University, but is
reproduced in THOMSON, supra note 119, at 63. Millan's assignment of the rights to Millar
also survives and is reproduced id. at 120.
212. Indeed, for this reason, several members of the Scottish Court of Session declined
to follow the King's Bench ruling: Lord Kennet said that the reversionary provision "would
have been absurd, if authors were understood to have that sole right ab ante" while the Lord
President said the reversion was "proof that no previous right was understood to exist." THE
DECISION OF THE COURT OF SESSION UPON THE QUESTION OF LITERARY PROPERTY IN
THE CAUSE OF JOHN HINTON, LONDON, BOOKSELLER AGAINST ALEXANDER DONALDSON
AND JOHN WOOD, BOOKSELLER OF EDINBURGH AND JAMES MEUROSE, BOOKSELLER,

KILMARNOCK 2,36 (James Boswell pub., 1774).
213. That said, Andrew Millar's claim in the 1769 case would not have been affected had
the courts required a deed. This is because he had acquired the "sole and exclusive property
and right of printing" in the fourth poem, Spring, by way of a deed, attested by two
witnesses, on January 16, 1729/30. The original is in the Houghton Library, Harvard
University, and is reproduced in THOMSON, supra note 119, at 69.
214. (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 257; COBBETr'S, supra note 84, at 993,passim.
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relation to which legitimate competition could exist. 215 At the same time, the
decision re-focused attention (of English publishers and authors) on the
bifurcated, contingent, term, and, in turn, the issue of assignability. Reporting
on the decision, the Annual Register observed:
The English booksellers have now no other security in future for
any literary purchases they make but the statute of the 8th of
Queen Anne, which secures to author's assigns an exclusive
property for 14 years, to revert again to the author and vest in him
for 14 years more. 216
After 1774,217 publishers' concern with, and authors' consciousness of,
the reversion increased. 218 David Hume, for example, offered to assign to his
publisher, William Strahan, copyright in the revisions of his works, in order
to extend the term:
As to my writings, I think it will be possible for me to prolong your
lease of them, even according to the Statute. I have never made a
new edition without Alterations, and even Additions, sometimes of
a considerable length. If it were thought worth while, I could
transfer you anew the Property of these; and if Nobody can reprint

215. But, the London booksellers continued to protect themselves by "honorary
copyright." 3 BOSWELL, supra note 2, at 370; Harlen, supra note 3, at 198.
216. Annual Register, XVII.i.95, quoted in 2 JOHNSON, supranote 153, at 443.
217. Letters between David Hume and publisher William Strahan indicate that the latter
did not think the decision in Donaldson would or should affect the prices paid to authors
for copyright. Writing on April 2, 1774, Hume suggested that the decision would not alter
publishers' practices because they could, as previously, operate "a tacite Convention among"
themselves. Strahan replied on April 9 that he would "not take into account the present

uncertain state of literary property in general" because the "simple question" of
remuneration turned on how many copies a book would sell at a particular price "in a few
years." HUME, supra note 153, at 80, 283-84. Contrast the views of James Beattie in a letter
to Edward Dilly, March 29, 1774, who described the decision as one "attended with bad
consequences not to Booksellers only, but to authors also, and to Literature in general" and
also in a letter to Thomas Blacklock, dated May 23, 1774 (discussing apparent rejection of
Blacklock's book by the bookseller Davis), in 2 BEATTIE, supra note 155, at 261 (Letter No.
514), 269 (Letter No. 550).
218. In 1786, the historian, William Robertson discussed the decision of his publisher to
issue a new edition of his History of Scotland explicitly in terms of the bifurcated copyright:
"Messrs Strahan & Cadell intend to close the second fourteen years of their Copyright
property by printing two elegant editions of the Book, one in quarto and the other in
octavo." Letter from Robertson to Hardwicke (Jan. 30, 1786), BL Add. Mss. 35350, fol. 73,
cited in Smitten, supra note 156, at 48. Likewise, Gibbon referred to the possibility of
providing a revision of his Decline and Fall to Cadell so that the latter would "renew your
copy-right at the expiration of the last fourteen years." Letter from E. Gibbon to T. Cadell
(Feb. 11, 1789), in 3 GIBBON LETTERS, supra note 159, at [721].
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these passages during fourteen Years after the first publication, it
219
would effectively secure you so long from any pirated edition.

While attention was refocused on the Statute of Anne, including section
11, the earlier Chancery decision of Millar & Dodsley v. Taylor seems to have
been forgotten by authors, booksellers and (at least some) lawyers alike. 220
Author Samuel Johnson, for example, clearly had no appreciation of the
decision. Considering the possibility of legislative reform of the limited
period of protection granted by the Statute of Anne, he wrote to his
publisher Strahan on March 7, 1774 with the following suggestions:
1. That an Authour should retain during his life the sole right of
printing and selling his work ....
2. That the authour be allowed, as by thepresent act, to alienate his right only
shorter time would not procure a sufficient price,
and a longer would cut off all hope of future profit, and
consequently all solicitude for correction or addition.

forfourteenyears. A

3. That when after fourteen years the copy shall revert to the
authour, he be allowed to alienate it again for only seven years at a
time. After fourteen years the value of the work will be known, and
it will be no longer bought at hazard. Seven years possession will
therefore have an assignable price. It is proper that the authour be
always incited to polish and improve his work, by that prospect of
accruing interest which those shorter periods of alteration will
afford.
4. That after the authour's death his work should continue an
exclusive property capable of bequest and inheritance, and of
conveyance by gift or sale for thirty years. 221
While Dr. Johnson's proposal is interesting, not least because Johnson would
have not only reinstituted but reinforced the author-protective provisions
from section 11, what is more significant about this letter, from our
perspective, is Johnson's interpretation of the effect of the section, namely,
that it only permitted alienation of copyright for fourteen years. According to

219. Hume to Strahan, Mar. 1774, 2 HUME, supra note 156, (Letter No. 496), at 286; see
also Adam Smith to Thomas Cadell, March 14, 1786, SMITH, supra note 178 (Letter No. 257)
('TJhe eight and twenty years property are now expired [in The Theory of MoralSentiments].
But I hope to be able to secure you the property for at least fourteen years more."). Smith
was planning a substantially revised edition.
220. But see infra text accompanying notes 235-36 (counsel for Carnan's reference to

"Millarv. Taylor').
221. 2 JOHNSON, supra note 153, at 442-46 (citing from an original then in the
possession of R.B. Adam of Buffalo) (emphasis added).
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Johnson, even with a deed and an express intention to override the statutory
protection, alienation of the reversionary term was impossible until it had
fallen into possession.
Moreover, the practices of at least some publishers seem to have altered
after 1774 in a way that suggest that they no longer recalled, or trusted, the
1765 decision. Several of the publishing contracts entered by William Strahan
(the addressee of Dr Johnson's letter) in the early 1780s are made by deed,
suggesting that Strahan had started to think, as some publishers had in the
1720s and 30s, that such formality was required. In addition, in a number of
these contracts the authors promised, after the fourteen year period had
lapsed, to do whatever was necessary to perfect the publisher's title. This
implies that the booksellers doubted that even the use of deeds had been
effective to achieve that goal.222
The legal profession, too, had new doubts about the assignability of the
reversionary term. Barrister and law reporter Charles Ambler, King's
Counsel, for example, advised the music publishers, Longman & Broderip, in
1783, that transfers that they believed they had received in the 1760s might
not have been fully effective with respect to the contingent reversion. 223 As
later recounted in litigation, the Ambler opinion stated that the words of the
Statute of Anne were "general" so that it appeared that, if living, the author
224
was entitled to the second term of protection "even against his own Act."
He said he could not "call to mind any Judicial determination upon [the
issue]." 225 As a reporter of Chancery decisions from the late 1730s onwards
(1737-1783), albeit one without an outstanding reputation, 226 he would have
been in a good position to know.22 7 Clearly, Millar & Dodsley v. Taylor, being
unreported and having attracted little attention, had quickly disappeared from
memory.
222. BL Add. Mss. 48901, supra note 87, fol. 20 (Blair), fol. 22 (Buchan), fol. 39
(Mackenzie).
223. Mace, supra note 72, at 9, contains Rennett's answer to Longman & Broderip's
complaint against him, E112/1702, No. 3728.
224. Mace, supra note 72, at 9.
225. Id.
226. John Wallace complained that in "many instances the language of the Judges was so
erroneously reported that false ideas were given of the points decided." JOHN WIILIAM
WALLACE, THE REPORTERS ARRANGED AND CHARACTERIZED 513 (1882). Van Vechten

Veeder was more damning still. V.V. Veeder, The English Reports, 1202-1865, 15 HARV L.
REv. 1, 114-15 (1901) (stating that "their statement of facts is often defective, their reports
of the arguments of counsel are far from lucid, and sometimes they give an incorrect report
of the decree").
227. Eldon LC said that he had "a very considerable knowledge of the decisions of his
own time." Clarke v. Parker, (1812) 34 Eng. Rep. 419, 423.
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1785-1787: Judicial Interpretation of Section 11 in Rennett v.
Thompson, Rennett . Longman & Broderi, Carnan v. Bowles, and
Cadell v. Anderson

The issue of whether, and if so, when and how the reversionary term
could be transferred fell finally for decision in four cases in the mid-1780s,
two before the four Barons in Exchequer,228 one in Chancery, 229 and one in
the Scottish Court of Session. 23 0 None concerned works of high literature.
The first two cases, Rennett v. Thompson and Rennett v. Longman and Broderip, in
Exchequer, concerned music, 231 a subject matter that courts had only in 1777,
explicitly recognized as falling within the scope of the Statute of Anne's
protection of "books." 232 The third, Carnan v. Bowes, was about very different
subject matter, namely maps, 233 while the fourth case, Cadell v. Anderson,
concerned Blackstone's Commentaries.234

228. Rennett v. Thompson (unreported, 1785) and Rennett v. Longman and Brodern)
(unreported, 1785). The processes seem to have been similar, though Exchequer was often
speedier. See generally W.H. BRYSON, THE EQUITY SIDE OF THE EXCHEQUER: ITS
JURISDICTION, ADMINISTRATION, PROCEDURES, AND RECORDS (1975); Henry Horwitz,
Chancey Equiy Records and Proceedings, 1600-1800, 55 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 146 (1996); Henry
Horwitz, ChanceU's 'Younger Sister".- The Court of Exchequer and Its Equiy Jurisdiction, 16491841, 72 HIST. RES. 161, passim (1999); Judith Milhous & Robert Hume, Eighteenth Century
Equity Lawsuits in the Court of Exchequer as a Source for Historical Research, 70 HIST. RES. 231

(1997).
229. Carnan v. Bowles, (1785) 29 Eng. Rep. 45 (Ch.).
230. Cadell v. Anderson, No. 340 (July 17, 1787), in DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF
SESSION: FROM NOVEMBER 1781 To AUGUST 1787, at 522 (A. Law, W. Steuart & R. Craigie
eds., 1788) [hereinafter COURT OF SESSION].
231. The cases are thoroughly described in Mace, supra note 72, at 13-22.
232. Bach v. Longman, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (K.B.). See Michael Carroll, The Struggle
for Music Copyrght, 57 FLA. L. REv. 907, 935-45 (2005).
233. Thompson and Carnan are linked by a curious geographical coincidence:
Carrington Bowles and Charles Thompson occupied adjacent premises in St. Paul's
Churchyard. RAVEN, supra note 74, at 184. James Raven wrote:
Of Donaldson's Churchyard neighbours, Charles Thompson's music
printing shop stood to the north of the great West door of the [St. Paul's]
Cathedral, almost adjoining Thomas and Carington Bowles, printsellers
and wholesalers, and for a long time the greatest print and cartoon shop
in the country. Thomas Bowles traded at no 69, next to the Chapter
House, from about 1712 to 1767. His nephew, Carington, son of his
brother John, who had been in the trade since about 1720, continued the
business until his own death in 1793.
Id. One might wonder whether Bowles was tempted to transact with Paterson because he
knew of Rennett's assertion of the reversion rights against his neighbour, Charles
Thompson.
234. Cadell v. Anderson, (July 17, 1787), Case No. 340, in COURT OF SESSION, supra note
230, at 522.
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In the two Rennett decisions, the claimant, Charles Rennett, a barristerturned-music seller, 235 had purchased reversionary terms in certain works
from their composers, the celebrated Charles Dibdin and John Garth, 236
before pursuing action for infringement against two music publishers,
Thompson and the partnership of James Longman and Francis Broderip,
who claimed to be acting under the authority of the original transfer. Both
claims were unsuccessful. According to a newspaper report, in the first case,
Rennett v. Thompson, the Barons expressed their "disapprobation of the
Plaintiffs conduct in departing from his profession for that of a Dealer in
Musick" before dismissing the Bill unanimously on the basis that the "suit
was frivolous and vexatious." 237 In the second case, Rennett v. Longman, the
Barons, after reviewing Rennett's case, and "without hearing one word of the
evidence on the part of Messrs Longman and Broderip," ruled against
Rennett. 238 The two cases are damning judgments against Rennett, but it is
difficult to draw much from them. Although Rennett v. Thompson was referred
to in argument in Carnan,neither it nor the subsequent Rennett action against
his former employer, Longman and Broderip, was fully reported, and the
reasoning will have remained a mystery to contemporaries. 239 Not
surprisingly, therefore, Carnan v. Bowles has long been regarded as the key
authority.
Carnan v. Bowles (1786) concerned rights in the book A New and Accurate
Descntion ofAll the Direct and PrincpalCross-roadsin Great Britain, compiled by
Daniel Paterson, the assistant to the Quarter Master General of His Majesty's
Forces. On January 7, 1771, Paterson entered into a publishing agreement
with Thomas Carnan, a bookseller at St. Paul's Churchyard in London. In
return for C50 and 300 copies of the book, Paterson:
did

Bargain

and

Sell

unto

your

Orator

his

Executors

Administrators and Assigns the said Book ... and all his the said
235. The complaint described Rennett as "of the Inner Temple" (one of the Four Inns
of Court). Rennett operated his music selling from 80 Haymarket.
236. The Garth piece was "Six Sonatas for the Harpsichord, Pianoforte and Organ
(assigned on October 20, 1784). The Dibdin works were operas called "The Padlock," "The
Recruiting Serjeant," and "The Jubilee," and were assigned on July 28, 1784. Mace, supra
note 72, at 10, 12.
237. The decree is at E126/33/Trin 1785/26, ited in Mace, supra note 72, at 21 n.50; ST
JAMES CHRONICLE, June 28-30, 1784, at 4d.
238. The decree is at E126/33/Mich 1785/6 and a report of the hearing appeared in
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1785, both itedin Mace, supra note 72, at 21 n.51.
239. One particular difficulty with interpreting the holding in the Longman & Broderip
case derives from the fact that Rennett had learned about the vulnerability of Longman's
title while he was employed by the music-sellers as a legal advisor. He would hardly have
appeared as having "clean hands."
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Daniel Paterson's right of copy title interests and Property of in
and to the same together with the sole right of printing publishing
and vending the same to the only proper use benefit and advantage
of your Orator, his Executors, Administrators and Assigns. 240
Carnan entered the tide on the Stationers' register and published and sold
many thousands of copies at two shillings each. In due course Paterson
corrected and added to the work for a further four editions (in 1772, 1776,
1778, and 1781), each time being paid by Carnan between £10 and k16.
Carnan registered each new edition at Stationers Hall. The fifth transaction
read as follows: "3d September 1781. Received of Mr Carnan Ten Pounds
ten shillings for improving and correcting the fifth edition of the Description
of the Roads. Dan Paterson." 241
As the first period of fourteen years was coming to an end, Paterson
entered discussions with a map and printseller, Carrington Bowles, also of St.
Paul's Churchyard, as to the possibility of publishing a map book
accompanied by copper-plate illustrations. They seem to have understood
that the first term of copyright in the Carnan publication would expire on
January 1, 1785. As Bowles was willing to offer Paterson £263 13 shilling and
2 pence, plus fifty copies, it is not surprising that Paterson agreed, and in due
course Bowles published Paterson's British Itinerary, being a New and accurate
Delineation and Description of the Direct and PrincipalCrossroads of Great Britain in
Two Volumes, with some 360 copper plates. The work sold for 2 guineas a
copy, twenty-one times the price of the Carnan volume. 242
Soon after, Carnan brought an action. Carnan's Bill alleged that the
agreements entitled him to
the sole right and property of the said book or pamphlet with
additions or improvement so made thereto for a second term of
fourteen years commencing and to be computed from the
expiration of the first term or from the said 3d day of September
1781 the date of the said last mentioned receipt of the said Daniel
Paterson or from the time of his publishing such fifth edition as
aforesaid and entering the same in the said Register Book of the
stationers Company.243
Such "receipts," Carnan charged, "were and are transfers and sales
respectively and the last thereof was and is a transfer of all of such copyright
240. The Bill and Answer can be found in the National Archives at Kew, London, at
C12/133/25m. The Orders are contained in C33/465 at 449 and C33/467 at 23, 393, 429.

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.

2010]

ANGLO-AMERICAN AUTHORS' REVERSION RIGHTS

1529

for the term of fourteen years from the dates thereof respectively or at all
events of the additions and improvements." These improvements were said
to be "numerous and of great value." 244 Consequently, Carnan claimed both
to be the assignee of the second term in the work embodied in the first
edition, and of any rights over improvements made in each subsequent
edition, so that any arrangement between Paterson and Bowles was
ineffective to vest any rights in Bowles. The Bill went on to assert that the
book published by Bowles infringed Carnan's right, and to deny Bowles and
Patersons' claim that they had published a "different and distinct work and
composition." 245 Carnan claimed that it was "the same book" and that any
variations were "colourable," and sought an answer, an injunction and an
account of all the profits made by Bowles. 246
The Answers of both Paterson and Bowles denied the charges, claiming
that the term of copyright conferred by the statute was fourteen years "and
no longer," that it had come to an end the previous January, and, in any case,
that the book was not the same book, varying from Carnan's in a "very great
number of essential particulars."247 In particular, Paterson submitted:
[TWhat he had not power to renew the said complainant's right of
printing and publishing the said work so sold to him by this

Defendant or his assignor or to enforce his term therein beyond
the aforesaid term of 14 years this Defendant being disabled as this
Defendant humbly apprehends by the said Act of the Eighth Year
of the Reign of Queen Anne from selling or assigning the said
Copy right for a longer term or number of years than Four teen
Years only.248
In July 1785, the Solicitor General, Archibald MacDonald, supported by
Madocks and Needham, put the case for Carnan, that the contract by
Paterson, purporting to convey "all his ... right," must convey the
contingent interest in the second term of fourteen years, as well as the
absolute interest in the first fourteen. 24 9 The power to assign must be coextensive with the right given by the Act." 25 0 In effect, this was a direct
appeal to the proprietary logic implicated in the form of the statutory
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Carnan v. Bowles, (1786) 29 Eng. Rep. 45 (Ch.).
250. Id. at 46. Carnan featured some of the leading barristers of the time, with one
contemporary account noting that "[t]here was a vast quantity of talents exercised on this
object." THE WORLD, & FASHIONABLE ADVERTISER, July 20, 1787.

1530

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1475

provision: the author was given two rights, two properties, and because each
was a property, each was assignable.
Carnan's counsel also appealed to authority. They cited in support the
decision in Millar v. Taylor, as well as that of the Court of Exchequer in
Rennett v. Thompson. The report says that the Solicitor-General argued that "[i]t
was understood in the case of Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burrow, 2303, that Millar
took the whole right for twenty-eight years, if the author should be alive at
the end of the first fourteen,"2sl but the reporter, William Brown, seems to
have confused the Kings Bench decision with the 1765 Chancery case,
mistakenly inserting the reference to the former.252 Counsel further urged
that the case was governed by Rennett, where an assignee of the reversionary
term was held not to be entitled to injunctive relief as against the initial
purchaser on the grounds that "the whole right" had been passed by "the
first grant." 253
Counsel for Bowles, Mansfield and Stanley, argued that Paterson "meant
to convey only what he had absolutely, the right of sole printing for fourteen
years." 254 Moreover, they observed that "the expression in the [A]ct meant to
secure something to authors, even against their own acts." 25 5 After fourteen
years, it says, "the right shall return to the authors (not their assigns), if living; so
that it is a personal bounty to the authors only. In selling the right, the author
sells all that is in him, not the contingent right that may return to him." 256
The Solicitor-General's reply sought to account for the language in the
statute: the "return is only between the public and the author, not between
him and his assignee. There are no negative words in the act to prevent his
assigning that, as well as his other rights. In many cases, if he could not
assign it, the disability would be productive of great inconvenience." 257
The Master of the Rolls,258 sitting for the Lord Chancellor, seems to have
found the latter arguments persuasive, treating the whole question not as one

251. Carnan v. Bowles, 29 Eng. Rep. at 46.
252. Indeed counsel for the defendant was also wrong-footed, observing, "[i]n Millarv
Taylor, if Thompson had lived, the question would have been between them, not upon the
common law right. No argument can be drawn from that case as to this question." Id.
Counsel clearly was thinking of the case concerning James Thompson's The Seasons, rather

than Edward Young's, The Complaint.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. (emphasis in original).
257. Id. at 46-47 (emphasis in original).
258. William Brown's report attributes the Lord Chancellor, but the Order Book,
C33/465 at 449, suggests that the order was made by the Master of the Rolls.
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of whether the author could convey the contingent interest, but whether, on
the facts, he had done so. To ascertain this, Lord Kenyon looked at both the
wording of the 1771 grant and its context. The reference to transfer of all
"interest," he explained, indicated an intention to transfer the contingent
interest (leaving unclear whether the other terms-"right of copy, tide, . . .
and property" 2 5 9-would have had a similar effect). Moreover, the context of
the agreement supported such an inference. As the contract was entered
between the decision of the Court of King's Bench in Millar v. Taylor (1769)
and that in Donaldson v. Becket (1774), the parties would have assumed a
common law right in perpetuity:
[T]he contingent interest must pass by the word interest in the
grant. He conveys all his interest in the copyright: the assignment
must have been made upon the idea of perpetuity; and it is
probable not a syllable was said or thought of, respecting the
contingent right. They merely followed the old precedents of such
conveyances. It must I think be considered as conveying his whole
right. If he had meant to convey his first term only, he should have
said so. 2 60
The decision as to the similarities between the works was to prove more
problematic. When the Master of the Rolls, Lloyd Kenyon, heard the case,
on July 23, 1785, he referred the question of the similarities between the
works to Master Wilmot, who reported on May 29, 1786, that while the
works were not the same book, differing significantly, nevertheless there
were similarities in the roads described.261 On June 20, 1786, the Master of
the Rolls awarded an injunction, taking the view that adding pictures did not
mean that Bowles could escape liability: "the mere act of embellishing could
not divest the right of the owner in the text."262 But, on appeal, in November
1786, Lord Thurlow, Lord Chancellor, found that the report of the Master
was not sufficiently clear, and should be referred back to him to determine
whether the Bowles work was "a new and original work and in any and what
particulars."263 The Master reported on May 19, 1787, in a manner favorable
to the defendant. As a result, it seems that no final injunction was granted.264

259. See discussion supra II.B.1.b.
260. Carnan v. Bowles, (1786) 29 Eng. Rep. 45 (Ch.), 47.
261. Carnan v. Bowles, (1786) 29 Eng. Rep. 1168.
262. Caman v. Bowles, (1786) 29 Eng. Rep. 45 (Ch.), 47-48; C33/465 at 449.
263. Carnan v. Bowles, (1786) 29 Eng. Rep. 45 (Ch.), 48 n.1; Caman v. Bowles, (1786)
29 Eng. Rep. 1168; C33/467 at 23 (Nov. 24, 1786).
264. C33/467 at 393 (Lord Chancellor ordering that effect be given to the report of the
Master unless the plaintiff showed good cause why it should not); id. at 429 (June 4, 1787)
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Lord Kenyon's analysis of the question of the reversionary right might
thus, in strict precedential terms, have been considered "obiter." It did not
matter, for the purposes of the suit, whether Carnan owned the copyright:
even if he did, there was no infringement. But this is too narrow and
meticulous an analysis of what, to contemporaries, would have been regarded
as the leading decision on the effect of section 11--given that the two Rennett
cases lacked published reasons and remained largely unreported. Carnan
established three points clearly: that the reversionary term could be assigned;
that this assignment could occur in advance, that is before it vested; and that
no deed (in the sense of a document signed andsealea) was required to do so.
On the first two points, the view that had prevailed in some circles in
Scotland was firmly rejected south of the border-and in Cadell v. Anderson,
the Court of Session same to the same conclusion for Scotland.265 On the
third point, the Court clarified something that had been unclear to
contemporaries, from Pope onwards (and had not been resolved in Millar &
Dodsly v Taylor (1765)). As the Rennett cases and Cadell also seem to have not
involved "deeds," they, too, affirmed this point. 266 Indeed, in one of the
Rennett cases, the successful defendants, Longman and Broderip, had
maintained that it had been the habitual practices of publishers of music and
books merely to give receipts in return for copyright. 267 But, those three
clarifications apart, the judgment in Carnan (and the unexplained holdings in
the other cases) left unclear precisely what it was that was effective to convey
the reversionary term. Three possible interpretations suggest themselves.
On one reading of Carnan, Lord Kenyon may be thought to have said
that the reversion was only retained in a case where the author expressly
reserved his or her rights: after all, the judge explained, "[i]f he had meant to
convey his first term only, he should have said so."268 Such a conclusion
would have removed the statutory protection, placing the onus on the author
to establish his or her rights expressly in the contract. It seems unlikely that,
so soon after Donaldson v. Becket had emphasised the importance of statutory
law that a judge would feel justified in ignoring it.
(requiring plaintiffs objections be argued within 4 days or to be dismissed). As there are no
further references, we can assume that the plaintiffs did not pursue the matter further.
265. Cadell v. Anderson (uly 17, 1787), Case No. 340, in COURT OF SESSION, supra note
230, at 522.
266. Rennett's bill of complaint did, however, state that his assignment of the
reversionary term, which occurred once the contingent term had vested in the composer
John Garth was "by Indenture." See Mace, supra note 72, at 10, 12.
267. Mace, supra note 72, at 15-22.
268. Carnan v. Bowles, 29 Eng. Rep. at 47.
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An alternative understanding of Carnan is that the contingent reversion
was transferred because the document used "the word interestin the grant."269
If so, the implication might be that the alternative terms of "right,"
"property," or "copyright" (terms that might have implied a vested interest
rather than an expectant one) would not themselves have sufficed. On this
reading, an effective transfer required that a transferee ensure that there were
special words in the contract. Such an understanding would have placed
undue emphasis on what might appear to be the chance inclusion of one
noun amongst many alternatives. As our review of The Upcott Collection makes
clear, many transactions use the terms right, property, and copyright but not
"interest." However, given that Lord Kenyon went on to conclude that the
transaction was to "be considered as conveying his whole right,"270 it seems
unlikely that he intended the transfer of the reversion to depend on such a
technicality. Although the subsequent Cadell case gives no guidance, as the
precise terms of the initial assignment from Blackstone to Cadell, Strahan
and Creech are unspecified,271 the Rennett cases support the view that it was
not merely a question of the use of the precise term "interest": Rennett, who
purported to be the assignee of the reversion in some of the musical works
of Charles Dibdin there failed to establish that the initial transfer had not
itself conveyed the reversion to the transferee even though the document
had merely specified that the money Dibdin received was "for my property"
in the music, with no further elaboration. 272
A third reading of Lord Kenyon's judgment would view the
interpretation as reflecting the specific assumptions of the parties at a
particular time in legal history. The Judge explained that "the assignment
must have been made upon the idea of perpetuity." 273 This assumption seems
plausible given that the date of the contract between Paterson and Carnan on
January 7, 1771 preceded the House of Lords decision in Donaldson v. Becket
on February 22, 1774. If so, it is unclear whether the reasoning would only
have applied to contracts made after April 20, 1769, the date of the judgment
of the court of King's Bench in Millar v. Taylor, or ones made in England
before that date (given that different assumptions might have applied in
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Cadell v. Anderson, No. 340 (uly 17, 1787), in COURT OF SESSION, supra note 230,
at 522.
272. Rennett's Bill of Complaint, asserted that on June 23, 1769, the composer John
Garth did "sell assign and set over the said Opera or Musical Work unto Peter Welcker of
Gerrard Street Soho in the City of Middlesex Music Seller together with all his said John
Garth's Right and Interest therein." E112/1705 No. 3808.
273. Carnan v. Bowles, 29 Eng. Rep. at 47.
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Scotland)? Rennett's failed action against Longman and Broderip was,
however, inconsistent with this technical interpretation. Although, as regards
Garth's works, Longman's defense was based on a contract from June 1769,
but the Dibdin contracts were said to have occurred in January 1769 and thus
preceded the King's Bench decision in Millar v Taylor.274 Of course, it might
be that the parties' expectation even before Millarv. Taylor was that there was
a perpetual common law right. If this was the real basis of the Carnan
decision, then presumably these same types of contracts would have had a
very different effect where they were entered into after February 22, 1774.
In fact, it seems that after Carnan v. Bowles, the interpretation of section
11 that was most widely adhered to was that in order to transfer the second
fourteen year period to the original publisher, the contract must have
expressed an intention specifically to convey the reversionary term. This was
how Lord Chancellor, Lord Scott, who had appeared as counsel successfully
in both the Rennett cases and in Carnan v. Bowles, interpreted the law in Rundell
v. Murray (1821).275 He explained: "I conceive that an author will not be taken
to have assigned his contingent right in case of his surviving the fourteen
years, unless the assignment is so expressed as to purport to pass it." 2 76An
1808 Bill that would have abolished the reversionary term prospectively also
contained a transitional clause that reflected this understanding of the
position under section 11,277 giving the author the sole liberty of printing and
reprinting such Book and "the power of assigning and disposing of such
additional right and liberty, any general words in any former Agreement or
Assignment to the contrary notwithstanding." 278 This provision appears to be
an affirmation of the interpretation, consistent with (if not specified in)
274. The Rennett v. Thompson case was based on rights in the works of John Garth a
composer of keyboard sonatas, which too, had originally been published in the late 1760s,
with the sold to publisher Peter Welcker before finding their way into the hands of
Thompson. Rennett's complaint asserted that Garth's sale of rights to Peter Welcker
occurred on June 23, 1769, and thus that the rights reverted in June 1783. The Dibdin operas
on which the complaint was also based, that is, The Padlock, The Recruiting Serjeant, and The
Jubilee, were said to have been created and published "in or about" January 1769. E112/1705
No. 3808. Mace dates their composition as 1768 (The Padlock), 1769 (TheJubilee), and 1770
(The Recruiting SegeanI). Mace, supra note 72, at 10.
275. (1821) 37 Eng. Rep. 868, 870.
276. Id.
277. A Bill for the Further Encouragement of Learning in the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, by Securing to the Libraries of the Universities, and Other Public
Libraries, Copies of All Newly Printed Books, and Books Reprinted with Additions; and by
Further Securing the Copies and Copyright of Printed Books to the Authors of Such Books,
or Their Assigns, for a Time to Be Limited, 1808, H.C. Bill [314] (Gr. Brit.) [hereinafter 1808
Bill]. The Bill was considered in Committee on June 22, 1808. (1808) H.C. JOUR. 461.
278. 1808 Bill, H.C. Bill [314], at 3.
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Carnan, that "general words" were not effective to assign the reversionary
term.
The case law of the 1780s, then, preferred the idea of an author's
proprietary autonomy to the sort of paternalistic view that seems to have
motivated the legislature in 1710, the Booksellers Bill in 1737, or Johnson's
remarks in 1774.279 Such an approach may well have been informed by the
famously lucrative payments many authors had received in the 1770s from
publishers such as Cadell and Strahan. These indicated that some authors
could negotiate well for themselves, and that, in many cases it was publishers
who took the risk. When Johnson famously stated that Andrew Millar had
"raised the price of literature," 280 he was referring approvingly to these
increased payments to authors rather than objecting, as might have been
traditional, to the exorbitant prices that the booksellers charged. Elsewhere,
discussing payment he had himself received from the collective of
booksellers who funded the production of his famous dictionary, Johnson
observed that the "booksellers are generous liberal-minded men." 281
3. Evidence of Use of the Reversion
If perceptions of the law were such that many of the contractual
arrangements originally made by authors with their publishers would not
have successfully transferred the reversion, what evidence is there of these
authors using the reversionary term to extract further remuneration? The
answer is that, as far as we can tell, there is very little. 282 None of the
contracts in The Upcott Collection appear to be assignments of the second
fourteen-year term. This fact, perhaps, is rather telling evidence of the
comparative rarity of reversionary term contracts. But individual biographical
records do tell us of at least four occasions where an author seems to have
taken advantage of the reversion.
The first case, perhaps not surprisingly, concerned Alexander Pope. In
1740, Pope was anticipating the lapse of a fourteen-year assignment of rights
in The Dunciad, which he had assigned, indirectly, to Lawton Gilliver in

279. Cornish, supra note 27, at 23 ("In an age when freedom of contract was gaining an
increasing hold, the judges were not willing to rcad an ambiguous section of the Statute as
imposing a mandatory construction in the hope of protecting authors against the
booksellers . . . .").
280. 1 BoSwELL, supra note 2, at 288.
281. Id. at 304-05.
282. We have relied on THE UPCoTr COLLECTION, supra note 4, and biographical
accounts. One important primary source we have yet to investigate is the Strahan ledgers in
the British Library. As we will see, this includes at least one reference to a payment being
made for the reversionary term. Further work might reveal other entries of this sort.
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As far as Pope was concerned, the assignment related only to the
first fourteen-year period under the Statute,284 and thus the rights in the work
would revert to him in 1742.285 However, Pope then heard that Gilliver
(whose relationship with Pope had deteriorated) had assigned his right to
another publisher, Henry Lintot (son of Bernard Lintot, who had published
some of Pope's early works). 286 Pope feared that if Lintot now republished
The Duniad, this would undermine Pope's plans for a new edition "with
diverse alterations, additions and improvements thereto." 287 Lintot wrote to
Pope in January 1740/41, primarily about The Iliad and The Odyssey, but
Pope's notes on the letter-transcribed by George Sherburn from the
originals in the Egerton Manuscripts- are revealing 288:
1728.283

[S]ee Gilliver's assignment Lords.
Silend: The dunciad, qu. Of Lintot, Gillivers Property is expir'd or
expires next year or this not to purchase it ... .289
Pope's reference to "Lords" is almost certainly to the very peculiar
circumstances by which Gilliver came by the rights: Pope had initially
assigned the copyright to three Lords, to shield his identity from the public,
and then had them assign the rights to Gilliver.290 The rest of the note is self-

283. The details are recounted in the pleadings in the case of Pope v. UIntot, which survive
in the National Archive. C11/549/39 (Feb. 16, 1743). The complaint from Pope is dated
February 16, 1742/3 and the answer from Lintot is dated April 19, 1743. Some aspects of
the litigation are discussed in Howard P. Vincent, Some DuniadLifigation, 18 PHILOLOGICAL
Q. 285 (1939).
284. The bill of complaint explains that the agreement was for the "purchase of copy or
sole right of printing and publishing the said Book or Poem for a Term of Fourteen Years
pursuant to the Regulations and Provisions made in and by an Act of Parliament in the Eight
Year of her late Majesty Queen Ann..
. ."
285. The pleadings in fact leave a number of gaps where the relevant dates were to
appear. James McLaverty notes that "Pope [was] very uncertain about when he had disposed
of the copyright." James McLaverty, Lawton Gilliver Pope's Bookseller, 32 STUD.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 101, 104 (1979).
286. Henry Lintot's answer suggests that he bought a one third share indirectly, via a
printer named Clarke and another publisher, John Osborne, on January 18, 1739/40, and
then two thirds directly from Gilliver on December 15, 1740. For Pope's contracts with
Bernard Lintot, see supra note 117.
287. National Archive C11/549/39 (Feb. 16, 1743).
288. BL Eg. Mss. 1951, supra note 163, fols. 17, 18, 19; 4 POPE, supra note 188, at 22224.
289. Egerton Charters, supra note 117, Ch. 738.
290. As Pope's bill of complaint explained, "a Treaty of Agreement was thereupon set
on foot by and between your Orator or others on your Orators behalf. . . with your Orator's
privity and consent." See National Archive, C11/549/39 (Feb. 16, 1743). On the
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explanatory: as far as Pope was concerned, Gilliver's rights were about to
lapse and thus should not be assigned. Unfortunately, the transaction was
completed and Lintot went ahead with his reprinting of the poem, as Pope
had feared. Pope thereupon brought a claim in Chancery, relying
simultaneously on the limited terms of the contract and the proviso
contained in section 11 of the Statute of Anne. In the claim, Pope alleged
that the property in the copy had reverted to him "not only in consequence
of the said assignment or bill of Sale and the express agreement therein
contained but also of the express proviso in the said Act of Parliament." 291
The pleading suggests that Lintot had offered three reasons for refusing to
comply: first, that it was not clear that Pope was the author or owner;
secondly, that the assignment was of the perpetual "author's right"; and
thirdly, that Lintot was unaware of the limitation. In his answer, Lintot
acknowledged Pope's authorship of The Dunciad, and relied only on his
assignment of whatever interest Gilliver possessed, alleging he was ignorant
of the existence and or extent of any limitation on that right. The answer
thus did not squarely address the question of the statutory reversion.
For reasons that remain unclear, the case did not proceed to a hearing.
There is no record on the English Short Title Catalogue of a Lintot edition of
The Duniad, so it is likely that he conceded the validity of Pope's claim, in
return for which Pope dropped the suit.
The other three examples come from later in the eighteenth century.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a number of high profile authors, including
Sir William Blackstone, Adam Smith, and Dr. Samuel Johnson (1709-1784),
dealt explicitly with the reversion: Johnson retained the reversion rights,
while Blackstone and Smith explicitly assigned the right once it had fallen
into possession.
The William Blackstone example relates to his Commentaries on the Laws of
England.292 This classic text is in four volumes, and each volume was
published at different times, the first on November 18, 1765 at eighteen
shillings and with a print run of 1,500. Blackstone retained the copyright and
had the book printed by Oxford University Press. 293 The Commentaries was an

background, see James Sutherland, The Duniad of 1729, 31 MODERN LANGUAGE REV. 347
(1936).
291. C11/549/39.
292. Cadell v. Anderson, No. 340 (uly 17, 1787), in COURT OF SESSION, supra note 230,
at 522.
293. Harry G. CARTER, A HISTORY OF OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 406-08 (1975);
WILFRID R. PREST, WILLIAM BLACKSTONE: LAW AND LETTERS IN THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY 217 (2008); JAMES PRIOR, THE LIFE OF EDMOND MALONE, EDITOR OF
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immediate success. 294 In 1772, the copyright was assigned to Daniel Prince,
William Strahan, and Thomas Cadell for L2000.2 95 When the first fourteenyear period of copyright in the first volume came to an end, Blackstone, who
was still alive, assigned the reversionary term to Cadell. 296 The Strahan
ledgers,297 which feature the initial payment of L2000, do not suggest that any
additional payment was made. Blackstone had been a well-known advocate
for perpetual copyright,298 and it may be that, at the time he first contracted
with Cadell and Strahan (when the 1769 King's Bench decision in Millar v.
Taylor that recognized a perpetual common law copyright was the governing
authority), he had believed he was transferring the rights to the publishers in
perpetuity. If so, he may well have thought it proper in 1769 to transfer the
second term, so as to give effect, as far as possible, to the agreement he had
intended to make in 1772.
The Johnson dealings concerned The Lives of the Poets. 29 9 William Cook,
the author of The Life of SamuelJohnson with occasionalremarks on his writings, says
that:
[The booksellers on going to press with the third edition of the
Lives offered Johnson C200 for his reversion of the copyhold; but
the Doctor, meeting the offer with the same generosity, after
pausing some time replied, "Why, let me see-fourteen years
hence, why I shall be but eighty-six-no--I'll even keep the
reversion as a nest egg for old age."300

SHAKESPEARE 431 (London, Smith, Elder & Co. 1860) (anecdote suggesting Blackstone

made £14,000 and his bookseller made L10,000).
294. PREST, supra note 293, at 219-20 ("enormous success").
295. IAN G. DOOLITTLE, WILLIAM BLACKSTONE: A BIOGRAPHY 100 (2001); C.S.
ELLER, THE WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COLLECTION IN THE YALE LAW LIBRARY 2-3 (1993);
PREST, supra note 293, at 217-19, app. 2 (transcribing details of annual income from the
book); R.D. Harlen, Sale and Profits of Some Early Editions of Sir William Blackstone's
Commentaries, 58 PAPERS BIBLIOGRAPHICAL Soc'y AM. 156, 156-59 (1964); Harlen, supra
note 3, at 188. There is no surviving Blackstone archive.
296. BL Add. Mss. 48807, supra note 87.
297. Id. (relating to Blackstone's Commentaries).
298. Blackstone was counsel for Tonson in Tonson v. Collins, (1762) 96 Eng. Rep. 180,
and for Millar in Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, and later one of the eleven judges
in Donaldsonv. Becket, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 257.
299. SAMUEL JOHNSON, THE LIVES OF THE MOST EMINENT ENGLISH POETS: WITH
CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THEIR WORKS (R. Lonsdale ed., 2006).
300. WILLIAM COOK, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON WITH OCCASIONAL REMARKS
ON HIs WRITINGS 65 (Kearsley pub., 1785), quoted in 1 JOHNSON, supra note 153, at 433.
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As matters turned out, Johnson's decision to retain his rights was of no
consequence. He died the next year, well within the first fourteen-year term,
so the contingent term never came into being.
The final example concerns Adam Smith and The Wealth ofNaions, which
was first published in 1776 by Strahan and Cadell on a profit-share basis.301
Twelve years later, and after four successful editions, the publishers
purchased the copyright from Smith for [300.302 In the spring of 1790, the
first term was approaching its end, and the publishers were keen to secure
the reversion. Smith, who was sick and dying, was-it seems-also eager to
sell the property so that he could make suitable provision for his nephew,
David Douglas.303 Consequently, in April 1790, Smith conveyed the
reversionary term for a further [300. Details of the transaction are recorded
in Strahan's ledgers,304 and were recalled by Thomas Cadell in a letter two
years later.30s The transaction was just in the nick of time: Smith passed away
three months later on July 17, 1790.306
The limited evidence of use of the reversion may seem surprising, but is
less so when placed in the context of late eighteenth-century authorpublisher relations. The demand for most books would dissipate after a short
time, and, where they did not do so, the author frequently passed away
before the contingent term was in operation. 307 Moreover, many of the books
that were marketable after fourteen years retained that quality as a result of
repeated updating and amendment. Such alterations not only induced new
sales, but also created new copyrights. Writing in 1774 to his co-publisher
William Creech, William Strahan justified the publisher's generous gift of
copies of books to their author: "His constant Corrections will merit such a
301. SHER, supra note 2, at 236; Sher, supra note 178; Letter from Adam Smith to
William Strahan (Nov. 13, 1776), in SMITH, supra note 178, at 221 (Letter no. 179); Letter
from William Strahan to Adam Smith (Nov. 26, 1776), SMITH, supra note 178, at 222 (Letter
no. 180).
302. SHER, supra note 2, at 236; Sher, supra note 178.
303. Sher, supra note 178, at 8.
304. BL Add. Mss. 48814A, fol. 7, reproducedin Sher, supra note 178, at 7 fig.2.
305. Letter from Thomas Cadell, the elder, to Henry Mackenzie (Dec. 21, 1792) (letter
No. 95), in HENRY MACKENZIE, LITERATURE AND LITERATI 177 (H.W. Drescher ed., 1989).
306. Donald Winch, Smith, Adam (bap. 1723, d. 1790), OXFORD DICTIONARY NAT'L
BIOGRAPHY,
Sept.
2004,
online
ed.
Oct.
2007,
available
at
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/25767 (last accessed June 21, 2010).
307. Of those that had a continuing market, a substantial proportion related to works
published within fourteen years of the authors death: The Wealth ofNations turned fourteen
just months before Smith died, but Goldsmith wrote The Vicar of Wakefeld seven years
before his death, while Johnson died only three years after publication of his magnum opus,
The Lives of the Poets. See 1 UPcorr,supra note 4, at [129] (indicating that George Lillo's The
London Merchantwas first published in 1731, only eight years before Lillo's death).
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Present, and tend much as well to the Preservation of Property as to the sale
of it."308 In the context of a work that had been amended on a number of
occasions during the first fourteen-year term, reversion would only have
enabled the sale of rights in the text as originally conceived. A new publisher
would not be entitled to use the revisions. This meant that the reversion
would be of limited value, really only relevant where the new assignee had
some vision of a transformed work (as in Carnan v. Bowles) or where there
were no revisions (as, for example, with pieces of music).
The practice of revising editions reminds us, too, that the authorpublisher relationship was often one characterised by continuity-a
continuity which a decision to exercise the reversion might well have
disrupted. This continuity had, in some cases, a social element and, in many
cases, a commercial one. 3 09 Many authors published their works through the
same publisher again and again. In such cases, old deals that turned out, in
retrospect, to look as if they had disproportionately rewarded a publisher,
could be compensated by generous new deals. One such example concerned
Strahan and Creech's dealing with William Buchan, who having had a huge
commercial success with Domestic Medicine, proposed to compose a different
work: Preventive Medicine. The publishers were keen to retain Buchan, and keep
him happy, for if he moved to a different publisher he might write a book
that would supplant demand for Domestic Medicine. Although they never
envisaged that Buchan would complete Preventive Medicine, nor were the
publishers particularly keen to do so, they entered a generous contract with
the author. 310 Another dimension to the continuity of relations between
publisher was the seemingly relatively common practice whereby if a book
turned out to be particularly successful, the publisher would offer the writer
extra payment beyond that to which he or she was entitled under their
contract.3 1' Given these sorts of relationships, it is hardly surprising that the
308. Letter from Strahan to Creech (Sept. 9, 1774), quoted in Richard B. Sher, William
Buchan's Domestic Medicine: Laying Book History Open, in THE HUMAN FACE OF THE BOOK
TRADE: PRINT CULTURE AND ITS CREATORS 45,54 (Peter Isaac & Barry McKay eds., 1999).
309. KENT, supra note 154, at 61, passim (describing the relationship between publisher,
John Newbery, and writer, Oliver Goldsmith, including Newbery's payment of the writer's
rent and debts). In The Vicar of Wakefield, Goldsmith describes Newbery as "the friend of all
mankind." OLIVER GOLDSMITH, THE VICAR OF WAKEFIELD: A TALE SUPPOSED TO BE
WRITTEN BY HIMSELF 113 (Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1895).
310. BL Add. Mss. 48901, supra note 87, fol. 22, cited in Sher, supra note 308, at 64 n.21
311. For example, Andrew Millar paid Henry Fielding an additional k100 for Tom Jones,
over and above the k600 copy money. See Horace Walpole to George Montagu (May 18,
1749), in WALPOLE, supra note 128, at 384. Millar also paid the same sum to Mrs. Sheridan,
when the demand for her play, The Dupe, turned out to be "uncommonly great." Letter from
Andrew Millar to Mrs. Sheridan (undated), in SAMUEL WHYTE & E.A. WHYTE,
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authors that explicitly exercised their reversion rights, such as Adam Smith or
William Blackstone, did so by conveying the contingent term to the original
publisher.
Finally, it is perhaps worth observing that, while the contingent reversion
was designed to protect authors, many authors of the time expressed a
preference for outright assignments over other forms of exploitation.
Advising Sylvester Douglas in 1775, James Beattie wrote: "I would not advise
you to make a conditional bargain, stipulating for a price proportioned to the
sale of the Book ... I think it would be better if you could finish the matter
at once, and sell your manuscript finally for a sum of money." 312 Historian
Richard Sher proclaims that this view "was widespread among eighteenthcentury authors."313 Certainly, a number explained that they sold copyright in
order to avoid the difficulty of managing publication. For example, David
Hume wrote to William Strahan that "in order to avoid the Trouble and
Perplexity" of publishing himself, he wished "at once to part with all the
Property" in the HistoU of England.314 Similarly, the novelist Frances Burney
(1752-1850), who had initially been careful not to sell her copyright in
Camilla (1796), did so soon after publication in order to save herself the job
of managing its exploitation. 315
C.

THE DEMISE OF THE REVERSION RIGHT IN

1814

Section 11 of the Statute of Anne was repealed and replaced by the
Literary Copyright Act of 1814.316The Act extended the term of copyright
from two terms of fourteen years to one term of twenty-eight years, and if
the author were still alive when the twenty-eight-year term elapsed, to the life
of the author. The relevant part of section four specified, with regard to
MISCELLANEA NovA 118 (Dublin 1801). Richard Sher gives many examples of authors who
had continuing relationships with specific publishers, and circumstances where publishers
would "compensate" authors for bad bargains with additional gratuitous payments or
increased payments on later works. SHER, supra note 2, at 244-45 (detailing extra payments
from Strahan & Cadell to John Moore).
312. Letter from James Beattie to Sylvester Douglas (Aug. 14, 1775), in 2 BEATHE, supra
note 155, at 308-09, dted in SHER, supra note 2, at 214.
313. SHER, supra note 2, at 214.
314. Letter from Hume to Strahan (Feb. 15, 1757), in HUME, supra note 153, at 14.
315. 3 THE JOURNALS AND LETrERS OF FANNY BURNEY (MADAME D'ARBLAY) 227 (.
Helmlow et al. eds., 1972).
316. An Act to Amend Several Acts for the Encouragement of Learning, 54 Geo 3, c.
156, § 4 (Gr. Brit. and British Empire). The details of the passage of the Act are obscure.
Lionel Bently, R v. The Author From the Death Penalty to Community Service, 32 CoLUM. J.L.
ARTS. 1, 66-71 (2008); Ronan Deazley, Commentary on the Copyright Act of 1814, available at
PSOC, supra note 2, http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/ exec/
ausgabeCom/"uk_1814" (calling this a "blind-spot in accounts of British copyright law").
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works composed or published after the passage of the Act (July 29, 1814),
that "[t]he author and his assignee or assigns, shall have the sole liberty of
printing and reprinting such Book or Books for the full term of twenty eight
years . . . and also, if the author shall be living at the end of the period, for
the residue of his natural life."3 17
The idea of replacing the bifurcated term with a single one had been
conceived at least six years previously, rather oddly, perhaps, in the context
of concerns over the enforcement of the obligation imposed by the Statute
of Anne upon publishers to deposit copies of their works with various
libraries, including those of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. 318 In
the case of Beckfood v. Hood,319 it was held that an action lay on the basis of
the Statute for damages, as opposed to the penalties prescribed by the Act,
and that this remedy was available whether or not the work was registered
with the Company of Stationers. 320 As a corollary, it appeared that
compliance of the deposit requirement likewise was not a condition that had
to be met in order to receive protection. When, as a result, booksellers
registered and deposited fewer and fewer works, the Cambridge Law
Professor Edward Christian began a campaign for "vindication of the rights
of universities." 3 21 In turn, the booksellers sought to highlight the injustice of
the deposit requirements. In the face of this resistance, Christian proposed a
compromise: in return for the publishers' compliance with the obligation to
provide copies of work for deposit libraries, the publishers would be given a
consolidated single term of twenty-eight years. 322 This compromise was

317. An Act to Amend Several Acts for the Encouragement of Learning, 54 Geo 3, c.
156, § 4 (Eng.).
318. The Statute of Anne designated nine libraries (The Royal Library, University of
Oxford, University of Cambridge, Sion College, the University Library and the Faculty of
Advocates in Edinburgh, the University Libraries at Glasgow, St Andrews, and Aberdeen)
and a further two (Trinity College Library and the Kings Inn Library) had been added in
1801 when the application of the Act was extended to Ireland. 41 Geo. 3, c. 2.
319. Beckford v. Hood, (1798) 101 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B.).
320. Id. at 1168 (Lawrence,J.).
321. EDWARD CHRISTIAN, VINDICATION OF THE RIGHT OF THE UNIVERSITIES OF
GREAT BRITAIN TO A COPY OF EVERY PUBLICATION (Cambridge Univ. Press 1807).
322. See (1818) (402) REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE COPYRIGHT
ACTS OF 8 ANNE, c. 19; 15 GEo. III, c. 53; 41 GEO. III, c. 107; AND 54 GEO. III, c. 116, at
83-85 [hereinafter 1818 REPORT] (Edward Christian, stating that it was agreed that "if the
Universities could induce the House by the influence of their members and their
representatives, to get an increase in copyright; the booksellers undertook never to disturb us
again, but that we should have a copy of every book which they published").
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agreed to sometime in 1807,323 but an attempt its legislative implementation
failed. 324
The matter lay dormant and unresolved for a few years until another
court decision, University of Cambridge v. Bryer, which affirmed the obligation to
deposit copies even where a bookseller did not propose to take advantage of
the remedies in the Statute of Anne. 325 The booksellers were angered and
petitioned Parliament to remedy the situation. In one of a series of petitions,
the booksellers also alluded to the issue of the dual term32 6 : "[T]he petitioners
humbly submit that this distinction is, in many cases, productive of great
hardships to the families of authors, and is not founded upon just
principles."327 Not long after the filing of the petition, an anonymouslyauthored pamphlet was published that elaborated the argument for a
consolidated term of twenty-eight years and the removal of or reduction of
the obligation of the deposit.3 28 On the first page, the pamphlet explained the
injustice that arose under section 11 where an author died before the end of
the first term. The author's
family loses all the profits of his labours at the very time when,
from the event of his death, they are in the greatest need of them.
It seems the dictate of reason and justice that authors should have
at least the full twenty eight years, without any reference to the life
of the author.329
3 30
The single fourteen-year term, the pamphlet argued, is "clearly too small."
This was for two reasons: first, there were very many valuable works which

323. 1818 REPORT, spra note 322, at 92 (John Charles Villiers, detailing the meeting
which he had hosted); (1812-13) (341) SELECT COMMITTEE ON ACTS FOR
ENCOURAGEMENT OF LEARNING BY VESTING COPIES OF PRINTED BOOKS IN AUTHORS OR
PURCHASERS OF COPIES: MINUTES OF EVIDENCE 17 (July 20, 1813) [hereinafter 1813
SELECT COMMITTEE MINUTES] (Mr. J. Mawman saying he consented to the Villiers Bill but
he would be "exceedingly sorry if anything [he] did then, should be considered as denoting
[his] opinion at present"). Thomas Norton Longman stated that he was present at the
meeting at MP John Charles Villiers's house in 1807, but that he did not consider the
extension of copyright an adequate quid pro quo for the continuation of the deposit
obligations even though there were "some persons of that opinion." Id. at 11-12.
324. Leave was given to introduce a bill on June 16, 1808, and Villiers, Sir William Scott,
the Earl of Euston, the Attorney General, Solicitor General, and Lord Advocate of Scotland,
were charged with its preparation. (1808) H.C. JOUR. 441.
325. Univ. of Cambridge v. Bryer, (1812) 104 Eng. Rep. 1109 (K.B.).
326. 24 PARL. DEB., H.C. (1st ser.) (1812) 308, 310 (U.K.).
327. Id
328. S. TURNER, REASONS FOR A MODIFICATION OF THE ACT OF ANNE RESPECTING
THE DELIVERY OF BOOKS AND COPYRIGHT (London, Nichols, Son & Bentley 1813).
329. Id. at 1.
330. Id.
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"scarcely get known to the publick during the first fourteen years"; 331
secondly, because the cost of publishing books had considerably increased in
the century since the Statute of Anne was enacted, a longer period was
needed to recoup the additional expense. 332
Although the pamphlet assumed to represent the interests of authors, 333
given that many contracts, as we have seen, purported to convey the second
term if the author survived, the claim that "the family loses all the profits"
was tendentious to say the least. Even those authors (such as Blackstone or
Gibbon) who retained the copyright initially, merely permitting the printing
of early editions (or entering into profit share arrangements), usually later
assigned away their property during the first term of protection. Moreover,
had the goal been to protect the families of deceased authors, then a
provision such as that which would later be adopted in the United States in
1831 and Lower Canada in 1832,334 allowing the estate to take advantage of
the reversion, would have been better suited than the consolidation of the
two terms into a single unit. A more principled justification was offered by
Sir Samuel Romilly, debating the petition, who pointed to an anomalous
effect of the dual term:
It operated in a way most injurious to the best interests of
literature; for as young authors were more likely to reach the
second term than old, it gave the immature and jejune
compositions of the former double the reward reserved for the
productions of ripened genius.335
Parliament appointed a Select Committee to look into the matter under
the chairmanship of Davies Giddy (also known as Davies Gilbert). 336 The
Committee heard evidence only from five booksellers, three printers,
Reverend Dibdin, and Sharon Turner.337 Some reference was made to the
331. Id. at 31.
332. Id. at 35 (stating that "they require a much larger space of time before the author
can get reimbursed in his expenses from that sale.").
333. Id. at 59.
334. See infra notes 374-76 (describing the Act of 1831 in the United States); see also Act
for the Protection of Copy Rights, 1832, 2 Will. 4, c. 53 (Can.). Protection lasted for an initial
twenty-eight year term (from recording of the work's title with the Superior Court), but with
the possibility of renewal for fourteen years if the author was alive at the end of that period,
and resident in the Province, "or being dead, shall have left a widow or child or children,
either or all then living." Id. The provision was extended to the whole of Canada when
Upper and Lower Canada were united. An Act for the Protection of Copy Rights in this
Province, 4&5 Vict c. 61 (Can.).
335. 25 PARL.DEB., H.C. (1st ser.) (1813) 12, 16 (U.K).
336. 1813 SELECT COMMITEE MINUTES, supra note 323.
337. Id.
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fact that engravers already received a fixed term of protection for twentyeight years, 338 thereby pointing to the apparent anomaly in the treatment of
books. But it seems, further, that the Committee accepted the contention
that the contingent term added unnecessary uncertainty to copyright law
without benefiting the author.
In fact, the Committee appears only to have considered as an
afterthought the author-protective aims that had informed the inception of
section 11 of the Statute of Anne. On June 16, 1813, the Committee called
Sharon Turner, who had already given evidence on behalf of the booksellers
(as well as playing an active role questioning the witnesses), for reexamination. At that point, Giddy asked Turner to consider the position of
authors, and in particular, whether "any advantages would result to authors
from a division of the term of copy right into two portions, and from an
enactment that no sale of the second portion should take place, till after the
expiration of the first?"339
The question itself was interesting, in that it must have been appreciated
after Carnan that the reversionary term could be assigned before it fell into
possession. It seems that another member of the Committee, Charles Watkin
Williams Wynn, MP for Montgomeryshire, had raised the possibility of
strengthening the author's position vis-a-vis the publisher. 340 Wynn was the
life-long friend of the Poet Laureate, Robert Southey. Corresponding with
Wynn in April and May 1813, Southey declared:
My opinion is that literary property ought to be inheritable, like
every other property, and that a law which should allow the use of
trees upon your estates for eight-and-twenty years, and after that
term make them over to the Carpenter's Company, would not be
more unjust than that which taken from me and my heirs the
property of my literary labour, and gives it to the Company of
Booksellers. I am afraid you do not agree with me on this, and
certain that even if you do, nothing more can be done towards
restitution of the author's rights than simply to make their
complaint when you speak upon the subject.... It is doing something
to get the twent-eghtyears absolute . .. I should rather the rght of sale was
limited.- it would give the authorsome share of those prices in the lottery which
now fall, almost wholly, to the bookseller. The second term would have enriched

338. Id. at 18 (question put to John Cochrane).
339. Id. at 33.
340. For general background on Wynn's Parliamentary career and relationship with
Southey, see Gwyneth Evans, Charles Watkin Williams Wynn 1775-1850 (1935)
(unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of Wales) (on file with University College Library,

Bangor).
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Conper. And if you gave us a lease for life I may probably be
benefited by it.341

Intriguingly, in another letter from Southey to Wynn, 342 the poet refers to a
mysterious proposed amendment by Wynn: "Your proposed clause will be a
real benefit to authors: the copyright of 'Joan of Arc' and of my poems
would have reverted to me if the bookseller's custom did not declare
otherwise."343 Although the precise details of Wynn's proposal are unknown,
the questions posed by Giddy to Turner, as well as the timing (less than two
months later), suggest Wynn had passed on Southey's complaints.
In response to Giddy's question, Turner explicitly denied that there was
any "bookseller's custom" that disadvantaged authors. Moreover, Turner told
the Committee that he thought "no benefit would result to authors" from a
reversionary term that was inalienable, adding that he thought it would be
desirable merely "that all contracts for copy right should be in writing, and
that the term for which the author disposes of it should be there
expressed." 344 Turner, 345 it might be noted, has been identified as the author
of the 1813 pamphlet, mentioned above, which had itself put the case for a
single consolidated twenty-eight-year term. 346
Ultimately, Turner's response proved persuasive. The Report of the Select
Committee on Copy Right of PrintedBooks347 recommended the consolidation of
the two fourteen-year terms in to one of twenty-eight years. Addressing the
issue in its final paragraph, the Report stated:
Your Committee have taken into their consideration, the subject of
Copy Right; which extends at present to fourteen years certain, and
then to a second period of equal duration, provided the author
341. Letter from Southey to Wynn (May 23, 1813), in 2 SELECTIONS FROM THE
LETTERS OF ROBERT SOUTHEY 323 (ohn Wood Warter ed., London, Longman, Brown,
Green & Longmans 1856) (emphasis added). The reference to "Cowper" is to the poet
William Cowper who died in 1800.
342. Letter from Southey to Wynn (Apr. 24, 1813), id. at 320.
343. Id. at 321. Southey's Joan ofArc was published in 1796.
344. (1818) (177) COMMITTEE ON AcTS OF 8 ANNE, AND 15 & 41 GEO. III, FOR THE
ENCOURAGEMENT OF LEARNING, BY VESTING THE COPIES OF PRINTED BOOKS IN THE
AUTHORS OR PURCHASERS OF SUCH COPIES: MINUTES OF EVIDENCE 33 (Apr. 13, 1818).

345. (1768-1847). Turner was a solicitor who represented booksellers in the case against
the University of Cambridge, gave evidence to the 1813 Select Committee, and assisted
Southey in his legal battle surrounding the publication of Wat Tyler in 1817.
346. Reasons was attributed to Sharon Turner by Egerton Brydges, a literary figure
closely involved in these debates. EGERTON BRYDGES, REASONS FOR A FARTHER
AMENDMENT OF THE ACT 54 GEO. III. c. 156, BEING AN ACT To AMEND THE COPYRIGHT
ACT OF QUEEN ANNE (London 1817).
347. 1813 SELECT COMMITTEE MINUTES, supra note 323.
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happens to survive the first. They are inclined to think, that no
adequate reason can be given for this contingent reversion, and
that a fixed term should be assigned beyond the existing period of
fourteen years. 348
The transformation of the reversionary fourteen-year term into a single
twenty-eight-year copyright which was effected by the 1814 Act had, thus,
been in the pipeline for some time. The reform reflected a perception that
the existing system created uncertainty, operated capriciously, did not secure
any benefits to authors and potentially deprived booksellers of a suitable
period in which to recoup their investments. The apparent absence of protest
from authors suggests that there was little affection for the contingent,
reversionary term.
The failure to replace the reversion with an author-protective provision
may well have reflected the growing dominance of the ideology of freedom
of contract. 349 Indeed, it is instructive to compare the manner in which the
legislature, in the very same year, 1814, treated the issue of the extension of
the term of copyright in sculpture, which had been first recognized in 1798.
The Models Act of that year introduced protection for sculptors lasting for
fourteen years. 350 The Act proved inadequate for various reasons, and when
reform was proposed, so too was an increase of the term so that sculptors
could be placed on a par with engravers (who received a fixed twenty-eightyear term) and writers (who hitherto had received the dual fourteen-year
terms). For some reason, the legislators chose the writers' model for
sculptors, but balked at the idea of reversion. In place, a new principle was
adopted: a sculptor would receive an additional fourteen-year term if he or
she was alive when the first term lapsed unless the rights in the work had
already been disposed of.351 Although the legislative record reveals no details
about the reasoning behind the approach, this curious provision seems to
reflect a desire to confer greater protection on sculptors who survive, but not
to give a windfall to assignees. Both goals are achieved through a targeted,
contingent extension, in a manner which avoids interfering with freedom of
contract.
As it happens, the Literary Copyright Act in 1814 did not merely
consolidate the two fourteen-year terms into a single period of twenty-eight
years, but also provided that, if the author were alive at the end of the
348. Id.
349. The classic exposition is P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND
(1979).
350. Models and Busts Act, 1798, 38 Geo. 3, c. 71 (Gr. Brit.).

FALL OF FREEDOM OF

CONTRACT

351. Sculpture Copyright Act, 1814,54 Geo. 3, c. 56,

§6

(Gr. Brit.).
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twenty-eight-year term, copyright was to continue for the remainder of the
author's life.3 52 In contrast with the decision to consolidate the reversion into
a fixed twenty-eight-year term, this extension to the life of the author appears
to have arisen spontaneously and without any serious debate. 353 According to
Deazley, the amendment was moved during the third reading of the Bill in
the Commons, and just before it went up to the Lords. 354 The record
suggests that the amendment was tabled by the MP, Samuel Egerton Brydges
(who had campaigned primarily for a reduction in the deposit obligations).355
Whatever Brydges' reasons for proposing this extension in a Bill that he
generally opposed, it is worth noting that the clause was written in a way that,
although introducing a "contingency," avoided any impression that the effect
would be to reintroduce a reversionary term. The clause stated clearly that
the contingent term benefited the author, "his assignee or assigns," and
avoided any language (such as that of "returning") that might be interpreted
as suggesting reversion. For those authors who assigned the rights "for ever,"
and took in return a fixed fee, the clause would have operated for the
financial benefit of publishers. For most authors, the amendment was of
largely symbolic, rather than pecuniary, significance: the Statute recognized
that there was some notional relation between their individual survival and
the existence of property in the text (even if that property would rarely
belong to the author). The amendment reflected the legal embodiment of
what Oren Bracha has called "the ideology of authorship," 356 at the same
moment that the law abandoned its attempt to intervene in the functioning
of the book market to protect the interests of real, flesh-and-blood, writers.
Nevertheless, before the idea of a reversionary right had come to be
abandoned in Britain, it was imported, in almost identical terms, by the newly
352. An Act to Amend Several Acts for the Encouragement of Learning, 54 Geo. 3, c.
156, § 4 (Gr. Brit. and British Empire).
353. Whether or not they influenced the British legislation, copyright terms based on the
life of the author were in force elsewhere in Europe. See, e.g., French Literary and Artistic
Property Act, art. 1, 2 (1793) (Fr.), available at PSOC, supra note 2, http://www.copy
22
; see
righthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/showmax//o22f_1793 im_001_0001.jpg/
at
available
1809),
also BADEN CIVIL CODE art. 577 d f (Luis A. Sundkvist trans., Karlsruhe
PSOC, supra note 2, http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgibin/kleioc/0010/exec/show

Translation/%22d_1809_im_0010003.pg/o22.
354. Deazley, supra note 316.
355. 2 EGERTON BRYDGES, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY, TIMES, OPINIONS, AND
CONTEMPORARIES OF SIR EGERTON BRYDGES 321 (London, Cochrane & M'Crone 1834)
("Nor was I less earnest and active in the trouble I took about the Copyright Act,-however
unsuccessfully."). Brydges's disappointment related, almost certainly, to the failure to reduce
the deposit obligations significantly in either 1814 or 1818.
356. Oren Bracha, The Ideology ofAuthorshtp Revisited: Authors, Markets, andLiberal Values in
Early American Copynght, 118 YALE L.J. 186 (2008).
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independent states of South Carolina and Maryland, and, with slight
variations in Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia and New
York. 357 From there, it made its way into U.S. federal copyright law,
transforming itself into the idea of a "renewal term," and via the United
States into Canadian law. In Part III, we explore how well it succeeded in the
United States and its ultimate transformation into a "termination right."
III.

UNITED STATES

A.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND THE FIRST
COPYRIGHT ACT

The 1787 U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to "secur[e]" "for
limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their ... Writings." 358
The plural duration echoes the Statute of Anne's provision for a second
term, contingent on the author's survival. 359 Even before the Constitution,
Congress' 1783 resolution encouraging the states to enact copyright laws and
many of the ensuing state copyright statutes imported the contingent twoterm structure from the Statute of Anne. 360 The United States followed
England as the only nation at the time to design exclusive rights around the
author, first by instructing Congress that exclusive rights were to go to the
creators of "Writings," and second, by implicitly directing that any additional
terms of years also vest in authors. The specification of "limited Times" thus,
we suggest, makes authors' continued ownership interest in their copyrights
part of the constitutional scheme. 361
The first copyright statute, enacted in 1790, accordingly implemented a
two-term duration, the second fourteen-year period contingent on the
author's survival. But while the Statute of Anne provided that the rights
would "return to the Authors," the first U.S. copyright act stated: "if, at the
357. Oren Bracha, The Adventures of the Statute of Anne in the Land of Unlimited Possibilities:
The Life of a Legal Transplant,25 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1429 (2010).
358. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
359. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 11 (1710) (Gr. Brit.).
360. Continental Congress Resolution Recommending the States to Secure Copyright to
the Authors and Publishers of New Books, available at PSOC, supra note 2,
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/"us_1783c";
Conn.
(1783); N.J. (1783); Md. (1783); S.C. (1784); Pa. (1784); Ga. (1786); N.Y. (1786).
361. The plural designation of "Times" might also reflect Art. I, § 8, cl. 8's combined
grant of power to Congress to provide both for copyright and for patents, since the two
regimes from the start carried different terms of protection. See generaly Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 100-03 (2d Cir. 1951) (reviewing differences in first
copyright and patent acts), but the prior federal and State copyright provisions suggest an
additional reason.
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expiration of the said term, the author or authors, or any of them, be living,
and a citizen or citizens of these United States, or resident therein, the same
exclusive right shall be continued to him or them, his or their executors,
administrators or assigns, for the further term of fourteen years . . . ."362 The
reference to "assigns" might suggest that the author could assign her rights
not only for the first term, but also for the second (subject to her surviving
through the first term). 363 On the other hand, "assigns" appears alongside
"executors" and "administrators" and the interests of the latter two arise
subsequent to the author's death, yet the renewal term was then contingent
on the author's survival. Thus, it more likely follows that, just as executors
and administrators could have succeeded to the author's second term rights
only in the event that the second term came into being, so the "assigns" in
question would have been grantees only of rights transferred after the
renewal term vested.364 Nonetheless, the contrast between the Statute of
Anne's specification that the right would "return to the Author" and the U.S.
text's provision that the "exclusive right shall be continued to him . . ."365
perhaps weakens the claim that the first U.S. copyright statute included a
reversion right (or that the Constitution required one); however, if Congress
did not intend the rights to return to the author, it is not apparent why it
would have made the author's survival a condition of the vesting of a second
term.
B.

SUBSEQUENT STATUTES AND CASE LAW PRECEDING THE 1909 ACT

In any event, courts construing the renewal term interpreted it to
incorporate a reversionary right. Although early U.S. case law on reversion
rights is sparse, it recognizes the second term of copyright as a "new interest"
that was "made to benefit authors." 366 But neither the Constitution nor the
1790 Act clearly precluded the author's advance assignment of his renewal
term interest, even though such anticipatory alienability arguably defeated the
362. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Securing the Copies of Maps,
Charts, and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of Such Copies, During the Times
Therein Mentioned (May 31, 1790), 1 Stat. 124, ch. XV, § 1 [hereinafter 1790 Copyright Act]
(emphasis added).
363. Even without statutory provision for "assigns," the English courts held the author's
contingent interest in the second term to be assignable. See Carnan v. Bowles, (1786) 29 Eng.
Rep. 45 (Ch.), discussed supra Section II.B.2.e. It is possible that this decision influenced the
drafting, four years later, of the U.S. provision.
364. This construction of the text does not, however, clearly preclude first term
assignments of the renewal term, or at least of a future contingent interest. See discussion
infra Section III.B.
365. 1790 Copyright Act, 1 Stat. 124, 5 1.
366. Pierpont v. Fowle, 19 F. Cas. 652, 659-60, (C.C.D. Mass. 1846).
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purpose of the reversionary right: if the author's prior assignment of the
second term bound the surviving author, then he would not have obtained
the benefit of the renewal term. 367 Some members of Congress appear both
to have understood the statute to provide for a reversion, and to have
appreciated the anomaly of its assignability, for several bills proposed in the
early 1800s would have retained the reference to "assigns," but would also
have provided "[t]hat any contract for the sale of the copyright for the
second term of fourteen years, or any part of the same made or entered into
before the expiration of the first, shall be utterly void." 368 By clarifying that
relevant "assigns" would have been new grantees for the second term of
copyright, the bills would have ensured that the reversion right retained its
remedial function of enabling authors to participate in the subsequent
success of their works.
In its 1831 amendments to the duration of copyright, however, Congress
did not explicitly address the validity of authors' advance alienation of the
renewal term. The 1831 amendments extended the first term from fourteen
to twenty-eight years and removed the condition that the author survive into
the (still fourteen-year) renewal term, thus making compliance with relevant
formalities the only remaining prerequisite to the vesting of the second term.
Section 16 of the 1831 Act, covering subsisting copyrights, appears to vest
the fourteen years added to the first term of copyright in the author rather
than the author's grantee. The debates over this provision in the House of
Representatives reinforce this conclusion. 369 Representative Hoffman
objected to the provision not only because he opposed a longer term of
copyright generally, but also because section 16 "would be a breach of
contract with those booksellers who had purchased copyrights of author

367. If the author received a separate consideration for conveying the future interest, the
assignment would have conferred some benefit, although the parties' probable inability to
anticipate the work's future value would have deprived the author of the raison d'ftre for
vesting the renewal term in him. Moreover, at least as of the advent of the nineteenthcentury book publishing form contract, authors' agreements systematically granted both the
first and the renewal terms, without providing additional consideration for the latter. See
discussion of publishing contracts infra.
368. H.R. 38, 11th Cong. (as rcported to Comm. of the Whole, Jan. 19, 1811); H.R. 75,
10th Cong. (as reported to Comm. of the Whole, March 7, 1808); A Bill for the
Encouragement of Learning, and for the Promotion of Useful Arts, 7th Cong. (as reported
to Committee of the Whole, Jan. 19, 1803).
369. The one decision that adverts to this extension appears to assume that the author
would take the additional term of years appended to the first period of copyright. See
Pierpont v. Fowle, 19 F. Cas. 652, 659 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) ("[I]he extension allowed under
the act of 1831, of a copyright taken out under that act, looks entirely to the author and his
family, and not to assignees.").
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heretofore, and whose rights would be infringed upon, should the privileges
of the authors of works be extended as proposed by the bill." 370
Representative Huntington's rejoinder rhetorically inquired: "why ... should
the author who had sold his copyright a week ago, be placed in a worse
situation than the author who should sell his work the day after the passing
of the act?"37 1 The Supreme Court has cited this objection as evidence of a
long-standing practice of extending the terms of existing copyrights when
Congress institutes a longer term for new works. 372 The passage in context
seems equally (if not more so) to address the claims of authors to benefit
directly from the extended term. Huntington may have assumed that the
author who sold a fourteen-year copyright would have received less
remuneration than an author who sold a twenty-eight-year copyright, and
therefore would have objected that the publisher should not get the windfall
of twenty-eight years of exclusive rights for the price of fourteen. Similarly,
William Ellsworth, introducing the bill for the House Judiciary Committee
asserted: "The question is, whether the author or the bookseller shall reap the
reward." 373 Whether the author in fact took the fourteen years added to the
first term free and clear of the grant of the initial fourteen years would have
turned on the scope of the granting language. 374
In addition, the 1831 amendments clarified who could claim the renewal
term: "the same exclusive right shall be continued to such author .. . or, if
dead, then to such widow and child, or children, for the further term of
fourteen years . . . ."375 The provision was apparently designed to protect a

370. 7 CONG. DEB. app. 423 (an. 6, 1831).
371. Id. at 424.

372. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003).
373. 7 CONG. DEB. app. cxx (Dec. 17, 1830).
374. In the early part of the 19th century, it appears that limited-term exclusive grants
were more common than transfers for the full term of copyright plus any extensions or
renewals. See, e.g., Contract between James K. Paulding and Harper & Bros. (1836) (on file
with Harper & Brothers [Publishers] Records 1817-1929, Columbia University Rare Book
and Manuscript Library [hereinafter Harper & Bros. (Columbia)]) (for The Life of Washington)
(granting Harper exclusive publication rights for ten years); Contract between Joel Parker
and Harper & Bros. (1843) (on file with Harper & Bros. (Columbia), supra) (for Invitations to
True Happiness and Motives for Becoming a Chistian). Later contracts tended to refer to the
"term" or "terms" of copyright in grant language. See, e.g., Contract between Samuel J. Prime
and Harper & Bros. (1854) (on file with Harper & Bros. (Columbia), supra) (for Travels in
Europe and the Easd (granting exclusive right to publish during the "term" of copyright);
Contract between E.D.G. Prince and Harper & Bros. (1871) (on file with Harper & Bros.
(Columbia), supra) (for Around the World) (granting exclusive right to publish during the
"terms" of copyright).
375. An Act to Amend the Several Acts Respecting Copy Rights (Feb. 3, 1831), 4 Stat.
436, ch. XVI, § 2.
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family in need, upon the death of the author.376 A later court perceived the
amendment's designation of statutory heirs to convert the second term from
a mere continuance of the author's rights-rights which the author could
transfer to a publisher or other party-to a true new title:
[The 1831 Act] broke up the continuity of title, and gave the right
of renewal to the widow or child or children .. . Here, then, was an
entirely new policy, completely dissevering the title, breaking up the
continuance in a proper sense of the word, whatever terms might
be used, and vesting an absolutely new title eo nomine in the
persons designated. 377
While decisions construing the renewal rights of authors still alive at the
vesting of the second term generally assumed that the author could convey
her future interest in the renewal term, at least some courts, adverting to the
intent underlying the renewal term, declined to rule that the initial assignment
necessarily conveyed the renewal right as well as the first term. Thus, the
author's assignment of the copyright would not suffice to convey the
author's contingent interest in the renewal term. But an explicit assignment
would:
It was the genius which conceived and the toil which compiled the
book that is to be rewarded by even the first copyright, and no one
ever dreamed that an assignee could alone take out the second or
extended term, unless he has paid for it, clearly contracted for
it . . . .378

Lower courts also acknowledged the moral claims of the author against
the assignee:
376. See 7 CONG. DEB. app. at cxix (emphasizing that "by the very event of the death of
the author, his family stand in more need of the only means of subsistence ordinarily left to
them"), cited in Barbara Ringer, Study No. 31, Renewal of Copyrght, in 1 STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT 503, 507 & n.13 (Arthur Fisher ed., 1963); Stenographic Report of the
Proceedings of the Librarian's Conference on Copyright (Mar. 1906), in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, pt. C, at 35 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman
eds., 1976), availablefrom HeinOnline [hereinafter Stenographic Report 1906] (affirming 1831
Act's concern for author's family because the "proprietor is carefully excluded from the
renewal term"). Noah Webster heavily lobbied for these family-protective provisions. See
Oren Bracha, CommentaU on the Copyright Act 1831, at 7, in PSOC, supra note 2,
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabeCom// 22us1831%22.
377. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 250 (1st Cir. 1911).
378. Pierpont v. Fowle, 19 F. Cas. 652, 659-60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846); see also Cowen v.
Banks, 24 How. Pr. 72 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1862) (intention of parties to assign author's contingent
interest in renewal term); GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHT 234 (1847).
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There are at least sentimental reasons for believing that Congress
may have intended that the author, who according to tradition
receives but little for his work, and afterwards sees large profits
made out of it by publishers, should later in life be brought into his
kingdom.379

In the course of the nineteenth century, however, publishing practices
evolved to defeat authors' accession to their kingdom: the publishing form
contracts that appear to have become standard by the 1870s systematically
provided for the alienation of the first and the renewal terms, without any
separate consideration for the latter. For example, during this period, a
typical Harper & Brothers form contract included the following language:
In consideration of the premises, the Author hereby grants and
assigns to Harper & Brothers an unpublished work, the subject or
title of which is [name of work] and also all rights of translation,
abridgement, dramatization, selection, and other rights of, in, or to
said work, for the United States of America. Harper & Brothers
shall also have the exclusive right in their own name to take out
copyright in the United States of America for said work, and to
obtain all renewals of copyright, and to hold said copyright and
renewals, and to publish said work during the term or terms
thereof."380
Leading authors might withhold the renewal term, or even provide for
termination of the grant by the author earlier than the expiration of the first
term, 381 but most grants included the renewal term. 382
379. White-Smith Music, 187 F. at 251.
380. Contract between Julia Magruder and Harper & Bros. (1899) (on file with Harper
& Bros. (Columbia), supra note 374) (for A Manfest Destiny). Earlier handwritten contracts
did not explicitly convey rights to the renewal term, but would grant the right to publish
"during the terms of copyright." See, e.g., Contract between Mary A. Dodge and Harper &
Bros. (1871) (on file with Harper & Bros. (Columbia), supra note 374) (for School-House
Stories) (emphasis added). Other publishers' form contracts contained similar language. See,
e.g., Contract between Frances Hodgson Burnett and Charles Scribner & Sons (Dec. 3, 1895)
(on file with Atkins Archive, Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library
[hereinafter Atkins (Columbia)] (for A Lady ofQuality) ("exclusive right to publish said work
during the terms of copyright and renewals thereof"); Contract between same parties (June
14, 1897) (on file with Atkins (Columbia), supra) (for Duke of Osmonde) (containing the same
granting language); Contract between Frances Hodgson Burnett and Holiday Publishing Co.
(Sept. 7, 1900) (on file with Atkins (Columbia), supra) (for The Land of the Blue Flowet) ("during
the full terms of copyright of the same and all renewals thereof").
381. See, e.g., Contract between Samuel Clemens and Harper & Bros. (1902) (on file with
Harper & Bros. (Columbia), supra note 374) (for A Double-BarrelledDetective Story) (Clemens
retained right to terminate contract beginning five years after publication); Contract between
Clara Kathleen Rogers and Harper & Brothers (1892) (on file with Harper & Bros.
(Columbia), supra note 374) (for The Philosophy of Singing) (exclusive publication rights to
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1909 ACT
1.

Legislative History

In the 1909 Act, Congress gathered the disparate provisions sprinkling
the Revised Statutes and in effect created the first federal copyright code.
The term of protection and authors' reversion rights figured prominently
among the reforms Congress addressed. Proposals included a bill offered in
1906 by Sen. Kittredge and Rep. Currier,383 which, for most works, would
have extended the term of protection to the life of the author, plus fifty
years. 384 A section concerning "extension of term of existing copyright,"
Harper only for five years); Contract between N. Otis and Harper & Bros. (1862) (on file
with Harper & Bros. (Columbia), supranote 374) (for IllustratedHistog of the Panama Rail).
382. Even when the statutory heirs renewed the copyright and thus enjoyed a "new
estate" superseding prior contracts, grantees appear at least at times to have continued to
exploit the work as if no reversion had vested. See, e.g., Letter from Harper & Bros. to John
C. Howard (May 26, 1919) (on file with Harper & Bros. (Columbia), supra note 374)
(explaining that although author died in 1911 during first term of works created between
1985 and 1900, when representative of widow wrote to inquire about copyright renewal and
royalties during the renewal term, Harper responded that the copyrights "will be renewed by
us in the regular way, in the name of the nearest kin").
The form contracts, and early 1870s handwritten contracts, did contain out-of-print
clauses returning the copyright to authors if the books proved unsuccessful. See, e.g.,
Contract between Sarah Randolph and Harper & Bros. (1871) (on file with Harper & Bros.
(Columbia), supra note 374) (for The Domestic Life of Thomas Jefferson) (giving Harper & Bros.
the right to cancel for lack of demand beginning five years after publication). Because the
copyrights in out-of-print books were rarely renewed, the statutory reversion right, albeit
available to the author, would not have mattered.
Although out-of-print clauses were a form of reversion, contractual rather than
statutory in nature, publishers, rather than authors, appear to have had the most to gain from
allowing the author to recapture her copyright. Once the rights reverted, the publisher saved
the expenses of keeping and mailing detailed royalty records. See MICHAEL WINSHIP,
AMERICAN LITERARY PUBLISHING IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE BUSINESS OF
TICKNOR AND FIELDS 35 (1995); mailing other communications to authors, id. at 184 (citing

postage as the largest of miscellaneous overhead expenses), business tax on inventory items,
id., and costs of warehousing and concomitant efforts for "tighter inventory control."
ALEXIS WEEDON, VICTORIAN PUBLISHING: THE ECONOMICS OF BOOK PRODUCTION FOR

A MASS MARKET, 1836-1916, at 63, 103 (2003). Out-of-print clauses also allowed publishers
to destroy plates and extra stock if the author declined to purchase them. The publisher also
enjoyed the right to sell copies free of any royalties if author did not purchase the stock.
383. S. 6330, 59th Cong. § 18 (1906). This bill was the product of the Librarian of
Congress's Conference on Copyright, at which participants worked from a memorandum
draft prepared by Thorvald Solberg, Register of Copyrights. Stenographic Report of the
Proceedings of the Librarian's Conference on Copyright (Nov. 1905), in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 376, pt. D, at xv-lxxv [hereinafter Stenographic Report 1905]. The bill
is thus generally referred to as the Solberg Bill.
384. S. 6330 5 18(c). Other terms were provided for labels on manufacturing items
(twenty-eight years from publication) and composite works (fifty years from publication).
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would have extended subsisting copyrights (then protected for a first term of
twenty-eight years, renewable for another fourteen) "to endure for the full
terms of copyright provided by this Act, for the sole use of the author of said
work, if he be living."385 The proposal further limited the rights of authors'
assignees to:
such term as the said assignee would have been entitled to hold and
possess the same under the copyright laws in force on the day of
the date of said assignment, and no longer. [The] remainder of said
term of copyright shall revert to and vest in the author of the work,
if he be living.386
Thus, the extension of the term of works then in their first or second periods
would clearly, and consistently with the Constitutional direction, have gone
"to Authors."
Authors' assignees-publishers-while purporting to endorse the vesting
of the extended term in living authors, objected to the next iteration of the
proposal, which would also have granted the "remainder of said term" to
authors' "heirs, executors, and administrators." 387 The Publishers Copyright
League therefore proposed to substitute a second renewal term, following
the then-current fourteen-year term, allowing subsisting copyrights to:
be further renewed and extended by the author, inventor or
designer if he be still living, or by his widow or children if he be
dead, for a further period equal to that provided under the present
act, i.e. for fifty years after the author's death, provided that the
said copyright has not been assigned previous to the passage and
approval of this act.388
The publishers claimed that the amendment, by limiting post-mortem
beneficiaries to the author's surviving spouse and children (as had the 1831
Act), would allay the publishers' fears of having to come to agreements with
a plethora of heirs, who, lacking the personal relationship with the publisher
that would make the author or her family more likely to "show themselves
reasonable in the matter of the protection of this invested property" (by the
publisher in creating plates for the printing of the books), would instead

385. Stenographic Report 1905, supra note 383, at 219-20 (proposed 5 53(a)).
386. Id. at 220 (proposed § 53(b), (c)).
387. Stenographic Report 1905, supra note 383, at 297 (proposed §§ 67, 298) (George
Haven Putnam stating. "The publishers endorse this").
388. Id. at 299.
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"insist upon securing a bonus before he would permit the publisher to
continue under the extended term the publication of those books."389
The amendment in fact would have given the publishers something they
had not clearly obtained in prior legislation, however: explicit statutory
recognition that the author's assignment of her copyright would also convey
any renewals or extensions of the copyright term. While the representative of
the American Authors Copyright League did not initially perceive the wolf in
the sheep's clothing of an amendment offered in the publishers' professed
"willing[ness] that they [authors] should have the full benefit of this
extension of those copyrights," 3 90 the reference to assignments did not
escape the notice of another participant in the discussions. Arthur Steuart,
Chairman of the American Bar Association, aptly characterized the term
extension as "for the benefit of the publisher."39 1
The ensuing discussion regarding rights of publishers versus authors is
somewhat confusing. The participants asserted different renewal
consequences to publishing agreements in which authors retained their
copyrights but granted publishing rights in return for royalties, and outright
assignments, with the latter lending themselves to an impasse if the copyright
reverted to an author or heir who declined to re-grant the copyright, leaving
the publisher with plates it could not use. In the latter instance, publishers
would even have preferred to let the work go into the public domain, so that
they could continue to exploit their investment in the plates (even if rival
publishers could also then go to the expense of setting their own plates). 392
The compromise amendment retained much of the renewal language of the
1831 Act, but would have required that any assignee or licensee have joined
the renewal application. 393 An extended term contingent on the author's (or
heir's) and publisher's "mak[ing] some new arrangement between
389. Id. at 298-99 (characterizing the bonus-demanding heir as an "obstructing child").
390. Id. at 299-300 (R.R. Bowker for the authors pronounced the publishers' proposal
"perfectly acceptable").
391. Id. at 300.
392. Id. at 300--03.
393. The Solberg Bill read, in rPlPvant part:
[Ihe copyright subsisting in any work at the time when this act goes into
effect may ....

Be further renewed and extended by the author .. . or if

he be dead, leaving a widow, by his widow .... Or if now widow survive
him, by his children ... provided further, that should such subsisting
copyright have been assigned, or a license granted therein for publication
upon payment of royalty, the copyright shall be renewed and extended
only in case the assignee of licensee shall join in the application for such
renewal and extension.
S. 6330, 59th Cong. 5 18.
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themselves"
authors.394

eased the publishers'

apprehension of being held up by

Before long, however, critics pointed out the compromise's susceptibility
to the opposite abuse, indeed that the "law [would] simply result in a
legalized system of blackmail-nothing more or less"395:
Let us assume that this bill passes, that a copyright expires next
year, and that I am the author of a certain book. I go to my
publisher and say: "Here under the law I am entitled to a renewal
of the copyright for my book for a term of fifty years in all, or
during my life, or whatever the term may be." The publisher
replies: "Very well: you want me to join in the securing of that
extension, do you?" "Yes." "Well, I have been paying you 20 per
cent royalty: I will pay you 2 per cent hereafter, and if you do not
take that I will pay you nothing." 396
The following year, the Monroe-Smith Amendment to the KittredgeBarchfeld Bill responded, incompletely, to the criticisms the prior bill had
attracted. It provided for authors' reversions, but only if there was no royalty
agreement or if the publisher refused to continue to pay the same percentage
as set out in the existing royalty agreement.39 7 The rationale for excluding
394. Stenographic Report 1906, supra note 376, at 302 ("if they be reasonable people,
they ought to be able to work out some fair settl.ement").
395. To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on S. 6330 and HR.
19853 Before the H. and S. Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong. (Dec. 1906) [hereinafter Hearings (Dec.
1906)] (statement of George W. Ogilvie, publisher from Chicago).
396. To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyrght: Hearings on S. 6330 and H.R
19853 Before the H. and S. Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong. (June 1906) [hereinafter Hearings (June
1906)] (statement of George W. Ogilvie, publisher from Chicago).
397. The Monroe-Smith Amendment read, in relevant part:
[I]f such subsisting copyright shall have been assigned or a license granted
therein for publication, and if such assignment or license shall contain
provision for payment of royalty. . . . Said original assignee or licensee or
his successor shall nevertheless be entitled to continue to publish the
work on payment of the royalty stipulated in the original agreement; but if
such original assignment or license contain no provision for the payment
of royalty, the copyright shall be renewed and extended only in case the
original assignee or licensee or his successor shall join in the application
for such renewal and extension.
S. 2900, 60th Cong. (1907); H.R. 11794, 60th Cong. (1908).
Another bill, the Smoot-Currier Bill, read, in relevant part:
[T~he copyright subsisting in any work at the time when this act goes into
effect may . . . . Be further renewed and extended by the author ...

or if

he be dead, leaving a widow, by his widow .... Or if now widow survive
him, by his children ... provided further, that should such subsisting
copyright have been assigned, or a license granted therein for publication
upon payment of royalty, the copyright shall be renewed and extended
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royalty agreements from the application of the author's reversion right is
consistent with the purpose of the tight, to allow authors to share in the
future success of their works. While authors who assigned rights for a lump
sum would not participate in future revenues, authors receiving a royalty
would; moreover, the bill endeavored to ensure that those authors' royalties
would remain constant. On the other hand, while rights could revert to
authors who had received lump sums, the reversion was conditioned on
filing a renewal application jointly with the original assignee or its successor.
Thus, this version of the bill explicitly continued the rights of assignees
whose contracts provided for payment of royalties, while leaving in place the
means for assignees who had paid a lump sum for the copyrights to
"blackmail" authors who sought to renew the copyright for the extended
term.
Subsequent hearings on the precursors to the 1909 Act indicate that the
drafters understood the importance to authors of renewal term reversions of
rights. The Patents Committee Chair, Rep. Currier, repeatedly stressed the
example of Mark Twain, who had sold the first term of copyright in Innocents
Abroad "for a very small sum," but whose "contract did not cover the
renewal period, and in the fourteen years of the renewal period he was able
to get out of it all of the profits." 398 The drafters abandoned the requirement
that assignees join the authors on any renewal application in favor of leaving
the transfer of renewal or extended term rights to the parties' contractual
arrangements. 399 It is not clear from the hearings whether those arrangements
included contracts that assigned the extended term in advance of its vesting.
At least one participant stressed that the Constitution states that
Congressional grants of copyright are to go "to Authors," 400 and another
expressed "doubt about whether it [validating advance assignments] legally
could be done"; moreover he urged that the bill "say that it cannot be done,

only in case the assignee of licensee shall join in the application for such
renewal and extension.
Smoot-Currier Bill, S. 2499, 60th Cong. (1907); H.R. 243, 60th Cong. (1907).
398. To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copynght: Hearings on S. 6330 and H.R
19853 Before the H. andS. Comm. on Patents,59th Cong. 20(1908) [hereinafter Hearings (1908)];
see also id. at 62.
399. See Hearings (Dec. 1906), supra note 395, at 48 (statement of George Ogilvie)
(admitting that "the amendment I suggested in June is impractical"); Hearings (1908), supra
note 398, at 72 (statement of George Ogilvie) (noting that, in his decision to turn against the
joint-application proposal, "there was a little bit of conscience mixed up in the matter"); id.
at 128 (statement of William Jenner) (discussing contracts for extended term).
400. Hearings(une 1906), supra note 396, at 48 (statement of George Ogilvie).
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so that the author is certain to have that extension as a provision for his age
or a provision for his widow and his children."401
The vesting of the extended term, or of an additional renewal term in
authors, presented additional problems in the case of multiple-authored
works, particularly encyclopedias and other composite works. Publishers
testified to the difficulty of locating and obtaining new assignments from the
authors of such contributions, and stressed their need to retain copyright in
the contributions throughout any extensions or renewals of the copyright
term.402
As enacted, the 1909 Act largely retained the approach of the 1831 Act,
and, rather than adopting a unitary term of years based on the life of the
author, added another fourteen years to the renewal term, for a total of two
twenty-eight-year terms or, assuming renewal was effected, fifty-six years
from first publication.403With respect to works already in their renewal term,
Congress extended their renewal terms so that the works would enjoy a total
of fifty-six years of protection. 404 Notwithstanding the earlier debates over
the beneficiary of term extension (or perhaps because of them), the text did
not specify whether the additional years should vest initially in the author or
automatically in the rightholder, nor did the statute address the advance
assignability of the fourteen-year extension of the second term of copyright
for existing works or of the twenty-eight-year renewal term for new works.
One passage of the House Report appears to support the inalienability of the
renewal term:
Your committee, after full consideration, decided that it was
distinctly to the advantage of the author to preserve the renewal
period. It not infrequently happens that the author sells his
copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum. If

the work proves to be a great success and lives beyond the term of
twenty-eight years, your committee felt that it should be the
exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term, and the law
should be framed as is the existing law, so that he could not be

deprived of that right.405

401. Hearings(1908), supra note 398, at 128 (statement of William Jenner).
402. Hearings (1908), supra note 398, at 18-19 (statement of George Haven Putnam,
Secretary of American Publishers Copyright League); id. at 109 (statement of W.A.
Livingstone, Print Publishers' Association).
403. An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright (Mar. 4, 1909),
35 Stat. 1075, ch. CCCXX, § 24 [hereinafter Act of March 4, 1909].
404. Id. § 23.
405. H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 14 (1909).
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But the reference to "the existing law" undermines the argument for
inalienability: under the 1831 Act, the practice, and considerable authority
both from caselaw and treatises, recognized that the author might bind
himself to assign the renewal term, at least if his contract clearly so
provided.406
Sections 24 and 23 of the Act (addressing new and subsisting works,
respectively) both contained the following language:
[T]he author of such work, if still living, or the widow, widower, or
children of the author, if the author be not living, or if such author,
widow, widowers or children be not living, then the author's
executors, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin shall be
entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such
work .... 407
Thus, like the 1831 Act, the 1909 Act provided widows and children with
renewal rights even after the death of the author. The 1909 Act, however,
added rights for executors and next of kin after the death of the widow and
children.
Responding to the concerns expressed by publishers of encyclopedias
and other composite works, the 1909 Act also listed certain categories of
works whose creators would not be vested with the renewal right. Rather, the
"proprietors" would take the renewal. For works published as of the Act's
effective date, proprietors received renewal rights for posthumous works,
periodicals, encyclopedias, and composite works, corporate bodies having
copyrighted works, and employers in cases of works-for-hire. 408 For
subsisting works, renewal rights were given only to proprietors of composite

406. See sources cited supra note 274; EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES:
EMBRACING COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART, AND PLAYRIGHT IN
DRAMATIC AND MUSICAL COMPOSITION 326-32 (n.p. 1879).
407. Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, ch. CCCXX, §§ 23, 24.
408. Section 23, on new works, reads:
That in the case of any posthumous work or of any periodical, cyclopedic,
or other composite work upon which the copyright was originally secured
by the proprietor thereof, or of any work copyrighted by a corporate
body ... or by an employer for whom such work is made for hire, the
proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension
of the copyright. . . ."
Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, ch. CCCXX, § 23; see also Catherine L. Fisk,
Authors at Work: The Orgins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1,
62-67 (2003).
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works.409 This distinction has been attributed either to solicitude for the
future interests of the families of authors whose works were published under
the prior regime, or simply to careless drafting.410 Even if the 1909 Act
preserved some authors' renewal rights in subsisting works, it appears that,
relative to prior enactments, the 1909 Act narrowed the scope of works in
which authors could claim renewal term reversions of rights, particularly with
respect to contributions to collective works.
2. The 1909 Act Renewal Term in Court: To Authors or To Their Assens?
While the 1909 Act did not expressly resolve the assignability of the
renewal term, the Supreme Court, in a controversy involving the song
"When Irish Eyes Are Smiling," ultimately ruled that the author's first-term
assignment of the second term bound him to convey the renewal term to the
original publisher. Justice Frankfurter, finding no explicit statutory limitation
on the author's advance assignment of the renewal term, showed no
solicitude for the plight of the author, finding no reason, "sentimental"411 or
practical, for constraining the author's freedom to contract away his renewal
rights:
We are asked to recognize that authors are congenitally
irresponsible, that frequently they are so sorely pressed for funds
that they are willing to sell their work for a mere pittance, and
therefore assignments made by them should not be upheld .... We
cannot draw a principle of law from the familiar stories of garretpoverty of some men of literary genius . . . . We do not have such
assured knowledge about authorship ... or the psychology of

gifted writers and composers, as to justify us as judges in importing
into Congressional legislation a denial to authors of the freedom to
dispose of their property possessed by others. While authors may
have habits making for intermittent want, they may have no less a
spirit of independence which would resent treatment of them as
wards under guardianship of the law. 412

409. Section 24, on subsisting works, reads: "[I]f the work be a composite work upon
which copyright was originally secured by the proprietor thereof, then such proprietor shall
be entitled to the privilege of renewal and extension granted under this section." Act of
March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, ch. CCCXX, § 24.
410. See Ringer, supra note 376, at 123.

411. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 251 (1st Cir. 1911).
412. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 656 (1943). The
Supreme Court majority thus made short work of Judge Frank's extensive critique in dissent
below of "laissez faire" approaches to contract. See M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music

Co., 125 F.2d 949, 954-69 (1942) (Frank, J., dissenting).
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Because most book publishing contracts routinely-since at least the
1870s-systematically and explicitly conveyed both the first and the renewal
terms, 413 generally with no separate consideration for the latter, the Court's
ruling validated industry practice but also ensured that authors by and large
would not be "brought into [their] kingdom,"414 nor even into a minor
freehold.
By contrast, the Supreme Court also ruled that the author's statutory
heirs took the renewal term free of the decedent's grant (improvident or
otherwise). Unsentimental as ever, the Court did not advert to congressional
policy to protect widows and orphans (though this concern almost certainly
animated the 1831 law and its successor provisions in the 1909 Act), but
rather dryly characterized the author's prior grant as a mere "expectancy,"
thus making the original grantee's acquisition of the renewal term contingent
on the author's survival.415 Not surprisingly, it became industry practice in
some sectors to condition payment for the author's grant of copyright on the
author's obtaining assignments to the publisher of her statutory heirs'
contingent interests in the renewal term. 416
If the contract of transfer did not, however, explicitly cover the renewal
term, many courts declined to deem it included within the scope of the grant.
As the Second Circuit noted, in a case involving a grant of "full ownership
. . . in all countries of the world" of the copyright in a musical composition,

"[t]he presumption against conveyance of renewal rights serves the
congressional purpose of protecting authors' entitlement to receive new
rights in the 28th year of the original term."417 Thus, an assignment of rights
in the copyright term would not suffice to convey the renewal term rights.19
413. See Harper & Bros, Scribner, and Holiday Publishing Contracts, supra note 374.
414. White-Smith Music, 187 F. at 251.
415. Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 375 (1960).
416. Interview with Irwin Robinson, former President, EMI Music Publ'g (Jan. 14,
2010); Interview with Jay Morgenstern, Exec. Vice President/Gen. Manager, Warner
Chappell Music Inc. (Nov. 25, 2009). The practice of obtaining assignments from contingent
heirs did not always ensure the grantee's acquisition of the renewal term, for example, if on
the author's death his wife was pregnant and the renewal term had not yet vested. E-mail to
Jane Ginsburg from Jay Morgenstern (June 8, 2010) ("[he studio demanded all of the
signatures and we were able to comply. [Then] the author died while his wife was expecting.
Everybody at the studio went into cardiac arrest thinking that the new heir could renege on
the license at reversionary time."); see also Report of the Register of Copyrights on the GeneralRevision
of U.S. Copyight Lw, in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 376, at 1199, 1253 [hereinafter
Report of the Register] ("A considerable amount of trafficking in the possible future renewal
rights of authors and their prospective heirs has grown up.").
417. Corcovado Music Corp. v. Hollis Music, Inc., 981 F.2d 679, 684 (2d Cir. 1993).
418. See, e.g., Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Charles K. Harris Music Publ'g Co., 255
F.2d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 1958) ("The cases are clear that a copyright renewal creates a separate
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Similarly, because the renewal term was considered a "separate interest,"
courts protective of authors' reversion rights might interpret a grant of "all
right, title and interest in and to the copyright" to apply only to the first
term!19 On the other hand, contract language, even if lacking the specification
"all renewals and extensions thereof," but which denoted intent to transfer
the renewal term, such as "exclusive right to . . . use . . . forever," could rebut

the presumption. 420
D.

REVERSION RIGHTS UNDER THE

1976 COPYRIGHT ACT

Against this background, when Congress finally revised the copyright
law, its provision in the 1976 Act of an inalienable termination right stood
out as a signal victory for authors. But, as examination of the text and
experience to date will show, the 1976 Act imposes many practical
impediments to successful exercise of the termination right. First, we will
summarize the genesis of the termination right with respect both to works
published before 1978 and to grants of rights (whether in works published
before 1978 or created after that date) made as of 1978. Then, in Section E,
we will examine how the termination right has been working in practice.
1. Termination of Contracts Concluded Under the 1976 CopyightAct
In the 1976 Act, Congress abandoned the two-term copyright scheme,
and for new works adopted the by-then international standard of the life of
the author plus fifty years. (In 1998, Congress extended the term of copyright
to life of the author plus seventy years.) Although the renewal term which
had triggered the reversion right would no longer exist, Congress determined
to retain a reversion right, and pegged it to the date of conclusion of a grant
of rights under copyright, with the right coming into effect from thirty-five
to forty years from that date (subject to no fewer than two and no more than
ten years' advance notification). 421
Some kind of reversion right figured in every copyright bill leading up to
the 1976 final version. In the initial Report of the Register of Copynghts on the
interest distinct from the original copyright and that a general transfer by an author of the
original copyright without mention of renewal rights conveys no interest in the renewal
rights without proof of a contrary intention."); cf sources cited supra note 378 (requiring
specificity in assignment of renewal term interests under prior Acts).
419. See, e.g., Rossiter v. Vogel, 134 F.2d 908, 911 (2d Cir. 1943) (holding "all right, title
and interest" transfer at outset of first copyright term insufficient to convey renewal term:
"the circumstances justifying the transfer of the right of renewal must be stronger than those
justifying the transfer of the copyright, since the right of renewal is separate from the original
copyright").
420. Siegel v. Nat'l Periodical Publ'ns, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 913-14 (2d Cir. 1974).
421. See 17 U.S.C. 5 203 (2006).
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General Revision of U.S. Copyrght Law, 42 2 the Register called for automatic
reversion twenty years following the conclusion of a grant, unless the grant
provided for continuing royalty payments to the author:
[t]he statute should provide that any assignment by an author or his
representative or heirs shall not be effective for more than twenty
years from the date of its execution, unless it provides for the
continuing payment of royalties based on the uses made of the
work or the revenue derived from it.423
The Register's report both harked back to one of the proposals preceding
the 1909 Act, which would have exempted royalty agreements from
termination upon the vesting of the renewal term, 424 and partly echoed
copyright legislation in other countries, notably France, which required
authors' contracts to provide for a royalty for every mode of exploitation.425
But author groups persuaded the Register that the royalties safeguard was
"illusory, since the royalties could be nominal and the proposal could easily
be evaded."426
The Register's Preliminary Draft Bill two years later thus offered two
very different alternative approaches. "Alternative A" provided for automatic
reversion twenty-five years after transfer "notwithstanding any agreement to
the contrary." 4 27 Offsetting the gain to authors of an automatic and
inalienable reversion right, the proposal excluded works-for-hire and
provided an exception allowing the continued exploitation of derivative
works created prior to termination. 428 "Alternative B" focused on

422. Report of the Register, supra note 416, at 1292-94 (calling for "protection of authors
against unremunerative transfers"). Section 16 would go on to become § 203 of the 1976
Act. See An Act for the General Revision of the Copyright Law, Title 17 of the United States
Code, and for Other Purposes, 90 Stat. 2541, 2569 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Act]. Section 22,
which became § 304, is addressed below.
423. Report of the Register,supra note 416, at 1292-94.
424. See discussion supra Section III.C.l.
425. See Copyright law of 1957, arts. 31, 35 (now Code de la propri6t&intellectuelle, arts.
L. 131-3, 131-4) [hereinafter Copyright law (France)]). The Register's Report took care to
add, however, "[w]e would encourage the compensation of authors on a royalty basis but we
would not forbid lump-sum transfers." Report of the Register, supra note 416, at 1293. On the
other hand, the French law also acknowledged certain instances of permissible lump sum
transfers as well. See Copyright law (France), art. 35 (now CPI art. L. 131-4).
426. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PT. 3, PRELIMINARY
DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DIscusSION AND COMMENTS ON THE
DRAFT, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., at 278 (Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION PT. 3] (statement of Barbara Ringer).

427. Id. at 16.
428. Id. at 15-16.
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"unremunerative transfers," allowing the author to terminate twenty years
after the transfer. If "the profits received by the transferee or his successors
in title are strikingly disproportionate to the compensation, consideration, or
share received by the author or his successors, action may be brought in any
court mentioned in section 1338 of Title 28 to reform or terminate said
transfer."429
While Alternative B in theory captured the raison d'8tre for the
termination right-to redress the imbalance when the author has sold her
copyright for a pittance and the publisher reaps all the reward if the work
proves successful-the "strikingly disproportionate" standard would have
invited expensive and inconclusive litigation.430 The proposal accordingly
garnered little support. 431 With respect to Alternative A, even with its
concessions on works-for-hire and derivative works (the former at least in
part an accommodation of the transactions costs problem arising with
multiple-authored works; the latter a recognition of the reliance interests in
the investments made to create derivative works such as motion pictures),
the proposal proved too radical for publisher interests who decried "another
example of slapping the publishers down, but in this instance the slap would
be so violent as to drain the very lifeblood of the industry."432
The following year the Revision Bills introduced in Congress 433 retreated
from two of the Preliminary Draft's most author-favorable provisions: they
made termination optional rather than automatic, and they delayed vesting of
the termination right from twenty to thirty-five years following execution of
the contract. On the other hand, the 1964 Bill retained the inalienable
character of the termination right, and clarified the scope of its application:
"The termination may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the
contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any other future
transfer."434 Both authors and publishers found the changes objectionable.
The Authors League of America considered thirty-five years too long to wait

429. Id. at 16.
430. Id.
431. See, e.g., id. at 250 (American Book Publishers Council: "The second alternative
would, in addition, be extremely impractical in terms of its open invitation to endless and
costly litigation in which the publishers might well find themselves at the mercy of the
courts, which would have no objective standard to guide them.").
432. Id. at 318 (Music Publishers' Protective Association).
433. S. 3008, H.R. 11947, 88th Cong., (1964); H.R. 12354, 88th Cong., (1964).
434. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PT. 5,1964 REvISION BILL
WITH DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., at 10 (Comm. Print 1964)
[hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PT. 5]; see also COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PT. 3,
supra note 426, at 402-03 (suggestions of Prof. Melville Nimmer).
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for termination rights,435 and feared that the exemption for works-for-hire
would encourage publishers to press authors to sign work-for-hire
agreements. 436 The American Book Publishers Council proved no happier:
"There is no adequate reason why the well-entrenched doctrine of nongovernmental interference with freedom of contract should not be applied to
this situation."437 The Council dismissed arguments grounded in authors'
inferior bargaining positions; they emphasized authors' representation by
literary agents, and noted: "As a matter of fact, if an author's first book sells
well, usually other publishers bid for him and his original publisher must
bargain competitively or lose the author."438
Despite the publishers' bid to eliminate reversion rights, subsequent bills
continued to include both the right and the "notwithstanding any agreement
to the contrary" proviso. 43 9 The termination right was made applicable to
"the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license,"440 and the
timeframe for effecting the termination was limited to five years beginning
thirty-five years after transfer.441 Thus, the exercise of the termination right
became progressively less author-favorable. It began as a right that vested
automatically twenty, then thirty-five, years from the conclusion of the
contract; it next would have vested only if the author exercised his right
(continued rights of exploitation thus by default remaining with the
assignees); and finally, through the addition of the five-year deadline, it fell
subject to a use-it-or-lose-it regime. These compromises, together with the
exclusion of works-for-hire and previously created derivative works from the
scope of the termination, made the termination right palatable to publishers
and motion picture producers.442
435. COPYRIGHT LAW REvISION PT. 5, supra note 434, at 239.
436. Id. at 156 (statement of Irwin Karp on behalf of Authors League). The concern
may have been overstated, in light of the 1976 Act's restriction of works-for-hire to
employee works or only certain specially ordered works, and subject to a signed writing. Id.
at 145 (testimony of Barbara Ringer concerning author-favorable change in definition of
works-for-hire). On the other hand, the concern may have been prescient. See Marvel
Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 292 (2d Cir. 2002) (retroactively deeming work a
"work for hire" constitutes impermissible agreement contrary to termination right).
437. COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION PT. 5, supra note 434, at 225.
438. Id
439. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 5 16(a)(4) (as introduced Feb. 4, 1965).
440. Id. § 203(a).
441. Id. § 203(a)(2) (with slight variation for grants for right of first publication).
442. Hearings on Copyright Law Revision Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on theJudidaU,
89th Cong. 98 (1965) (Memorandum Statement by the Copyright Comm. of the Motion
Picture Association of America, Inc. on H.R. 4347) ("Although we are still strongly opposed
in principle to the very concept of statutory recapture in any form, the compromise worked
out, after much travail, in H.R. 4347, is a minimal basis on which we can learn to live with
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At least one issue remained in dispute-namely, whether unanimity was
required among joint authors and/or their heirs to exercise the termination
right. Motion picture producers pushed for unanimity, 443 while authors'
groups contended that such a requirement would likely render the exercise of
the right in co-authored works unworkable.444 The Authors League thus
urged that a majority of those sharing the copyright be sufficient.445 The
following year's bill awarded the round to the authors, allowing exercise of
termination by a "majority of the authors"446 and working through the
portion of the termination interest the widow(er) and each of the children
would hold.447 By 1966, Congress had settled most of the details of the 1976
Act termination provisions respecting contracts entered into as of its
effective date.
2. Reversion Rights in Works Whose 1909 Act Copyrights Were Still
Subsisting
For works published before 1978, Congress extended the term of
copyright by adding nineteen years to the twenty-eight-year renewal term for
a total of seventy-five years of protection from publication.448 Congress then
confronted the question of the beneficiary of the additional nineteen years,
an issue raised as early as the Register's 1961 Report. Without explicitly
adverting to the Constitution's authorization to Congress to secure exclusive
rights "to Authors," the Register acknowledged that "there would be little
justification for lengthening the term unless the author or his heirs were to
receive some benefit from it."449 The Register initially recommended an
automatic reversion at the end of the twenty-eighth year of the renewal term,
but only for works for which the author was not receiving royalties.450 In the
course of the revision bills, however, the same compromises that trimmed
the statutory termination right for post-1977 contracts also whittled down
the reversion right attached to the "extended renewal term."451 Thus,
such a provision, and accept the same in the interests of furthering an adequate revision
statute.").
443. Id. at 996-98.
444. Id. at 94 (Prepared Statement of Rex Stout on Behalf of the Authors League of
America) ("one of several children of a deceased author" could prevent his mother and
siblings, or even the still-living co-authors of a work from exercising termination rights).
445. Id.
446. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., § 203(a)(1) (as reported by Judiciary Comm., Oct. 12, 1966).
447. § 203(a)(2).
448. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2006).
449. Report of the Register,supra note 416, at 1258.
450. Id.
451. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c).
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"proprietors" who under the 1909 Act were entitled to effect, the renewals,
remained in title throughout the extended renewal period as well, and the
scope of the reversion right excluded pre-existing derivative works.452 By
contrast, under the 1909 Act, the renewal term (if not contracted away)
entitled authors to retrieve their copyrights free and clear of all prior grants;
thus, the copyright owners of any derivative works created under the
authority of the first-term grant would be obliged to negotiate with the
owner of the renewal term rights in the underlying work.453 And, as with
termination of post-1977 contracts, the extended renewal term reversion
right did not attach automatically; the author (or her heirs) was obliged to
effect the termination, within a specified time period, otherwise the
previously transferred rights would remain with the grantee for the remaining
duration of copyright. 454
When Congress in 1998 added another twenty years to the terms of
extant copyrights, it gave the authors (or heirs) of works published before
1978 another opportunity to terminate grants during the last twenty years,
but only so long as they had not previously terminated grants at the outset of
the prior nineteen-year extension. 455 As a result, as between the two term
extensions, authors may only once recapture rights they assigned or
licensed.456 The grantee who negotiated rights for the first extended renewal
term of nineteen years thus would reap thirty-nine years of exclusive rights
for the price of nineteen. In such instances, one may query whether Congress
has "secur[ed]" the term extension "to Authors." If compliance with the
constitutional clause was already attenuated under the use-it-or-lose-it
recapture provisions accompanying the nineteen-year renewal term
extension, the exclusion of many authors from the twenty-year renewal term
extension seems even less compatible with the constitutional charge.457
452. See §5 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A) (2006).
453. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990) (addressing the renewed copyright in
short story on which film Rear Window was based). In 1992, Congress amended § 304(a) of
the Copyright Act to provide for automatic renewal of copyright registrations. If the author
or her heirs effect the registration, all renewal term rights, including in derivative works, will
vest; if the renewal is automatic, the first-term grantee of derivative work rights is permitted
to continue to exploit the pre-existing derivative work during the renewal term and its
extensions. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(4)(A).
454. 5 304(c).
455. See § 304(c), (d).
456. 5 304(d).
457. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 483 Before the S. Comm. on the judhiag, 104th Cong. 112 (1995)
(Register of Copyright Marybeth Peters' response to challenge on "to Authors" issue); id. at
117 (Comm'r of Patents and Trademarks Bruce Lehman's response to challenge on "to
Authors" issue); id. at 165 (statement of Prof. William Patry) ("[Miusic publishers have let it
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3. No Reversion Rights in Unpublished Works
The 1909 Act reversion right and its extensions in the 1976 Act all are
tied to the renewal term following the first twenty-eight-year term. The 1976
Act and 1998 Copyright Term Extention Act amendments' reversions are
both a recapture of rights during the extended renewal term. But the renewal
term follows an initial twenty-eight-year period that, unless the work was
registered as an unpublished work, began upon publication. If the author
granted derivative work rights in an unpublished work-for example, a grant
of motion picture rights in an unpublished play or story-the underlying
work would remain unpublished, and no renewal term would ever attach.458
Thus, while the 1909 Act renewal term reversion did not include the
derivative works carve-out the motion picture producers demanded for the
1976 Act, to the extent the producers based their films on prior unpublished
works that were not works made for hire, they would have limited their
exposure to hold-up from the authors of underlying works. By contrast,
because the 1976 Act provisions on termination of grants thirty-five years
following their conclusion do not distinguish between published and
unpublished underlying works, the perceived need for a derivative works
carve-out becomes apparent.

be known they would oppose any bill that gives the [extended] copyright to authors. This
assertion, if true, demonstrates how far S. 483 as drafted departs from the constitutional goal
of protecting authors."); S. REP. No. 104-315, at 33-34 (1996) (minority views of Sen. Hank
Brown) (arguing that CTEA "does not secure the copyright to authors. Instead it secures the
extended monopoly grant to the current owners of the copyright").
458. See, e.g., Copyght Office Assignments of Copyrght, 186 PHOTOSTAT COPIES 141 (grant
from Vin Moore to Universal Picture Corp, 30 Aug. 1927, of all rights, "forever" in
unpublished story "Ocean Bruisers"); id. at 47 (grant from Agnes Christine Johnston to
Columbia Pictures Corp., September 20, 1927, of motion picture rights in unpublished
original dramatic composition "The Kiss"); see also Paige v. Banks, 80 U.S. 608, 616 (1871)
(finding no reversion right because publisher received unpublished manuscript).
It is possible that 1978 unpublished works became vested with § 203 termination
rights on January 1, 1978, when § 303 brought these works under federal copyright, because
the "execution" of a grant of federal copyright rights would have occurred only with the
effective date of the 1976 Act. See Letter from Jane C. Ginsburg, Professor, Columbia Univ.,
to Maria Pallante, Assoc. Register, Policy & Int'l Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office (Apr. 27,
2010), availableat www.copyright.gov/docs/termination/comments/2010/ginsburg-jane.pdf.
But the § 203(b)(1) exception for derivative works would in any event shield the motion
picture producers from any non-employee for hire's termination.
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1. Summary of TerminationProvisions
Different events trigger the 1976 Act's termination provisions. For works
first published when the 1909 Act was still in force, the advent of the
author's reversion rights is calculated from the date of first publication.4 59 For
grants made as of the 1976 Act's effective date, the date of the execution of
the grant (not the date of publication of the work) determines the vesting of
the reversion right.460
The 1976 Act includes transitional provisions covering the reversion of
renewal term rights in works published before 1978, and therefore under the
aegis of the 1909 Act. These works fall into two categories, those published
before 1964 (whose first twenty-eight-year term expired before 1992), and
those published between 1964 and 1977 (whose first twenty-eight-year term
expires between 1992 and 2015); the latter group benefits from the automatic
renewal amendments made in 1992.461 For works published before 1964, the
renewal term reversion of rights vested automatically (upon proper
application and registration). The term generally vested in the author,462 but if
she survived into the renewal term she was bound by a prior grant of renewal
term rights; if the author died before the renewal term vested, the author's
surviving spouse or children took the rights notwithstanding any grant of
renewal term rights by the author, including with respect to derivative works.
No deadline was imposed on the author's or statutory heirs' exercise of the
reverted rights.463 For works published between 1964 and 1977, inclusive, if
the author did not grant the renewal term, or if the author died before the
renewal term vested, then renewal term rights revert if the renewal is effected
during the twenty-eighth year of copyright. (If the author, or survivor, does
not renew, then the term of copyright will be automatically renewed, but the
transferee may continue to use pre-existing derivative works.)464
With respect to the nineteen additional years the 1976 Act appended to
the end of the renewal term for works published under the 1909 Act, the
author or her heirs may effect the reversion of these extended renewal term
459.
460.
461.
462.
renewal.
463.
author's
1965.
464.

17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3).
Id.
See § 304(b)(2).
The 1909 Act included four categories of works whose "proprietors" took the
See 17 U.S.C. § 23 (repealed Oct. 19, 1976).
Thus, for example, in Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977), the
widow effected the renewal in 1952, but did not assign the rights to Rohauer until
17 U.S.C.

§ 304(b)(4)(A).
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rights within a five-year period beginning at the end of fifty-six years from
publication (with a minimum of two years, and a maximum of ten years,
advance notice); however, the transferee may continue to use already created
derivative works. Similarly, for the twenty years Congress in 1998 added to
the extended renewal term of 1909 Act works, the author or her heirs may
effect the reversion during a five-year period beginning at the end of seventyfive years from publication (with a minimum of two years, and a maximum
of ten years, advance notice), but only if the author or her heirs did not
terminate at the end of fifty-six years; the transferee may continue to use
already-created derivative works.
For grants of exclusive or non-exclusive rights made after 1977
(regardless of the work's date of publication), the author or her heirs may
effect termination within a five-year period beginning thirty-five years from
execution of the grant (or, if the grant transferred publication rights, thirtyfive years from publication or forty years from execution, whichever is
earlier), with a minimum of two years, and a maximum of ten years, advance
notice. 465 As with all other 1976 Act terminations, the transferee may
continue to use already-created derivative works.466
2. Case Law
Grants concluded after 1977 are governed by section 203 of the 1976
Act; they will be terminable beginning in 2013 (with the earliest notice period
having begun in 2003). As a result, courts have yet to interpret those
provisions. But controversies under section 304(c), governing the
termination of the extended renewal term, began to arise with the effective
date of the 1976 Act, and are likely to continue for as long as the right to
reclaim the section 304(c) or (d) extended renewal term remains enforceable(
that is, until 2055).467 The cases calling for interpretation of section 304(c)
have fallen into three general categories: adequacy of notice given to
grantees; scope of the derivative works right exception to termination; and
evasion of the inalienability principle embodied in the "notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary" proviso.

465. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2006).
466. § 203(b)(1).
467. The last works under the aegis of the 1909 Act were published in 1977; the second
extended renewal term will vest seventy five years later, 2052. The author (or heir) has five
years in which to effect termination (2057), but must give at least two years advance notice,
hence 2055.
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a) Adequacy of Notice to Grantees
The notice provisions of section 304(c) are not author-friendly. As the
court in Siegel v. WarnerBros. (concerning the recapture of rights in Superman)
lamented, section 304(c)'s "intricate provisions oftentimes create unexpected
pitfalls that thwart or blunt the effort of the terminating party to reclaim the
full measure of the copyright in a work of authorship."468 The caselaw
confirms this sobering assessment. In Burroughs v. MGM,469 Edgar Rice
Burroughs' heirs sought to recapture film rights in the Targan books. While
the derivative works exception insulated the grantees of rights in previouslycreated motion pictures, the Burroughs heirs aimed to exercise control over
future films incorporating the Tartan characters. The Second Circuit held
that the termination notice's "undoubtedly inadvertent"470 failure to include
five of fourteen "Tarzan" titles rendered the termination ineffective even
though the five omitted titles did not include the first appearances of the
various Tagan characters. In theory, any rights conveyed in the five
remaining titles should have been limited to the new matter contributed by
those titles, the basic character attributes and adventures having been set out
in the earlier works covered by the notice of termination.471 As a result, the
terminated grantee seeking to make a new film should not have been entitled
to rely on its remaining rights in the later works because any new film would
inevitably incorporate character traits and plot elements contained in the
earlier works in which the grantee no longer had rights.
The Second Circuit, however, citing no authority, proclaimed "when an
author grants the rights to a work that contains material protected by the
author's copyright in an earlier work, the grant implicitly authorizes the use
of all material contained in the licensed work, including material that may be
covered by the author's other copyrights." 4 72 The decision is especially
devastating for authors of works in which the same characters appear in
multiple sequels. The court's reasoning has the effect of nullifying the

468.
469.
470.
471.

Siegel v. Warner Bros. Ent., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 622.
Cf 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2006). Copyright in a derivative work
extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as
distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and
does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The
copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge
the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright
protection in the preexisting material.

Id.
472. Broughs, 683 F.2d at 622.
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limitation on the derivative works exception to pre-existing derivative works.
Section 304(c)(6)(A) specifies that the "privilege [to continue to exploit
previously prepared derivative works] does not extend to the preparation
after the termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work covered by the terminated grant." If derivative works rights granted in
later works in the series may continue to be exploited based on an "implicit"
grant of rights in earlier works, then the character rights will not be retrieved
until fifty-six years following the publication of the last pre-1978 sequel, or
thirty-five years following a post-1978 grant of rights in the last sequel.
In Siegel v. Warner Bros., the termination notice served by the heirs of
Jerome Siegel, one of the two creators of Superman, specified an effective date
that failed, by a few days, to encompass the first published appearance of the
Superman character in promotional announcements for the forthcoming first
comic book featuring the character. Though the timing of the notice did
encompass the comic book, Warner Bros. claimed that the subsistence of its
rights in the earlier advertisements preserved its rights in the essential visual
and story elements of the character. The court agreed that as much of the
character as was depicted in the announcements remained unaffected by the
termination. However,
[t]he Court begins by observing what is not depicted in the
announcements. Obviously, nothing concerning the Superman
storyline (that is, the literary elements contained in Action Comics,
Vol. 1) is on display in the ads; thus, Superman's name, his alter
ego, his compatriots, his origins, his mission to serve as a champion
of the oppressed, or his heroic abilities in general, do not remain
within defendants [sic] sole possession to exploit. Instead the only
copyrightable elements left arise from the pictorial illustration in
the announcements, which is fairly limited.
The person in question has great strength (he is after all holding
aloft a car). The person is wearing some type of costume, but
significantly the colors, if any, for the same are not represented, as
the advertisement appears only in.black and white. The argument
that the "S" crest is recognizable in the promotional advertisement
is not persuasive. What is depicted on the chest of the costume is
so small and blurred as to not be readily recognizable, at best all
that can be seen is some vague marking or symbol its precise
contours hard to decipher. The Court thus concludes that
defendants may continue to exploit the image of a person with
extraordinary strength who wears a black and white leotard and
cape. What remains of the Siegel and Shuster's Superman copyright
that is still subject to termination (and, of course, what defendants
truly seek) is the entire storyline from Action Comics, Vol. 1,
Superman's distinctive blue leotard (complete with its inverted
triangular crest across the chest with a red "S" on a yellow
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background), a red cape and boots, and his superhuman ability to
leap tall buildings, repel bullets, and run faster than a locomotive,
473
none of which is apparent from the announcement.
The Siegel court correctly construed the relationship between the
copyright in a work containing a character's first appearance and the
copyright in each subsequent work containing additional iterations of the
character. Superman may be unusual in that the first published works (the
promotional announcements) did not convey all the essential elements of the
character's appearance and story. The heirs' recapture, while incomplete, was
nonetheless sufficiently substantial to oblige Warner Bros. to account to the
heirs for profits generated by at least some of the exploitations of the
Superman copyright.474
b) Scope of the Derivative Works Exception to Termination
The 1976 Act termination right returns fewer rights to the author than
did the renewal term reversion because "a derivative work prepared under
authority of the grant before its termination may continue to be utilized
under the terms of the grant after its termination," while the "new estate" of
the renewal term freed the author (if she had not previously assigned her
renewal term rights) or her statutory heirs from all prior grants.475 Without
the continued use exception, derivative works grantees, principally motion
picture producers, would have opposed, and likely defeated, an inalienable
termination right. While the exception secured the investment made in the
creation of derivative works, the Supreme Court interpreted the statute to
benefit not only derivative works producers, but also (and at the cost of
authors) the intermediaries, generally publishers, who license them. In Mills
Music v. Snyder, the heirs of the composer of the aptly-named song "Who's
Sorry Now?" served a notice of termination on the music publisher.476 The
music publisher had, pursuant to the now-terminated grant, licensed several
record producers to make sound recordings of the song. Under the
exception, it was clear that the record producers could continue to sell the
recordings they had already made. At issue were the royalty payments: would
the record producers now pay 100% of the royalties to the composer's heirs,
473. Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
474. The court does not appear to have considered whether Warner Bros.' rights in later
iterations of Superman derived from subsequent, unterminated (or unterminable, if later
iterations were work for hire) grants which "implicitly" incorporated grants of rights in the
earliest versions of the character.
475. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 226, 230 (1990) (holding that renewal terminates
right to exploit derivative works).
476. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985).
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or would they continue to pay 50% to the publisher, even though the
publisher no longer held any rights in the song? The Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, construed "the terms of the grant" to cover both the composer's
grant of rights to the music publisher, and the publisher's grants of derivative
works rights to the record producers. As a result, the publisher would
continue to receive its prior share of the royalties. While the derivative works
licenses in Mills Music split the royalties evenly, so that the author continued
to be remunerated, the Court's reasoning would seem to apply even when the
licensing intermediary keeps most or all of the royalties.47 The decision has
been widely criticized as inconsistent with legislative intent. 47 8 Subsequent
decisions of lower courts appear to endeavor to limit the potential damage.
In Woods v. Bourne, the Second Circuit considered the post-termination
distribution of royalties in arrangements of the song "When the Red Red
Robin Comes Bob Bob Bobbin' Along" as sold in sheet music and as
publicly performed in sound recordings.479 The Court rejected the terminated
publisher's reliance on Mills Music for two reasons. First, with respect to
royalties earned from the radio broadcasts and other public performances of
the recorded songs, the court held that the exception "protects only
authorized uses made by derivative work copyright owners, or their
licensees." 480 Because, at the time of the decision, there was no public
performance right in a sound recording, the public performances whose
royalties were at issue could not be authorized uses with respect to the sound
recordings, rather they implicated rights in the underlying musical
composition.
But what was the underlying musical composition? The composer's heirs
contended it was the piano-vocal version, from which subsequent
arrangements were adapted. The publisher argued that the initial iteration of
477. See id. at 177 ("no support ... for the proposition that Congress expected the
author to be able to collect an increased royalty for the use of a derivative work").
478. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5:132-34; Howard B. Abrams, Who's
Sorj Now? Termination Rights and the Derivaive Works Excepion, 62 U. DETROIT L. REv. 181,
224-32, 238-39 (1985); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislaive HistoU, 72
CORNELL L. REv. 857, 901-02 (1987) ("With this interpretation, the [Mills Musi] Court did
to the right of termination essentially the same thing as it had done to the 1909 Act's renewal
provision 42 years earlier. With termination, as with renewal, the author's recapture
expectancy is essentially alienable. In industries such as music publishing where authors and
composers typically assign to the publisher the right to license any further uses, the statutory
right to terminate will have little value. As with the renewal term, the author will have
assigned most of what is valuable in her work to people from whom she will be unable to
recapture it.').

479. Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995).
480. Id. at 989.
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the song in the "lead sheet" constituted the "work" that was the subject of
the "grant." The lead sheet was "a very simple, hand-written rendering of the
lyrics and melody of the composition without harmonies or other
embellishments. [The publisher argued that it] modified the lead sheet by
adding harmonies and other elements to create a commercially exploitable
piano-vocal arrangement that qualifies as a derivative work." 8 1 In that event,
if all the commercially exploited versions of the song were derivative works,
then none would be terminable, and under Mills Music, the publisher would
keep its share of the royalties from the continued sale of the sheet music.
Thus, as its second basis for distinguishing Mills Music, the court affirmed the
district court's ruling that the "work" was the piano-vocal version, and,
moreover, that most of the arrangements derived from the piano-vocal
version lacked sufficient originality to constitute derivative works. If the
works for which the royalties were owed were not derivative works, then the
derivative works exception would be irrelevant. Applying the Second
Circuit's "distinguishable variation" standard of requisite creativity for
derivative works,482 the court distinguished originality from the mere skill or
"special training" that characterized the "cocktail pianist variations of the
piece that are standard fare in the music trade by any competent musician." 483
In its endeavor to prevent the derivative works exception from
swallowing the songwriter's termination right, the court may have applied an
unduly high standard of creativity, a suspicion supported by the court's
favorable citation to Gracen v. Bradford Exchange.484 Gracen's suggestion that a
higher standard of originality is required for derivative works than for
underlying works has since been discredited in its own circuit. 4 85 On the
other hand, the Woods court's reference to "standard fare in the music
trade" 486 may be consistent with prior Second Circuit decisions that reject the
originality of variations that are necessary to implement the adaptation of a
work from one medium to another. For example, in Batlin v. Snyder, the Court
disregarded the changes the copyright claimant introduced in producing a
plastic version of a public domain cast iron "Uncle Sam" bank on the ground
that the variations were trivial or necessitated by the medium transformation.
In Woods, the Second Circuit may have felt confident in affirming the trial
court's assessment that most of the arrangements were trivial because the
481. Id.
482. See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cit. 1976) (internal
quotations omitted).
483. Woods, 60 F.3d at 991 (internal quotations omitted).
484. Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
485. See Schrock v. Learning Curve Int'l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513 (7th Cit. 2009).
486. Woods, 60 F.3d at 991.
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trial judge was not only a respected jurist but also an opera composer 487
(although the court of course did not allude to this additional competence).
The disqualification of the alleged derivative works meant not only that the
terminated intermediary publisher would not receive royalties for the
continued exploitation of the arrangements, but that the terminating author
(or his subsequent grantee) would determine whether and when the
arrangements might henceforth be exploited.488
In Fred Ablert Music Cop. v. Warner-ChappellMusic, the Second Circuit
adapted Mills Musicts interpretation of "under the terms of the grant" in the
author's favor.489 Addressing whether the licensor of pre-termination
derivative works could authorize different exploitations of the derivative
work post termination, the court ruled that the grantor of a mechanical
license to make a sound recording of the song "Bye-Bye Blackbird" was not
later entitled to license that derivative work for the soundtrack and
soundtrack album of the film "Sleepless in Seattle" once the songwriter
reclaimed his rights for the extended renewal term. The Second Circuit
emphasized that in Mills Music, the Supreme Court interpreted "the grant" as
"the entire set of documents that created and defined each licensee's right to
prepare and distribute [the] derivative work[]."490 Thus, the court determined
that "the grant" at issue combined the songwriter's original grant to the
music publisher with the publisher's subsequent grant to the record
producer:
Although the original grant would presumably authorize this new
use [in connection with the motion picture], plainly Warner's
license to A&M does not
additional releases of the

...
...

. This grant does not authorize any
derivative [recording], much less its

inclusion on a movie soundtrack. Just as Warner continues [by
virtue of Mills Music] to benefit from the terms of the second grant,
pursuant to which it receives royalties from sales of the [derivative
recording] . .. , it is bound by those terms of the second grant

487. See Christine Perkins, Courtrooms and Dramas: Richard Owen '50 Has a Noteworthy
Career in Both, HARv. L. BULL., Summer 2006, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
news/bulletin/2006/summer/cn_01.php.
488. The works the court deemed were not "derivative works" were various sheet music
arrangements. The sound recordings, even if based on unoriginal arrangements, would
nonetheless be derivative works by virtue of the originality of the recorded performances
and of the contributions of the recording engineer.
489. Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.
1998).
490. Id. at 23 (emphasis and brackets in Second Circuit's opinion).
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which limit its exploitation of the Song to sales of that
phonorecord. 491
Because the music publisher had not, pre-termination, authorized
additional uses of the licensed derivative work, it was now too late to engage
in new exploitations, and the rights to license and receive royalties from
those exploitations reverted to the author (or his statutory heirs). Whether
Fred Ahlert effectively cabins Mills Music may turn on whether during the
minimum two-year period between service of the notice of termination and
the effective date of the termination,492 the grantee engages in a flurry of
downstream licensing to cover the exploitations the grantee did not
previously authorize. If "[t]he effect of Mills Music . .. is to preserve during
the post-termination period the panoply of contractual obligations that
governed pre-termination uses of derivative works by derivative work owners
or their licensees," 493 then perhaps intermediary grantees may elude the effect
of FredAhlert by expanding the "panoply" before the effective date of the
termination. 494
A related issue concerns the interpretation of the phrase "a derivative
work preparedunder authority of the grant before its termination"495: must the
derivative work have been fully created before termination, or will the
derivative work escape termination so long as its creation has been
undertaken before the effective date of termination? If "prepared"
encompassed derivative works begun but not yet completed, then one might
anticipate that grantees would rush to initiate the creation of the maximum
number of derivative works during the minimum two-year period between
the notification and the effective date of termination. While the notice period
may well have been intended to allow grantees the opportunity to wind down
their exploitation in anticipation of termination, 496 the termination right
would be considerably compromised if the notice period also enabled
491. Id. at 24.
492. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4)(A) (2006).
493. Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 987 (2d Cir. 1995).
494. Section 304(c)(6)(B) provides that the "future rights that will revert upon
termination of the grant become vested on the date the notice of termination has been
served," but it seems doubtful that the vesting cuts off the grantee's present rights during the
notice period.
495. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A) (emphasis added).
496. See, e.g., SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE US COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 75 (May 1965)
("The thought behind the 2-to-10-year limitation on the time for serving a notice was to
establish a definite period for filing the notice toward the end of the 35- or 40-year term,
thus avoiding earlier, indiscriminate terminations, and to provide a fair period of advance
notice to the grantee that his rights are to be terminated.").
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grantees to gear up to engage in further development of derivative works. No
decisions yet appear to confront this issue. 497
c) Inalienability: "Any Agreement to the Contrary"

498

The termination right remains available to the author or her heirs
"notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to
make a will or to make any future grant."499 The Second Circuit has held that
a subsequent agreement to recharacterize as a "work for hire" an author's
creation of "Captain America" for a series of comic books was an
impermissible "agreement to the contrary" because grants of rights in works
made for hire are not terminable.5 00 The determination long after the work's
creation that it was "for hire" thus constituted an impermissible agreement
that the creator would have no termination rights.50' But it appears that not
every agreement whose effect is to deprive the author or the statutory heir of
the opportunity to terminate a grant is an "agreement to the contrary" within
the meaning of section 304(c)(5). The Second and Ninth Circuits have issued
conflicting decisions when the parties to an initial pre-1978 grant (or their
successors) agreed post-1978 to rescind the grant and enter into a new
agreement. Because the initial agreement would have been terminable under
section 304(c), but the new agreement would not (nor would it be under
section 203), the question arose whether the new agreement was "contrary"
to section 304(c).
Milne ex. rel. Cqyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., concerned transfers of renewal
rights in A.A. Milne's Winnie the Pooh works. 502 Milne wrote and published
several Winnie the Pooh stories between 1924 and 1929. In 1930, he granted
Stephen Slesinger an exclusive license of merchandising and other rights to
497. Cf NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 11.02[C][1] n.65 (suggesting that as much of derivative
work as had been created by date of termination may continue to be exploited, and if
remainder of derivative work is not based upon the underlying work--e.g., a soundtrack for
a film based on a terminated novel, then the whole derivative work may continue to be
exploited. By the same token, one may infer from this suggestion that the termination would
preclude further additions to the derivative work-in-progress if those additions derive from
the underlying terminated work.).
498. Portions of the following section are adapted from JANE C. GINSBURG & R.
ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERiALS 40-44 (Supp. 2009). For a detailed

examination of the "any agreement to the contrary" decisions, see Peter S. Mennell & David
Nimmer, Poob-Poohing CopynghtLw's qnalienable' Termination Rzgbts (UC Berkeley Pub. Law
Research Paper No. 1525516, 2009), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1 525516.
499. 17 U.S.C. %§203(a)(5), 304(c)(5) (2006).
500. Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002).
501. Id.
502. Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005).
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the Pooh character in the United States, for the initial and renewal copyright
terms in exchange for royalties (Slesinger then transferred his rights to the
corporation SSI). The stories' copyrights were later properly renewed. In
1961, SSI-in exchange for royalties-exclusively granted to Walt Disney
Productions the rights that SSI had under the 1930 contract, and Disney
.acquired, inter alia, film rights from Milne's widow. In 1983, after Mrs.
Milne's death, her only child,Christopher Robin Milne,contracted with SSI
and Disney not to exercise his statutory termination rights; SSI and Disney in
turn agreed to increase Christopher Robin's royalties from the Pooh
properties. The 1983 agreement revoked the 1930 and 1961 agreements and
re-granted the rights in the Pooh works to SSI, which then granted rights to
Disney. In 2002, Clare Milne, Christopher Robin's sole surviving child,
attempted to terminate her grandfather's 1930 grant to Slesinger under
section 304(d). She then sought a declaratory judgment that her termination
,notice was valid and effective. Disney did not object, as Clare simultaneously
agreed to grant to Disney the rights that reverted to her; indeed, Disney
agreed to fund Clare's litigation.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the execution of the 1983 agreement
revoked the 1930 grant, so that when Clare Milne served her termination
notice, there was no longer any pre-1 9 7 8 agreement to be terminated. The
court did not view the 1983 agreement as one inconsistent with the statutory
goal of protecting authors or their families against unremunerative transfers,
apparently because the 1983 agreement achieved the same objective as
termination: obtaining a better deal for the author's heir (in this case the son,
rather than the granddaughter). Moreover, the threat of termination proved
the incentive both for increasing Christopher Robin's royalties and for paying
them earlier than the termination date. That the arrangement cut out the
statutory heir of the section 304(d) termination right (the section 304(c) right
having gone unexercised) seems not to have troubled the court, which
appears to have found Clare's claim almost frivolous.503
The Ninth Circuit reached the opposite result, however, in ClassicMedia,
Inc. v. Mewborn,50 which involved the story "Lassie Come Home," written and
copyrighted by Eric Knight in 1938, as well as Knight's 1940 novel based on
the short story. Knight granted the predecessor to Classic Media the right to
make a television series based on the works. Knight died in 1943, and his
widow and three daughters later renewed the copyrights. Classic's
predecessor had an agreement regarding the renewal term television rights

503. See id. at 1048.
504. Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn, 532 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008).
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with Knight's widow, but not his daughters. In July 1976, Ms. Mewborn, one
of the daughters, assigned her 25% share of the film, TV, and radio rights in
the Lassie works to Classic's predecessor for $11,000. In March 1978,
Classic's predecessor contracted with the other two daughters to assign their
film, TV and radio rights, as well as ancillary merchandising, dramatic, and
recording rights, for $3,000 to each daughter. In order to conform all of the
daughters' grants of rights, Classic's predecessor paid Mewborn $3,000 to
sign a new agreement in March 1978 that was identical to her sisters'
agreements, except that it referred to the 1976 agreement, specifying that
Mewborn was granting the identified rights "to the extent such rights are
owned by me" and that the rights granted "are in addition to" the rights
granted in the 1976 agreement.50 5 In April 1996, Mewborn served a notice of
termination on Classic's predecessor, seeking to terminate her 1976 grant of
film, TV, and radio rights effective May 1, 1998. Classic asserted that the
termination was invalid, and eventually both parties sought a declaration of
ownership of the disputed rights.
The court ruled that Mewborn's 1976 assignment had transferred all of
her film, TV, and radio rights in the Lassie works. As a result, the court
decided that when she entered into the 1978 assignment, all Mewborn had to
left transfer were the ancillary rights that had not been mentioned in the 1976
agreement, so that the 1978 language purporting to transfer film, TV, and
radio rights was "a nullity." The court concluded that the 1978 agreement did
not substitute or revoke the 1976 agreement, but instead left it intact and
explicitly affirmed it. Thus, Mewborn's pre-1978 agreement remained in
force and subject to termination by her 1996 notice. Because the ClassicMedia
court found that the 1978 agreement did not prevent Mewborn from
terminating the 1976 grant, it did not need to decide whether the later
contract was an "agreement to the contrary." (It did indicate, however, that
interpreting the 1978 agreement as conveying film, TV, and radio rights to
Classic would make that assignment void as an "agreement to the contrary.")
One might distinguish the "Lassie" case from "Pooh" on the ground that
the remuneration for the 1978 Mewborn agreement was, compared to
Christopher Robin's, relatively paltry, and, more importantly, that where
Christopher Robin knew that the agreement bargained away future
termination rights for a substantial sum, it does not appear that Mewborn
understood that Classic's predecessor had devised the agreement to divest
her of a later termination opportunity. The Ninth Circuit appears to
distinguish a successful revocation and novation from one that violates the

505. Id. at 981.
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"'any agreement to the contrary" proscription based on its evaluation of the
extent to which the author benefits from the new arrangement and is aware
that the conclusion of a new agreement will deprive her of a future
termination opportunity.
Finally, Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck50 6 concerned a 1938 grant by
John Steinbeck to Viking Press of the exclusive right to publish in the United
States and Canada some of his best known works, in which he held the
copyright, in return for royalty payments. The agreement was to last as long
as the publisher kept the works in print. Steinbeck renewed the works'
copyrights as they came due. Steinbeck died in 1968; his will left his interest
in his copyrights to his widow Elaine. (His two sons from a previous
marriage, Thomas and John IV, received $50,000 each.) Viking later assigned
its rights and duties under the agreement to Penguin. The section 304(c)
termination window for the earliest work covered by the 1938 agreement
opened in 1985; the termination window for the latest work closed in 2000.
In 1994 Elaine and Penguin signed a new contract covering all works
included in the 1938 agreement (as well as several earlier and posthumous
Steinbeck works). Penguin agreed to pay a larger guaranteed annual advance
against royalties and to pay royalties on the retail price of the copies sold,
rather than the wholesale price. The 1994 agreement expressly provided that
it canceled and superseded the 1938 agreement. Elaine died in 2003, leaving
her interest in Steinbeck's copyrights to her children and grandchildren from
a previous marriage, and excluding Thomas and John IV and their heirs. In
2004, Steinbeck's son Thomas and granddaughter (the only surviving child of
the now-deceased John IV) served notice on Penguin seeking to terminate
Steinbeck's 1938 grants under section 304(d). Each party sought a declaration
as to ownership of the rights in question.
As in Milne, the Steinbeck court found the subsequent agreement
superseded the original agreements, leaving no subsisting agreement to be
terminated under section 304(c). Moreover, although the conclusion of the
new agreement defeated the statutory heirs' termination rights, it was not
held an "agreement to the contrary."507 According to the Second Circuit, the
parties' intention to terminate the 1938 contract was clear from the language
of the 1994 agreement. The court noted that, under applicable New York
law, "parties to an agreement can mutually agree to terminate it by expressly
assenting to its rescission while simultaneously entering into a new agreement
dealing with the same subject matter."5 08 The court therefore concluded that
506. Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2008).
507. Id. at 204.
508. Id. at 200 (quoting Jones v. Trice, 608 N.Y.S.2d 688 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)).
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the 1938 contract had been extinguished, and thus the 1994 agreement left
no pre-1978 grants in effect that could be subject to termination under
section 304.
The Second Circuit similarly concluded that the 1994 agreement was not
an "agreement to the contrary," notwithstanding which the termination could
be effected. Steinbeck's son and granddaughter argued that the effect of that
agreement, as interpreted by the court, was to eliminate their opportunity to
exercise their section 304 termination interest. The court explained that not
every agreement which effectively eliminates an author's or heir's statutory
termination right was "an agreement to the contrary." It noted, for example,
that, in instances in which multiple parties share the right to terminate a
particular agreement, the holders of a majority of the interest might agree
among themselves not to terminate, which would effectively eliminate the
minority parties' right to terminate the grant, but that the agreement among
the majority would not be an invalid "agreement to the contrary."
The Second Circuit explained that under its interpretation of an
"agreement to the contrary," "authors or their statutory heirs holding
termination rights are still left with an opportunity to threaten (or to make
good on a threat) to exercise termination rights and extract more favorable
terms from early grants of an author's copyright," but that the statute does
not suggest that they "are entitled to more than one opportunity, between
them, to use termination rights to enhance their bargaining power or to
exercise them." 50 9 And like the Milne court, the Second Circuit viewed
Elaine's actions in 1994 as consistent with the statutory purpose because she
obtained an increased return on Steinbeck's works.s 0
The Second and Ninth Circuits thus may understand "agreement to the
contrary" not to mean contrary to the exerise of the termination right, but
contrary to the policy underlying the termination right.511 But the statute says:
509. Id. at 204.
510. Allowing Elaine to cut out Steinbeck's children from his first marriage appears not
to have been inconsistent with Steinbeck's own intent, but the Second Circuit had previously
held that the author's intent does not trump the interests of the statutory heirs. See Larry
Spier, Inc. v. Bourne Co., 953 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1992) (indicating that composer provided in
his will for his mistress, but she was not entitled to share of copyright interests following
termination by statutory heirs).
511. Penguin Group (USA), 537 F.3d at 204. These decisions also suggest a formula for
eluding § 203 terminations of rights granted after 1977. Under that provision, grants may be
terminated thirty-five years following conclusion of the contract, subject to a minimum twoyear and maximum ten-year notice period. If, before the termination right vests with the
service of notice, the author and her grantee rescind the prior grant and enter into a new
agreement, the thirty five year clock starts over again. If the heirs rescind and regrant, that
grant will not be terminable at all. See 17 U.S.C. 5 203(a) (2006). So long as the new
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"termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the
contrary"; 512 it does not add "unless the agreement confers the kind of
benefits the author or her heirs would have received had they effected the
termination." The rescission-and-rollover technique, if valid, not only
postpones exercise of the termination right by another thirty-five years, but
may prevent effecting the termination altogether. This is because, as to post1977 grants, only those made by the author are terminable; heirs who regrant
rights in lieu of termination thereby lose their statutory termination rights.513
While the thirty-five-year accrual date for the statutory termination right
should not be interpreted to prevent the parties from ending their relationship
before thirty-five years have elapsed, 514 a new agreement between the same parties
(or their successors in title) that follows the rescission attracts suspicion. The
statute casts some doubt on these arrangements, for both sections 203(b)(4)
and 304(c)(6)(D) bar agreements to make a further grant of any right covered
by a terminated grant unless made after the effective date of termination;
while the statute allows the terminating author or heir to make an agreement
with the original grantee, she may do so only after the termination notice has
been served.515 At the least, the rescission-and-rollover should invite judicial
scrutiny. Judicial review may well be delicate, for arguably the present value
of a modest increase in royalties might be worth as much, if not more, to the
agreement offers the author somewhat better terms than the revoked contract, the
rescission-and-rollover technique arguably remains consistent with the policy underlying the
termination right. Moreover, it may not even be necessary that the new grant offer better
terms. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 127 (1976) ("Section 203 would not prevent the parties
to a transfer or license from voluntarily agreeing at any time to terminate an existing grant
and negotiating a new one, thereby causing another 35-year period to start running.").
512. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5) (emphasis added).
513. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (stating that "the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or
license of copyright or of any right under a copyright, executed by the author on or afterjanuary 1,
1978, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination" (emphasis added)).
514. Compare Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding thirty-five
year termination period preempted earlier terminations), with Walthal v. Rusk, 172 F.3d 481
(7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting Rano), and Korman v. HBC Florida, Inc., 182 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir.
1999) (also rejecting Rano). See also Latin Am. Music Co. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers Authors
& Publishers, 593 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that section 203 requirements do not
apply to terminations under state contract law); Foley v. Luster, 249 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir.
2001) (referring to caselaw upholding right under state contract law to terminate agreement
before 35 years). The Court of Appeals of England and Wales has also upheld contractual
clauses providing for automatic reversion of copyright in the event that the grantee
materially breaches its obligations under the contract assigning rights under copyright. See
Cross Town Music Co. 1 LLC v. Rive Droite Music Ltd., [2010] EWCA (Civ) 122 (reversion
of UK and foreign copyrights in 119 songs upon material breach-failure to pay royalties to
the songwriters).
515. 17 U.S.C. %g203(a)(4), 304(c)(4) (2006).
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author than the future value of retrieving all her rights (except as to alreadycreated derivative works). But in that event we may sense a depressing d6ja
vu: a return to the world of Fred Fisher v. Witmark, in which Justice
Frankfurter contended that authors need not be protected against
themselves, and that they could rationally choose to assign the renewal term
for a small consideration before its vesting, rather than gamble on a greater
return at the end of twenty-eight years.516
IV.

CONCLUSION

If authors' reversion rights laws endeavor to offset the author's weaker
bargaining position by assuring her a future opportunity to make a better
deal, history and practice suggest at best inconsistent achievement of that
aim. Legislators might improve the reversion rights regime, but it is not clear
that authors' lots will accordingly ameliorate. As Julie Cohen observed in this
Symposium:
[i]f we think that termination of transfers is the best way to put
authors in a good bargaining position with respect to what is, in
some transcendent sense, rightfully 'theirs,' we may concentrate our
energies on reforming termination of transfers, rather than, for
example, engaging in substantive regulation of labor contracts in
the creative industries.517
"Transcendent" or not, authors' interests in reaping the fruits of their
intellectual labors warrant meaningful and effective protection; substantive
regulation of contracts of transfer, rather than rights to terminate those
transfers, may indeed offer the preferable path. Reversion rights derive from
an era in which delineation of time-limited property rights afforded the most
legislatively likely means of attaining the author-protective objective. With
time running out in April 1710 in the House of Lords, it is understandable
that there is no evidence that any Lord raised or debated intervening in
author-publisher contracts; British lawmakers simply adopted a device they
knew and understood. The rest is history's inertia. Perhaps American and
certainly British authors now would be better off with a more continental
European approach, limiting the scope of transfers and assuring them royalty
participation for each mode of exploitation of the work.1s Today we are less
reluctant to legislate for the weaker party, as the author's right to terminate
516.
517.
Berkeley
518.
Berkeley

Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 656 (1943).
See Julie E. Cohen, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, Address at the
Center for Law and Technology Symposium: Copyright @ 300 (Apr. 9, 2010).
See Bernt Hugenholtz, Professor, University of Amsterdam, Address at the
Center for Law and Technology Symposium: Copyright @ 300 (Apr. 9, 2010).
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grants of U.S. rights "notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary" at least
in theory attests. We might consider redirecting those limitations on
alienability to the substance of the grant, rather than to its duration.
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APPENDIX: EVOLUTION OF U.S. AUTHORS' REVERSION
RIGHTS

Statute of Anne (Britain 1710)st9
Originalterm- Fourteen years.
Additionalterm- Fourteen years (if author living).
Reversion of rightsfor additionalterm- Author.
Formalitiesrequired: None.
Language. "[A]fter the Expiration of the said Term of Fourteen Years, the sole Right
of Printing or Disposing of Copies shall Return to the Authors thereof, if they are
520
then Living for another Term of Fourteen Years."

1783 Resolution of Continental Congress521
Originalterm At least fourteen years.
Additionalterm: At least fourteen years (if author living).
Reversion of rnghtsfor additionalterm. Author; then to: executors, administrators, assigns.
Formalitiesrequired: Restrictions as States deem proper.
Language- "[R]ecommended to the several States ... to secure to said authors, if they

shall survive the first term mentioned, and to their executors, administrators, and
assigns, the copy right of such books for another term of time not less than fourteen
years."

519. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, 5 11 (1710) (Gr. Brit.).
520. Id. Assignment of renewal right was also possible. See Caman v. Bowles, (1785) 29

Eng. Rep. 45 (Ch.).
521. Continental Congress Resolution Recommending the States to Secure Copyright to
the Authors and Publishers of New Books, available at PSOC, supra note 2,
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/"us_1783c".
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Connecticut (1783); 522 New Jersey (1783);
Georgia (1786);525 New York (1786)526

523
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Pennsylvania (1784); s24

Originalterm. Fourteen years.

Additional term. Fourteen years (if author living).
Reversion of rightsfor additionalterm- Author; then to heirs, assigns.
Formalitiesrequired: None.
Lnguage "[A]t the expiration of the said term of fourteen years ... the sole right of
printing and disposing of any such book ... shall return to the author thereof, if

then living, and his heirs and assigns, for the term of fourteen years more."

Massachusetts
(1783)529

(1783);

527

Rhode Island (1783);

528

New Hampshire

Onginalterm. Twenty-one years (twenty years in N.H.).
Additional term. Not applicable.
Reversion ofrnghtsfor additionalterm: Not applicable.
Formalitiesrequired: Not applicable.

522. Connecticut, An Act for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius, available at
PSOC, supra note 2, http:// www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/
"us_1783a".
523. New Jersey, An Act for the Promotion and Encouragement of Literature, 1783 N.J.
Acts 325, available at PSOC, supra note 2, http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/
0010/exec/ausgabe/"us_1783f".
524. Pennsylvania, An Act for the Encouragement and Promotion of Learning, 1784 Pa.
Acts 306, available at PSOC, supra note 2, http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/
0010/exec/ausgabe/"us_1 784a".
525. Georgia, An Act for Encouragement of Literature and Genius, available at PSOC,
2,
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/
supra note
"us 1786".
526. New York, An Act to Promote Literature, available at PSOC, supra note 2,
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/"us_1786a".
527. Massachussetts, An Act for the Purpose of Securing to Authors the Exclusive

Right and Benefit of Publishing Their Literary Productions for Twenty-One Years, available
at PSOC, supra note 2. http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/
ausgabe/"us_1783d".
528. Rhode Island, An Act for the Purpose of Securing to Authors the Exclusive Right
and Benefit of Publishing Literary Productions for Twenty-One Years, available at PSOC,
supra note
2,
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/
"us_1783h".
529. New Hampshire, An Act for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius, and for
Securing to Authors the Exclusive Right and Benefit of Publishing Their Literary
Productions for Twenty-One Years, available at PSOC, supra note 2, http://www.copy
7 83
g".
righthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/ "us1
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Lnguage "[A]ll books ...

shall be the sole property of the said author or

authors . . . Their heirs and assigns, for the full and complete term of twenty-one

[twenty] years, from the date of their first publication."

Maryland (1783)5"
Originalterm: Fourteen years.
Addiionalterm-Fourteen years (if author living).
Reversion of rigbtsfor additionalternm Author.
Formalitiesrequired: None.
Language- "[A]t the expiration of the aforesaid term of fourteen years, the sole right
of printing or disposing of copies shall return to the authors thereof, if they are then
living, for another term of fourteen years."

South Carolina (1784)31
Originalterm- Fourteen years.
Additionalterm: Fourteen years (if author living).
Reversion of rghtsfor additionalterm. Author.
Formaliiesrequired: None.
Language- "[A]fter the expiration of the said term of fourteen years, the sole right of
printing, or disposing of copies, shall return to the authors thereof, if they are then
living, for another term of fourteen years."

Virginia (1785)532
Originalterm Twenty-one years.
Additionalterm: Not applicable.
Reversion of rghtsfor additionalterm- Not applicable.
Formalitiesrequired:Not applicable.

530. Maryland, An Act Respecting Literary Property, available at PSOC, supra note 2,
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/"us_1783e".
531. South Carolina, An Act for the Encouragement of the Arts and Sciences, available at
PSOC, supra note 2, http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/

"us_1784b".

532. Virginia, An Act Securing to Authors of Literary Works an Exclusive Property
Therein for a Limited Time. available at PSOC, supra note 2, http://www.copy
righthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/"us_1785".
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Language-"[he author of any book ... his heirs and assigns shall have the exclusive
right of printing and reprinting such book or pamphlet ... For the term of twentyone years, to be computed from the first publication thereof."

North Carolina (1785)533
Originalterm- Fourteen years.
Additional term- Not applicable.
Reversion of nightsfor additionalterm- Not applicable.
Formalitiesrequired: Not applicable.
Language- "Mhe author of any book ... and his heirs and assigns, shall have the sole
liberty of printing, publishing, and vending the same within this State for the term of
fourteen years."

1789 Copyright Bills>3
Originalterm. Fourteen years.
Additionalterm. Fourteen years (if author living).
Reversion of rightsfor additionalterm. Author.
Formaliiesrequired: None.
Language: "[A]fter the expiration of the said term of fourteen years, the sole right of
printing and of disposing of copies of such books, shall return to the author or
authors of such books, if they are living, for another term of fourteen years."

Act of 1790535
Orginalterm- Fourteen years.
Renewal term- Fourteen years (if author living).
Reversion / Power of Renewat Authors; then to executors, administrators, assigns.
Formalities required: Re-recording of title in clerk's office of author's local Federal
district court within six months before expiration of first term, and, within two
months following renewal, publication of record in one or more newspapers for
four weeks.

533. North Carolina, An Act for Securing Literary Property, available at PSOC, supra note
2, http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/"us_1785a".
534. Copyright (and Patent) Bill, H.R. 10, 2d Cong., (1789).
535. 1790 Copyright Act, 1 Stat. 124.
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Language: "[I]f, at the expiration of the said term, the author or authors, or any of
them be living, and a citizen or citizens of these United States, or resident therein,
the same exclusive right shall be continued to him or them, his or their executors,
administrators, or assigns, for the further term of fourteen years ... ." 536

Early 1800s Bills 537
Orginalterm Fourteen years.
Renewal term. Fourteen years (if author living).
Reversion / Power of Renewal Authors; then to heirs, assigns. And, any contract for sale
of renewal term would be void.
Formalities required: Re-recordingof title in clerk's office of author's local Federal
district court within six months before expiration of first term, and, within two
months following renewal, publication of record in one or more newspapers for
four weeks.
Language: "[I]f, at the expiration of the said term of fourteen years, the author or
authors, or any of them ... be living . . . the same exclusive right shall be continued
to him or them, his or their heirs and assigns, for the further term of fourteen years
... And provided, That any contract for the sale of the copyright for the second
term of fourteen years, or any part of the same made or entered into before the
expiration of the first, shall be utterly void."

Act of 1831538
Originalterm. Twenty-eight years.
Renewal term. Fourteen years.
Reversion / Power of RenewaL Authors; if deceased, then surviving spouse and children.
Formalities required: Re-recording of title in clerk's office of author's local Federal
district court within six months before expiration of first term, and, within two
months following renewal, publication of record in one or more newspapers for
four weeks.

536. Id. § 1; see also Paige v. Banks, 18 F. Cas. 1001 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870), af'd, 80 U.S.
609 (1872) (publication rights, during both terms, deemed assigned); White-Smith Music
Pub. Co. v. Goff, 187 Fed. 247, 249-50 (1st Cir. 1911) (interpreting second term as
continuation of original rights).
537. No number, 7th Cong. (as reported to Committee of the Whole Jan. 19, 1803);
H.R. 75, 10th Cong. (as reported to Committee of the Whole Mar. 7, 1808); H.R. 38, 11th
Cong. (as reported to Committee of the Whole Jan. 19, 1811).
538. An Act to Amend the Several Acts Respecting Copy Rights (Feb. 3, 1831), 4 Stat.
436.
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Language. "[I]f, at the expiration of the aforesaid term of years, such author ... be
still living, and a citizen ... of the United States ... or being dead, shall have left a

widow, or child, or children, either or all then living, the same exclusive right shall
be continued to such author ... or, if dead, then to such widow and child, or
children, for the further term of fourteen years ....

1838 Bill 54 0
Orginalterm. Twenty-eight years.
Renewal term- Fourteen years.
Reversion / Power of RenewaA Author; if deceased then heirs.
Formalitiesrequired: Within six months before expiration of first term and, within two
months following renewal, publication of record in one or more newspapers for
four weeks.
Language: "[I]n all cases where any copy-right may have been obtained and term shall
have expired, or may hereafter expire, when the author, if living, would have been or
would be entitled to a renewal thereof, the same privilege of renewal shall be, and
the same is hereby, extended to the heirs of such author."

1844 BB 54 1
Onginalterm The longer of: life of author plus seven years, or forty-two years from
publication.
Renewal term. Not applicable.
Reversion / Power of Renewal: Not applicable.
Formalitiesrequired: Not applicable.
Language: "[C]opyright ... Shall endure for the natural life of such author, and for
the further term of seven years, commencing at the time of his death, and shall be
the property of such atuhor and his assigns: Provided, always, That if the said term
of seven years shall expire before the end of forty-two years from the first
publication of such book, the copyright shall, in that case, endure for such period of
forty-two years . . . ."542

539. Id. § 2; see also Pierpoint v. Fowle, 19 F. Cas. 652, 660 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) ("new
.interest"); White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Goff, 187 Fed. 247 (1st Cir. 1911) (confirmed

status as
540.
541.
542.

reversion and new grant).
H.R. 885, 25th Cong. (1838).
H.R. 9,28th Cong. (1844).
Modeled after English Statute, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45 (1842).
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Solberg Proposal (in Kittredge-Currier Bill) 1906543
Original term New works: three-tiered single term based on nature of work.
Subsisting works: existing law.
Renewal term- Subsisting works: For period making total copyright period that
granted by proposed act.
Reversion / Power of Renewal. Author; if deceased then surviving spouse, children. But,
if assigned or licensed, only with assignee or licensee on application for renewal.
Formaliies required: Renewal of copyright registration within one year before
expiration of first term.
Language. "[he copyright subsisting in any work at the time when this act goes into
effect may ... Be further renewed and extended by the author ... or if he be dead,
leaving a widow, by his widow ... Or if now widow survive him, by his children ...
provided further, that should such subsisting copyright have been assigned, or a
license granted therein for publication upon payment of royalty, the copyright shall
be renewed and extended only in case the assignee of licensee shall join in the
application for such renewal and extension."

Smoot-Currier Bill 1907544
Orginalterm: Life of author plus thirty years.
Renewal term Not applicable.
Reversion / Power of Renewal Not applicable.
Formalities required: Full term obtained only if claim recorded within twenty-eight
years from publication, and author's death recorded by executors, administrators, or
assigns.
Language: "[Wlithin the next year preceding the expiration of twenty-eight years from
the first publication of such work the copyright proprietor shall record in the
Copyright Office a notice that he desires the full term ... And provided further,
That where the term is to extend beyond the lifetime of the author it shall be the
duty of his executors, administrators, or assigns to further record in the Copyright
Office the date of his death."

Monroe Smith Proposal 1907 (in Kittredge-Barchfield Bill)545
Onginal ter New works: Forty-two years from publication or life of author plus
thirty years, whichever longer. Subsisting works: Existing law.
543. S. 6330, 59th Cong. § 18 (1906); see supra note 383.
544. S. 2499, 60th Cong. (1907); H.R. 243, 60th Cong. (1907).
545. S.2900, 60th Cong. (1907); H.R. 11794, 60th Cong. (1908).
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Renewal term- New works: not applicable. Subsisting works: For period making total
copyright period that granted by proposed act.
Reversion / Power of Renewal: Author; if deceased then: surviving spouse, children; if
deceased then: heirs, executors, administrators BUT . . . if no royalty agreement, or

author refused to continue royalty agreement: assignee/licensee entitled to be on
application.
Formaliies required: New works: Full term only obtained if claim recorded within
twenty-eight years from publication, and author's death recorded by executors,
administrators, or assigns. Subsisting works: Renewal of copyright registration
within one year before expiration of first term.
Language: "[I]f such subsisting copyright shall have been assigned or a license
granted therein for publication, and if such assignment or license shall contain
provision for payment of royalty ... Said original assignee or licensee or his
successor shall nevertheless be entitled to continue to publish the work on payment
of the royalty stipulated in the original agreement; but if such original assignment or
license contain no provision for the payment of royalty, the copyright shall be
renewed and extended only in case the original assignee or licensee or his successor
shall join in the application for such renewal and extension."

Act of 1909: For New Workss46
Onginalterm. Twenty-eight years.
Renewal term. Twenty-eight years.
Reversion / Powerof Renewal Authors; if deceased then surviving spouse and children;
if deceased then: executors, or next of kin except proprietors (for composite works,
periodicals, encyclopedias, works copyrighted by corporate body, or works for hire).
Formaliies required: Renewal of copyright registration within one year before
expiration of first term.
Language- "[T]he author of such work, if still living, or the widow, widower, or
children of the author, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow,
widowers or children be not living, then the author's executors, or in the absence of
a will, his next of kin shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in
such work for a firther term of twenty-eight years[,]" except "[trhatin the case of
any posthumous work or of any periodical, cyclopaedic, or other composite work
upon which the copyright was originally secured by the proprietor thereof, or of any
work copyright by a corporate body ... or by an employer for whom such work is

546. Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, ch. CCCXX, 5 24.
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made for hire, the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and
extension." 547

Act of 1909: For Subsisting Works548
Onginalterm. Existing law.
Renewal term For period making total copyright period that granted by Act (i.e. fiftysix years).
Reversion / Power of Renewal Authors, if deceased then surviving spouse, children; if
deceased then executors, or next of kin, except proprietors (for composite works).
Formalities required: Renewal of copyright registration within one year before
expiration of first term.
Language- "[The author of such work, if still living, or the widow, widower, or
children of the author, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow,
widowers or children be not living, then the author's executors, or in the absence of
a will, his next of kin shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in
such work for a further period such that the entire term shall be equal to that
secured by this Act, including the renewal period: Provided, however, That if the
work be a composite work upon which copyright was originally secured by the
proprietor thereof, then such proprietor shall be entitled to the privilege of renewal
and extension granted under this section." 549

Act of 1976: For Contracts executed after 1977 (whether in new or
subsisting works).so
Onginalterm Life of author plus fifty years.
Renewal term. Not applicable.
Reversion / Power of Renewal Termination of grant available for five years beginning
thirty-five years after execution; or beginning forty years after execution if grant
included right of publication, with minimum two years and maximum ten years

547. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Goff, 187 Fed. 247 (1st Cir. 1911) (confirming
status as reversion and new grant); Fred Fisher Music Corp. v. Knowles, 318 U.S. 643 (1943)
(confirming ability to assign future interest in renewal copyright); Miller Music Corp. v.
Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960) (holding that deceased author's assignment of
expectancy in renewed term does not bind statutory heirs); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207
(1990) (holding that renewal terminates right to exploit derivative works).
548. Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, ch. CCCXX, § 23.
549. See sources listed supra note 547.
550. 1976 Act, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976), § 203.
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notices to grantee; grantees of derivative works rights retain throughout renewal
term rights in already-created derivative works.551
Formalitiesrequired: Notice to grantees & recordation of notice in Copyright Office.
Language- "Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period of
five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the
grant; or, if the grant covers the right of publication of the work, the period begins
at the end of thirty-five years from the date of publication of the work under the
grant or at the end of forty years from the date of execution of the grant, whichever
term ends earlier.... Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any
future grant." 552

Act of 1976: For Subsisting Works553
Originalterm Copyrights in first term on Jan 1, 1978: twenty-eight years from date of
copyright.
Renewal term- Copyrights in first term on Jan 1, 1978: 47 years. Copyrights in renewal
term on Jan 1, 1978: total of seventy-five years from date of copyright.
Reversion / Power of RenewaA Copyrights at end of first term: Termination of grants as
per 1909 Act. Copyrights in second term: Termination of grant available for five
years beginning fifty-six years from date of copyright or Jan 1, 1978, whichever is
later, with minimum two years and maximum ten years notices to grantee; grantees
of derivative works rights retain throughout renewal term rights in already-created
derivative works.
Formalities required: Renewal: Renewal of copyright registration within one year
before expiration of first term. Termination: Notice to grantees & recordation of
notice in Copyright Office.
Language- "Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period of
five years beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the date copyright was
originally secured, or beginning on January 1, 1978, whichever is later ...
Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the
contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant." 554

551. First terminations to take effect starting 2013 (for grants made starting in 1978).
552. Id. ( 203(a)(3), (5).
553. Id. 5 304.
554. Id. ( 304(c)(3), (5). Notice of termination: Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,
683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that licensee retained continued rights to exploit works
not mentioned in notice of termination); Siegel v. Warner Bros. Ent., Inc., 542 F.Supp.2d
1098 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that notice of termination did not reach first appearance of
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1992 Automatic Renewal Amendment55 5
Ornginalterm. Not applicable.

Renewal term- Same as extended renewal term for 1976 Act.
Reversion / Power of RenewaL If renewal effected during last year of first term, rights
revert to author (or, proprietor in case of posthumous, cyclopedic, composite, or
corporate-owned works); if renewal "automatic," grantees of derivative works rights
retain throughout renewal term rights in already-created derivative works.
Formaliiesrequired: If renewal by author or statutory heirs, must be applied for within
one year before expiration of first term; if no renewal application, renewal
automatic.
Language: Sec. 304(a)(2)(B) "At the expiration of the original term of copyright in a
work specified in paragraph (1)(C) of this subsection, the copyright shall endure for
a renewed and extended further term of 67 years, which(i) if an application to register a claim to such further term has been
made to the Copyright Office within 1 year before the expiration of
the original term of copyright, and the claim is registered, shall vest,
upon the beginning of such further term, in any person who is
entitled under paragraph (1)(C) to the renewal and extension of the
copyright at the time the application is made; or
(ii) if no such application is made or the claim pursuant to such
application is not registered, shall vest, upon the beginning of such
further term, in any person entitled under paragraph (1)(C), as of

Superman character, but did cover later iterations establishing essential story line and some
visual aspects).
Scope of derivative works exception: Mills Music v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985) (holding that
royalties from continued exploitation of derivative work should be paid to terminated
publisher rather than to terminating author (heirs)); Woods v. Bourne, 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir.
1995) (discussing the characterization of derivative works qualifying for exception); Fred
Ahlert Music Corp. v. Wamer-Chappell Music, 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that new
uses of pre-termination derivative works don't qualify for exception).
'Any agreement to the contrary": Marvel Characters v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002)
(holding that retroactively deeming work a "work for hire" constitutes impermissible
agreement contrary to termination right); Milne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that revocation of grant and negotiation of new grant, in lieu of
exercising termination right, not impermissible agreement contrary to termination right);
Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn, 532 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (interpreting agreement not to
have revoked earlier grant, thereby preserving termination right over grant); Penguin Group
(USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that revocation of grant and
negotiation of new grant, before termination right could have been exercised, not
impermissible agreement contrary to termination right).
555. Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, 106 Stat. 264, as amended by the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (October 27, 1998), 112 Stat. 2827, 2828 [hereinafter
CTEA].
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the last day of the original term of copyright, to the renewal and
extension of the copyright."
Sec. 304(a)(4)(A) "If an application to register a claim to the
renewed and extended term of copyright in a work is not made
within 1 year before the expiration of the original term of copyright
in a work, or if the claim pursuant to such application is not
registered, then a derivative work prepared under authority of a
grant of a transfer or license of the copyright that is made before
the expiration of the original term of copyright may continue to be
used under the terms of the grant during the renewed and extended
term of copyright without infringing the copyright, except that
such use does not extend to the preparation during such renewed
and extended term of other derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work covered by such grant.
556
1998 Copyright Term Extension Act: For Subsisting Works

Originalterm: No change: Copyrights in first term on Jan 1, 1978: twenty-eight years
from date of copyright.
Renewal term. Copyrights in first term on Jan 1, 1978: sixty-seven years. Copyrights in
renewal term on Jan 1, 1978: total of ninety-five years from publication.
Reversion / Power of RenewaA If author or statutory heir failed to terminate grants fiftysix years from original copyright date, author or statutory heir may terminate grant
during a period of five years beginning seventy-five years from date of copyright,
with minimum two years and maximum ten years notices to grantee; grantees of
derivative works rights retain throughout extended renewal term rights in alreadycreated derivative works.
Formalities required: Renewal: See 1992 Automatic Renewal Amendment, supra.
Termination: Notice to grantees & recordation of notice in Copyright Office.
Ianguage-"In the case of any copyright other than a work made for hire, subsisting
in its renewal term on the effective date of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act for which the termination right provided in subsection (c) has
expired by such date, where the author or owner of the termination right has not
previously exercised such termination right ... Termination of the grant may be
effected at any time during a period of five years beginning at the end of seventy557
five years from the date copyright was originally secured."

556. CTEA, 112 Stat. 2829.
557. Id. § 304(d).
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